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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article aims at providing insight to the European Community's
(EC) position within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)' and the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 We will see that the
1. Although the GATT, signed in 1947, was not formed at the Bretton Woods Conference
that took place in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (U.S.), in 1944, the participants at the
conference contemplated the necessity of an international trade organization. The GATI', which
set out a plan for economic recovery after World War II, by encouraging reduction in tariffs and
other international trade barriers, is therefore one of the three mechanisms for global economic
governance that comprise the Bretton Woods System, the other two being the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The GAIT was a collection of rules applied temporarily,
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EC's specific problems and challenges for the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) are partly related to the EC's sui generis position in the WTO. In
this sense, the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro with regard to
Hermes International v FHT Marketing Choice is helpful for
understanding the unitary character of the EC's external trade relations:
"The Community legal system is characterized by the simultaneous
application of provisions of various origins, international, Community and
national; but it nevertheless seeks to function and to represent itself to the
outside world as a unified system."3 We shall see more specifically the
problem that the EC faces in its external trade relations by analyzing the
so-called "duty of close cooperation" and unity in the Communities'
external relations. We will also deal with the difficult and old issue of

without an institutional basis, unlike the World Trade Organization (WTO),which is a permanent
organization with a permanent framework and its own Secretariat. For almost fifty years, the GAT
focused exclusively on trade in goods, leaving tariffs and quotas aside in the various rounds of
negotiations of the world trading system. The GAIT set the terms for countries who wanted to
trade with each other. The GAIT signatories were called "contracting parties." The Uruguay
Round, completed in 1994, replaced the GATT with the WTO, a global trade agency with binding
enforcements of comprehensive rules expanding beyond trade. The GATT has now become one
of the eighteen agreements enforced by the WTO.
2. The WTO is a global trade agency that was established through the GAIT Uruguay
Round Agreement signed in 1994. The WTO provides dispute resolution, administration, and
continuing negotiations for the seventeen substantive agreements that it enforces. The WTO and
its underlying agreements set a system of comprehensive governance that goes far beyond trade
rules. It is argued by some commentators (Lori Wallach being one of the most relevant activists in
the public domain) that the WTO system, rules, and procedures are undemocratic and nontransparent. The WTO's substantive rules systematically prioritize trade over all other goals and
values. Each WTO member is required to ensure "the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures" to the WTO's substantive rules. Marrahesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, art. XVI:4, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. National policies and laws found to violate WTO rules must be
eliminated or changed; otherwise, the violating country faces trade sanctions. The economic, social,
and environmental upheaval being suffered by many countries that have lived under the WTO
regime since 1995 means that business-as-usual at the WTO is over. It remains to be seen whether
the handful of powerful WTO members who have dictated WTO policy since 1995 will adapt to
the new reality. By the same token, it is also unclear whether countries demanding changes to the
WTO's current system of rules that are damaging their national interests may begin to withdraw
if those changes do not take place. Regarding withdrawal from the WTO Agreement, although
Article XV(1) is clear and reads that "Any Member may withdraw from this Agreement. Such
withdrawal shall apply both to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall
take effect upon the expiration of six months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal
is received by the Director-General of the WTO," the withdrawal from certain rules or agreements
is not entirely clear. Id.art. XV(1).
3. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Case C-53/96, Hermes Int'l v. FHT Mktg. Choice
BV,1998 E.C.R. 1-3603, 21.
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allocation of competences between the EC and its Member States in EC
trade policy.
As a result of the allocation of competences, mixed agreements shall
be analyzed in the latter part of this Article. In this sense, we shall first
explain what is meant by a mixed agreement and will see what Dominic
McGoldrick has said in this respect.' It will be shown that the EC appears
"to be a unique creation from the perspective of international law." 5 A
brief note on the importance of attempting to reach a proper conception of
the mixed procedure shall be made. We shall see the various types of
mixed agreements6 that exist in the field of the external relations of the
EC. We shall then look into the conclusion and effects of the EC's
international agreements vis-A-vis third parties. Attention shall be paid to
the fact that problems raised by mixed agreements do not exist within the
context of exclusive EC competence. Some of these problems have to do
with the functioning of the EC.7 We shall see how the Member States have
delegated their authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the
supranational level.'
We shall also see that within the EC treaty-making, there is a tendency
to sign mixed agreements rather than agreements of EC exclusive
competence in areas dealing with the external relations of the European
Union (EU). This shows their importance for the EC and for its position
in the world.9 Although the EC increasingly wants to become an
international actor and somehow assert its international personality and
identity, it also has to accept that Member States and third parties have

4. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(1997).
5. Id. at 1.
6. For types of mixed agreements, see Allan Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 125, 128-33 (Martti Koskenniemi ed.,
1998) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS]; see also Henry G. Schermers, A Typology of
Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS 23 (David O'Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds.,
1983).
7. See Sophie Meunier, What Single Voice? European Institutions and EC-U.S. Trade
Negotiations,54 INT'L ORG. 103 (2000).
8. Supranational means "at a level above national govemments"-as opposed to
"intergovernmental," which means "between or among governments." Many EU decisions are
taken at the supranational level in the sense that they involve the EU institutions, to which EU
Member States have delegated some decision-making powers.
9. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, MixedAgreements: A List ofProblems,in MIXED AGREEMENTS,
supra note 6, at 3, 3.
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legitimate interests.' ° EC Treaty practice" has become increasingly
dominated by mixed agreements 2 for they reflect the legal and political
reality that the EC is not a single State for the purposes of international
law.' 3 We shall see how the EC's membership and participation in

10. The relationship between the EC and Third States is a unique experience in international
law and international relations.
11. Treaties are usually composed of articles, protocols, and declarations. As an example we
have the Treaty of Amsterdam, composed of 15 articles, 13 protocols and 58 declarations. In the
case of the EU, there are currently founding treaties, amending treaties, accession treaties, and
budgetary treaties. There is also an EU Constitutional Treaty, which seeks to consolidate, simplify,
and replace the existing set of overlapping treaties. It was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 and
is due to come into force in the near future, conditional on its ratification by all EU Member States.
In the meantime, or if the EU Constitutional Treaty fails to be ratified by all EU Member States,
the EU will continue to work on the basis of the current treaties. As for the founding treaties, there
are four of them: 1) the Treaty of Paris (1952), establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), which expired in July 2002; 2) the Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom); 3) the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC) (these last two treaties are known as the Treaties of Rome (1958); however, when the term
"Treaty of Rome" or the acronym TEC is used, it is to mean only the EEC Treaty); and 4) the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1993) (this Treaty changed the name of the EEC to simply "the
European Community," and introduced new intergovernmental structures to deal with the aspects
of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), as well as police and judicial cooperation). The
structure formed by these so-called three pillars (Community pillar; foreign and security policy;
police and judicial cooperation) is the EU, whose scope then became more overtly political as well
as economic. With respect to the amending treaties, there are also four of them, which are: 1) the
Merger Treaty (1967), which provided for a Single Commission and a Single Council of the then
three European Communities; 2) the Single European Act (1987), which provided for the adoptions
required for the achievement of the Internal Market; 3) the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997),
whose purpose was, inter alia, to simplify decision making in addition to further integrating the
CFSP concept (it also amended and renumbered the EU and EC Treaties); and 4) the Treaty ofNice
(signed in 2001), where qualified majority voting was again extended to more areas, abolishing the
national right to veto in some policy areas. A concept of "enhanced co-operation" was introduced
for countries-there must be at least eight of them-wishing to forge closer links in areas where
other EU Member States disagreed or were unable or unwilling to join in at this stage. The
outsiders must, however, be free to join in later if they wish. The accession treaties came into being
for every enlargement of the EU. As for budgetary treaties, there have been two: 1) the Budgetary
Treaty of 1970, which gave the European Parliament the last word on what is known as "noncompulsory expenditure"; and 2) the Budgetary Treaty of 1975, which gave the European
Parliament the power to reject the budget as a whole, and created the European Court of Auditors.
12. See McGoLDRicK, supra note 4, ch. 5.
13. This is also the case for the EU, where "it is difficult to see anything short of major war
provoking a transition to statehood." Christopher Hill, The Capability-ExpectationsGap, or
ConceptualisingEurope's InternationalRole, 31 J.COMMON MKT. STUD. 305, 325 (1993).
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variable for an organization, which
international organizations 4 is highly
5
pretends to act as a single actor.'
This Article does not deal with treaties that are entered into by the
Member States alone (if that were the case, they would not be mixed
agreements stricto sensu), but treaties which in substance cover matters of
exclusive EC competence. If it is not possible to have Community
adherence to such treaties (because the treaty is only open to States), the
EC competence may be exercised "through the medium of the Member
States acting jointly in the Community's interest."' 6 Nor does this Article
deal with treaties concluded in the framework of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), where the EU technically lacks legal personality. 7
However, the situation with respect to the EU legal personality has
fundamentally changed since the enforcement of the Treaty of
Amsterdam,' 8 although Article 24 of the TEU refers to the conclusion of
CFSP agreements by the Council.' 9 The final subtitle will be devoted to
14. For the participation of the EC in International Organizations, see RACHEL FRID, THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; LEGAL THEORY AND

PRACTICE (1995).

15. See generally McGOLDRiCK, supra note 4, chs. 2 & 10.
16. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 5. See also McGOLDRICK,
supra note 4, at 82-83.
17. M.R. Eaton, Common Foreignand SecurityPolicy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT
TREATY 215, 224 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES OF
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY].

18. Allan Rosas, The European Union andMixedAgreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 200, 203 (Alan Dashwood & Christophe Hillion eds., 2000) [hereinafter
THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS].

19. Treaty on European Union, art. 24, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253
[hereinafter TEU]. Article 24 TEU reads:
When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or
1.
international organisations in implementation of this title, the Council may
authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open
negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on
a recommendation from the Presidency.
The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for
2.
which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal decisions.
When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or
3.
common position, the Council shall act by a qualified majority in accordance with
Article 23(2).
The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title
4.
VI. When the agreement covers an issue for which a qualified majority is required
for the adoption of internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a
qualified majority in accordance with Article 34(3).
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concluding remarks on the issue of mixity in the EC external relations.
This unique legal and political situation, in which the EC and its
Member States participate, raises a number of research questions: is there
more legal coherence by having exclusive EC competence 21 on all issues
of EC trade policy? Does Article 133 EC after the Nice Treaty suffice to
reach the aim of the EC's common commercial policy? Is Article 133 EC
an adequate legal instrument for the purposes of the EC's common
commercial policy? If the EC acts together externally, might it help to join
internally within the EU? Would deeper integration of the internal market
(for, say, services) strengthen the negotiating position of the EC in the
international trade arena? How does the political context shape this legal
issue? How does it impact the thinking about the legal solution, taking into
account the fact that the EU is legally federal (i.e., it possesses a federal
legal structure), but politically intergovernmental (i.e., it is an
intergovernmental political structure)? What political consequences will
the legal outcomes have? In Amato's view, no member of the EU is
powerful enough to be taken seriously on its own in the international
arena. Thus, in order to play an effective role in the world, Europe must
join together. In this sense, coordinating its foreign trade policies and
streamlining the process was one of Amato's major ambitions during the
Convention on the future of Europe.2 '

No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in
5.
the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own
constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the
agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally.
Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be
6.
binding on the institutions of the Union.
Id. See generally Esa Paasivirta, The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal
Person?,2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37 (1997).
20. On the issue of coherence and external competences, see generally Pascal Gauttier,
Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union, 10 EUR. L.J. 23
(2004).
21. Interview by Renee Haferkamp and Professors J.H.H. Weiler and Martin Schain, With
Giuliano Amato, former Prime Minister fo Italy and Vice President of the Convention on the Future
of Europe, at NYU School of Law, NY (Mar. 26, 2002), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/
seminar/02/Amato_script.rtf.
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ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS

With two remaining Communities22 (currently there are only two
Communities23 since the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
Treaty expired on July 23, 2002),24 one Union, and three different pillars
of competences and decision-making, it is no wonder that third parties are
often puzzled.25 In order to avoid this chaos, it was proposed at the
Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 1996-97 to create a
single legal entity, the EU, just like the United Nations or the WTO. This
proposal was perceived as a possible transfer of sovereignty in the field of
CFSP.26 Unfortunately, this discussion focused on the question of the

22. In the 1950s, six European countries decided to pool their economic resources and set up
a system of joint decisionmaking on economic issues. To do so, they formed three
organizations-the ECSC, the EEC, and the Euratom. "European Communities" was the name
given collectively to these three organizations when in 1967 they first merged under a single
institutional framework with the Merger Treaty. They formed the basis of what is today the EU.
The EEC soon became the most important ofthese three communities, and was eventually renamed
simply the "European Community" by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which at the same time
effectively made the EC the first of three pillars of the EU, called the "Community (or
Communities) pillar." Subsequent treaties added further areas of competence that extended beyond
the purely economic areas. The other two communities remained extremely limited; for that reason,
often little distinction is made between the European Community and the European Communities
as a whole. Furthermore, in 2002 the ECSC ceased to exist with the expiration of the Treaty of
Paris which established it. Seen as redundant, no effort was made to retain it. Rather, its assets and
liabilities were transferred to the EC, and coal and steel became subject to the EC Treaty.
23. In fact, the two remaining Communities work as one entity which functions in the
framework of two treaties, even if they are legally different. In this sense, legally binding
agreements concluded by the EC are still signed on behalf of one or both of the existing
Communities. To clarify it must be said that the EC, and not the EU, is a member of the WTO or
regional fisheries organizations-to give just two examples. See generallyJm Sack, The European
Community's MembershipofInternationalOrganizations,32 COMMONMKT. L. REV. 1227 (1995).
24. See the decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the EU Member States,
meeting within the Council, on February 27, 2002 on the financial consequences of the expiry of
the ECSC Treaty and on the research fund for coal and steel. 2002 O.J. (L 79) 234.
25. For a comprehensive study on the ramifications of the expiration of the ECSC, see
generally Benedetta Ubertazzi, The EndoftheECSC,8 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2004),
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020a.htm, and Nico Groenendijk & Gert-Jan Hospers, A Requiem
fortheEuropeanCoal andSteel Community (1952-2002), 150 DE ECONOMIST 601 (2002). See also
Pinot Meunier, La Communaut europdenne du charbonet de l 'acierest morte, vive lafid~ration
europgenne, 451 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN ET DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE 509 (2001); Walter
Obwexer, Das Ende der Europdischen Gemeinschaftfiir Kohle und Stahl, in EUROPAISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT 517 (2002); Maria Cervera Vallterra, La disoluci6n de la
ComunidadEuropeadel carb6ny del acero: estado actual, 12 Revista de Derecho Comunitario
Europeo 393 (2002).
26. See generally Maria-Gisella Garbagnati Ketvel, The Jurisdictionof the European Court
of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreignand Security Policy, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 77
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exercise of competence, and the idea of the EU as a single actor (legal
person) does not prejudge the powers of the EU in, say, the CFSP.
At Maastricht, it was not possible for Member States to accomplish a
CFSP in the framework of the traditional mechanisms of Community
institutions and Community law.27 The second pillar28 of the EU does not
presently provide for a real supranational decision-making by majority
voting. It utilizes unanimity as a decision-making system with the
possibility of common positions 29 and joint actions."

(2006); see also Daniel Thym, Beyond Parliament'sReach? The Role of the EuropeanParliament
in the CFSP, 11 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 109 (2006).
27. These mechanisms are known in the Community institutions as those of the first pillar.
28. The so-called "second pillar" refers to the CFSP in the EU.
29. TEU art. 12. Article 12 TEU reads: "The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in
Article 11 by: defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security
policy, deciding on common strategies, adopting joint actions, adopting common positions,
strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy." Id. The
common position in the context of the CFSP is designed to make cooperation more systematic and
improve its coordination. The EU Member States are required to comply with and uphold such
positions which have been adopted unanimously at the Council. For reasons of simplification, the
EU Constitutional Treaty, which is in the process of being ratified, restricts CFSP instruments to
European decisions and international agreements. Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into
force, common positions and their implementation will be based on European decisions (nonlegislative instruments) adopted by the Council of Ministers.
30. TEU art. 13. Article 13 TEU reads:
The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines
1.
for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence
implications.
2.
The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be
implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important
interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be
made available by the Union and the Member States.
The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and
3.
implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general
guidelines defined by the European Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and
shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common
positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the
Union. Id. Joint action, which is a legal instrument under title V of the TEU (or
the CFSP), means coordinated action by the EU Member States whereby all kinds
of resources (human resources, know-how, financing, and equipment) are
mobilized in order to attain specific objectives set by the Council, on the basis of
general guidelines from the European Council. For reasons of simplification, the
EU Constitutional Treaty, which is in the process of being ratified, restricts CFSP
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It is the Treaty of Amsterdam that attempts to strengthen these
mechanisms without implying major changes in this respect.3 ' One major
change is that the Council of the EU may adopt joint actions or common
positions by qualified majority if they are based on a common strategy
decided upon by the European Council.32 However, in adopting a common
strategy, the European Council3 3 must be unanimous, which diminishes the
practical importance of this innovation. In addition, any Member State can
declare that for "important and stated reasons of national policy" it will
"oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority," in
which case such decision shall not be taken.34
Another important result from Amsterdam is the Secretary-General of
the Council will assist the Presidency of the Council in matters dealing
with the CFSP.35 It is still unknown whether the High Representative for
the CFSP will bring more coherence to the EU. One wonders how much
coherence can be found in a system in which the Presidency will continue
to assert its own role, the High Representative wishes to play an important
role, and the Commission continues to be the representative of the EC in
the first pillar,36 as well as fully associated with the second pillar and
therefore, has its own voice.
The Amsterdam Treaty also implies that parts of the third pillar37 have
been transferred to the first pillar.38 This means that Community
competence and supranational Community law are growing. The matters
instruments to European decisions and international agreements. Once the EU
Constitutional Treaty enters into force, joint actions and the implementation of
such action will therefore be based on European decisions (non-legislative
instruments) adopted by the Council of Ministers.
31. See J6rg Monar, The European Union's Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of
Amsterdam: A "Strengthened CapacityforExternal Action"?, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 413-36
(1997). The author concludes that, for the EU's foreign affairs system, the Treaty of Amsterdam
"brings only fragments of a reform." Id. at 434.
32. TEU art. 23(2); Allan Rosas, The External Relations of the European Union: Problems
and Challenges 62 (Paper prepared for The Forum for US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, 1998).
33. The European Council is not to be confused with the Council of the EU. The European
Council consists of the heads of state and government of the 27 EU Member States.
34. TEU art. 23(2).
35. TEU art. 18(3). Article 18.3 reads: "The Presidency shall be assisted by the SecretaryGeneral of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the [CFSP]." Id.
See EUROPEAN UNION, SELECTED INSTRUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE TREATIES (1999), at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/treaties-en.pdf.
36. This is the so-called Community pillar.
37. The so-called "third pillar" refers to matters of police and judicial cooperation in the EU.
38. The first pillar contains title IV on "Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies
Related to Free Movement of Persons."
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transferred from the third to the first pillar cover the entry of third-country
nationals (visas, asylum, and immigration policy). This shows that
although the transfer of the second pillar to the first may still seem remote,
a gradual merger in one form or another of the two pillars seems inevitable
for the construction of Europe.
Instead of being faced with two "international organizations" (the
remaining two Communities) and the EU as an umbrella concept for these
organizations, as well as the second and third pillars, Third States are now
facing two organizations (the Communities) and a third legal (?) person
(the EU), which appears as a different entity from the Communities. This
situation hardly corresponds to the basic institutional principles of the
TEU, such as Article 1 TEU 9 or Article 3 TEU.4 ° From this, we can
deduce that there is a need for clarification and for more coherence to the
institutional image of the EU in the outside world.4

39. TEU art. 1. Article 1 TEU predicates that "The Union shall be founded on the European
Communities." Id.
40. TEU art. 3. "The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities
as a whole." Id.
41. There is a vast body of literature on this matter. See generally Manuel Rama-Montaldo,
InternationalLegal PersonalityandImpliedPowersofinternationalOrganizations,44 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 111 (1970); JAMES J. ALLEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT (1960);
EUROPE AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE (Leonce Bekemans & Loukas Tsoukalis eds.,

1993); Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO andAdvisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach
Procession,32 COMMONMKT. L. REV. 763 (1995); Alan Dashwood, ExternalRelations Provisions
oftheAmsterdam Treaty, 35 COMMONMKT. L. REv. 1019 (1998); Hermann DaFonseca-Wollheim

& Horst Krenzler, Die Reichweite der gemainsamen Handelspolitik nach dem Vertrag von
Amsterdam-eine Debatte ohne Ende, 33 EUROPARECHT 223 (1998); PAUL DEMARET, RELATIONS
EXTtRIEURES DE LA COMMUNAUTt EUROPtENNE ET MARCHE INTtRIEUR: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES ET
FONCTIONNELS (1986); KLAUS HEIDENSOHN, EUROPE AND WORLD TRADE (1995); STANLEY HENIG,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY; ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
(1971); RAM6N TORRENT, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES EXTERIEURES DANS
L'UNION EUROPtENNE (1998); Pierre Pescatore, Opinion 1/94 on "Conclusion" of the WTO
Agreement: Is Therean EscapefromaProgrammedDisaster?,
36 MKT. L. REv. 387 (1999); Ernst-

Ulrich Petersmann, Application of GA T by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities, 20
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 397 (1983); Jean-Claude Piris, La Capacitd de l'Union Europ6enne de
s'engager et d'agir en Matiere de Relations Economiques Exterieures: l'example de I'OMC,

Florence, Academy of European Law, Conference given by Jean-Claude Piris, Jurisconsult of the
Council of the European Union, on the 15th July 1998; EDWARD L.M. V6LKER, BARRIERS TO
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL COMMUNITY TRADE (1993); PROTECTIONISM AND TE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (Edward L.M. V61ker ed., 1987); STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, TRADING PARTNERS OR
TRADING BLOWS?: MARKET ACCESS ISSUES IN EC-U.S. RELATIONS (1992).
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A. On ForeignPolicy
Under international law, international organizations can have
international personality, that is, rights and duties under the public
international system of law.42 In this respect, the major international law
precedent on the international personality of public international law
institutions is the Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
UnitedNations Case.43 Since the EC is an "international organization," it
can be given explicit legal personality by the treaty that created it.
Concerning Third States, what counts is the international practice of the
organization and the links that such an organization creates with these
Third States.' This practice and its links will, or will not, create the
organization's international legal personality.
In September 1948, Count Bernadotte, the ChiefU.N. Truce Negotiator
in Jerusalem, was killed by a gang of private terrorists. 45 The U.N. General
Assembly asked for an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice to bring an international claim concerning injuries suffered by its
employees in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State.4 6
Although the U.N. Charter does not expressly confer legal personality on
the U.N. Organization, the Court examined the Charter as a whole and
concluded that the United Nations was an international entity holding
international rights and obligations, and capable of maintaining its rights
by bringing international claims.4 ' The Court pronounced itself as follows:
Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
Organization is an international person. That is not the same thing
as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a
State ....

Whereas a State possesses the totality of international

rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and
duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its

42. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS &NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW:
UNITY wrrni DIVERSITY 976-82 (4th rev. 2003); NIGEL D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS (1996).
43. MCGOLDRICK, supranote 4, at 26.
44. SeegenerallyOPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATioNALLAw 117-329 (Robert Y. Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
45. MCGOLDRICK, supranote 4, at 27.
46. Id.
47. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11); see also MCGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 27.
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purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent
documents and developed in practice.48
So the question is: what, then, is the EU? For the time being, it is just
the institutional and political framework in which all the EC's, and certain
Member States', competences are exercised. In the near future, once the
EU Constitutional Treaty is implemented-or a similar legal document, if
the Constitutional Treaty never sees the light of day-the Union will be
more than just a simple framework and, therefore, will become an actor
with its own legal personality and competences. Let me try to explain this
argument by giving the example of former Yugoslavia.
First, if we think of sending military forces, then we are dealing with
the 27 Member States of the Union, acting outside the institutional system
of the Union. However, one should not exclude the possibility that sending
troops to former Yugoslavia may have a link with the CFSP. The
borderline between Member States acting on their own, outside the
institutional framework of the Union, and Member States acting within the
political and institutional framework of the Union is not very clear.
Secondly, if we refer to the "European Administration" of the town of
Mostar, then we are dealing with Member States' competences in the
framework of the EU. Thirdly, if we look at the commercial regime
applicable to the republics of former Yugoslavia, then we are dealing with
the EC's competences.
These examples should illustrate the danger of an indiscriminate use of
the expression "the European Union does ..... Such an expression does
not let us know who really does what: what does the EC, as such, do?
What do the 27 Member States together do in the framework of the Union?
What do Member States and the Community together do? Obviously, it
would be even worse to use the expression "European Union" when
making reference to the Member States outside the EU's institutional
framework. Again, knowing the precise answer to these questions is vital,
since the nature, as well as the legal and political consequences of this
action, is completely different, depending on who acts.49 To defend this
argument, allow me to suggest two examples:
Example 1: The European Union reacts to the Helms-Burton ° and
d'Amato Acts. 5 This statement could mean:

48. U.N. Reparation Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 179-80.
49. TORRENT, supra note 41, ch. 1, subtitle 1.
50. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (better known as
the Helms-Burton Act) is a U.S. law that strengthens and continues the U.S. embargo against Cuba.
51. The d'Amato Act refers to the economic embargo by the U.S. government against
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a.-that the Community and the Member States both react to these two
legislations, each with their own legal and political means; or
b.-that Member States cede their responsibilities to appear behind a
single action conducted by the Community. As a matter of fact, the
Community has very limited competences regarding such issues as the
Helms-Burton or d'Amato Acts. Therefore, its action has very little effect
or repercussion.
52
Example 2: Agreements between the European Union
5 3 and Mercosur,
and the European Union and the Andean Community.
This expression does not reveal the main difference between both
agreements. The agreement with Mercosur is an agreement signed between
the EC and the Member States on the European side, and Mercosur and its
Member States on the South American side, whereas the agreement with
the Andean Pact and its Member States has been signed only by the EC on
the European side. In other words, EC Member States have not
participated in this second agreement. Therefore, the first agreement has
a greater scope than the second one. The same difference exists between
the Euromediterranean Agreements of the EC and its Member States with
Tunisia,54 Morocco, Israel and other countries, as well as the
Euromediterranean Agreement with the Palestinian Liberation
Organization.55 The latter agreement was signed by only the EC (and not
the EC and its Member States) and has a lesser scope than the former
agreements since the EU Member States do not participate in the
agreement.
It is thus of vital importance to make certain linguistic clarifications
that will ease the understanding of what we are trying to explain:
a.-the expression "The Union does humanitarian work" actually
means "The Community and/or its Member States, acting together in the
framework of the European Union, do humanitarian work;"

companies of third countries investing in gas or oil in Iran and Libya.
52. MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern
Cone) and is composed of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. On December 9, 2005,
Venezuela was accepted as a new member, and was officialized in late 2006. It was founded in
1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro
Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and currency.
53. The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising, until recently, five South American
countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced its
withdrawal, reducing the Andean Community to four Member States. Until 1996, the trade bloc
was called the Andean Pact, and came into existence with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement
in 1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru.
54. 1998 O.J. (L 97) 1.
55. 1997 O.J. (L 187) 1.
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b.-the expression "The Union and its Member States" is rather
confusing since the Union includes the Member States; however, we can
speak of "the Community and its Member States." Here we mean 26
different legal entities, each one of them having legal personality;
c.-the expression "The Union and its Member States act
individually," refers to activities carried out within the framework of the
Union (by the Community and/or the Member States acting together) and
activities carried out by the Member States outside the framework of the
Union.
That said, the success of the EU on unity in commercial policy seems
to be inextricably linked to its success with a coherent foreign policy. 6In
fact, as is evidenced in the famous bananas and hormones disputes, both
the political and economic aspects of the EU's external relations are
inseparable.5 7 At what was called the European Summit58 in The Hague,
in December 1969, the heads of state and government of the six original
Member States asked their ministers of foreign affairs to study how
progress could best be made in the area of political unification.59 Their
report was a proposal for cooperation in the area of foreign policy, which
became the basis of what, for 25 years, would be called European Political

56. See generally PANOS KOUTRAKOS, TRADE, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE IN EU
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF SANCTIONS, EXPORTS OF DUAL-USE GOODS

AND ARMAMENTS chs. 2-7 (2001); Christian Tietje, The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on
European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 211
(1997); Esa Paarsivirta & Allan Rosas, Sanctions, Countermeasuresand Related Actions in the
ExternalRelations of the EU: A Searchfor Legal Frameworks,in THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN
ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 207 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002); Riccardo Pavoni, UN
Sanctions in EU and NationalLaw: The Centro-Com Case, 48 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 582 (1999);
Monar, supranote 31, at 413; Ramses A. Wessel, The InternationalLegal Status ofthe EU, 2 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 109 (1997); Ramses A. Wessel, Revisiting the InternationalLegalStatus of the
EU, 5 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 507 (2000); Nanette Neuwahl, A Partner with a Troubled
Personality:EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam, 3 EUR. FOREIGN
AFF. REV. 177 (1998).
57. EC-Bananas
III (WT/DS27/AB/R);
EC-Hormones
(WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R).
58. European (or EU) Summits are the meetings of heads of state and government (i.e.,
presidents and prime ministers, depending on what their national constitutions indicate) of all EU
countries, plus the President of the European Commission. In today's EU politics, summits are
embodied in the European Council, which meets, in principle, four times a year to agree upon
overall EU policy and to review progress. The European Council is the highest-level policy-making
body in the EU, which is why its meetings are often called "summits."
59.

EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EC AND CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE (Walter

Carlsnaes & Steve Smith eds., 1994).
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Cooperation (EPC).6 ° The procedure was purely intergovernmental and
based on unanimity, a constraint reflecting a strong belief that foreign
policy decisions remained under the sovereign competence of national
governments. 6'
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen argue the move from EPC to the
CFSP was propelled by ambitions to create a "common" EU foreign policy
analogous to, say, the common agricultural policy or common commercial
policy.62 Yet, French national foreign policy decisions to test nuclear
weapons in the Pacific, send troops to Bosnia, or propose a French
candidate to head the European Central Bank could be viewed as far more
momentous and consequential than anything agreed upon within the CFSP
between 1995 and 1997. It is plausible to suggest, as David Allen does,
that the EU simply does not have a "foreign policy" in the accepted sense
of the term. 63 Going one step further, the CFSP may be described, perhaps
dismissed, as a "myth."' It does not, as the Maastricht Treaty promises,
cover "all areas of foreign and security policy."65 Obviously, it is not
by its Member States in a
always supported "actively and unreservedly
66
solidarity.,
mutual
and
loyalty
of
spirit
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the EU is to have
collective action, is there really a "common" European interest? If so, is
this interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances Member
States will act with a single voice? Do Member States have enough
proximity in their national interests to act with one voice in the
international sphere?
According to the same authors, the EU has not yet reached its apogee
in terms of its ability to act with power and unity in international affairs.67
However, some competences are exclusively of the EC. Customs duties

60. For a description and analysis of such foreign policy co-ordination, see EUROPEAN
1980s: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR WESTERN EUROPE?
(Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988).
61. L'UNION EUROPtENNE ET LE MONDE APRES AMSTERDAM (Marianne Dony ed., 1999).
62. John Peterson & Helene Sjursen, Conclusion: The Myth of the CFSP?,in A COMMON
FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP 169 (John Peterson & Helene
Sjursen eds., 1998) [hereinafter A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY].
63. David Allen, "ho SpeaksforEurope?The Searchforan Effective and CoherentForeign
POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE

Policy, in A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 62, at 41.

64. John Peterson & Helene Sjursen, Conclusion, The Myth of the CFSP?, in A COMMON
FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP 169 (John Peterson & Helene

Sjursen eds., 1998).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY,supra note 62, at 170.
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and protective non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 68 such as quantitative limits,
safety norms, health, and hygiene standards, were, and are, fixed by the
Union as a whole, not by the individual Member States.
Although the Single European Act in 1987 established a legal basis for
EPC, it remained largely unchanged and intergovernmental. Only when
the EC faced the challenge of Central and Eastern Europe and the Iraqi
crisis in 1990 and 1991 was more thought given to increasing cooperation
in foreign policy. The result was the "implementation of a common foreign
and security policy including the progressive framing of a common
defence policy...,, 69 The fact that Title V of the Treaty on the European
Union brought foreign policy under the umbrella of the EU represents a
step forward in regards to clarity. Having more transparent instruments is
the result of requiring Member States to conform to common positions
with the Council of Ministers.7" Through joint actions, the Member States
are committed to acting in support of these common positions. Finally,
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam give the CFSP a clearer character
by creating a High Representative of EU foreign policy (title V of the
consolidated version of the TEU), assisted by a new policy planning and
early warning unit in the Secretariat of the EU Council.7 '
The whole purpose of creating the CFSP was to enable the EU Member
States to speak with one voice by creating a new entity that would do this
on their behalf.7 2 The Amsterdam Treaty brought limited majority voting
for implementing foreign policy once it has been agreed to in outline by
unanimity (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty of
Amsterdam),73 and the definition and implementation of a foreign policy
position have been helped further along by the existence of EC policy
instruments-in particular, the budget.74 For example, the EC instruments
68. NTBs are government measures or policies, other than tariffs, that restrict or distort
international trade. Examples are import quotas, discriminatory government procurement practices,
technical and scientific barriers related to plant health, environmental labelling, codes and
standards, inter alia.
69. TEU art. 2, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Office Journal C 321 E, of Dec. 29, 2006.
70. A Council common position is the provisional position agreed by the EU Council after
the first reading stage of legislation, that is, after taking account of any amendments proposed or
opinions offered by the European Parliament.
71. Treaty of Amsterdam, declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early
warning unit, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 132.
72. Ramses A. Wessel, The Multi-Level Constitution of European Foreign Relations 22 (Apr.
2002) (unpublished EUI Workshop Paper, on file with European University Institute).
73. TEU arts. 11-28.
74. For more details, see SIMON J. NUTrALL, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY (2000); Uwe
Schmalz, The Amsterdam Provisionson ExternalCoherence:Bridgingthe Union's ForeignPolicy
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advanced external policy with respect to the Mediterranean and to the New
Transatlantic Agenda75 between the EU and the United States and
enhanced cooperation with Asia through the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Declaration Initiative of August 8, 1967.76 In
addition, the EU's political relations with Central and Eastern Europe have
been focused through European Agreements negotiated under the EC's
competence.7
The EC's achievements in assisting other nations have been significant.
Under the CFSP in 1995, the EU gave Russia U.S.$ 1.5 billion to assist its
transition to democracy.78 In 1996, European humanitarian aid totaled
almost U.S.$ 2 billion. 79 Because Member States have proved reluctant to
contribute to CFSP action from national budgets, EC financing has
become the norm, which means that de facto, there is an indirect

Dualism?, 3 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 421 (1998); Brian L. Crowe, Some Reflections on the CFSP,
3 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 319 (1998); Iris Canor, "Can Two Walk Together, Except They be
Agreed? " The RelationshipBetween InternationalLaw and EuropeanLaw: The Incorporationof
United Nations Sanctions Against Yugoslavia into European Community Law Through the
Perspective of the European Court of Justice, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 137 (1998); Marise
Cremona, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and the External
Relations Powers of the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY,
supra note 17, at 247; Elfriede Regelsberger & Wolfgang Wessels, The CFSPInstitutions and
Procedures:A Third Way for the Second Pillar, 1 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 29 (1996); Roy
Ginsberg, Conceptualising the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the
Theoretical Capability-ExpectationsGap, 37 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 429 (1999); PARADOXES OF
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY (Jan Zielonka ed., 1998); Deirdre Curtin & Ige F. Dekker, The EUas
a "Layered"InternationalOrganization:InstitutionalUnity in Disguise,in THE EVOLUTION OF EU
LAW 83 (Paul Craig & Grninne de Bdirca eds., 1999); THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CONFLICT
PREVENTION-PoLICY AND LEGAL ASPECTS (Vincent Kronenberger & Jan Wouters eds., 2004).
75. The New Transatlantic Agenda, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 49, 89496 (Dec. 4, 1995).
76. Association of South-East Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233
[hereinafter ASEAN Declaration].
77. David Kennedy & David E. Webb, The Limits of Integration:Eastern Europe and the
European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1095 (1993); Marc Maresceau & Elisabetta
Montaguti, The RelationsBetween the European Union and CentralandEasternEurope:A Legal
Appraisal,32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1327 (1995); Jdnos Volkai, The Applicationof the European
Agreement and European Law in Hungary: the Judgment of an Activist Constitutional Courton
Activist Notions, (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int'l & Reg'l Econ. L. & Justice Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 8/99, 1999), availableat http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990801.html#
fn0; Kirstyn M. Inglis, The Europe Agreements Comparedin the Light of Their Pre-Accession
Reorientation, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1173 (2000); Wolfgang Weiss, The Chapter H on
Establishment in the EuropeAgreements, 6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 243 (2001).
78. Hugo Paemen, The European Union in InternationalAffairs: Recent Developments, 22
FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 145 (1999).
79. Id.
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communitarization of CFSP as the Commission presents the budget, and
the European Parliament decides on non-obligatory expenditures. In
theory, CFSP has augmented the EU's competence to act in external
matters. In practice, without the political will necessary to adapt the
decision-making machinery or to use it effectively, CFSP has done more
to raise and to disappoint expectations than it has to enhance the EU's
international role.80
However, unity in foreign policy is a dramatic step forward and has
made it easier for the EC to unify on commercial issues. As mentioned
earlier, there are several areas where this cohesion is likely to spill over
and impact the international arena. One example is that of competition
policy, an area in which the Commission has been active since the early
1960s. With increasing worldwide economic interdependency and the
emergence of global markets for a large number of products, more
competition cases involve actions that take place outside of the EU8 ' like
the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger. In this respect, the EC-U.S.
Cooperation Agreement (which provides the background for the
McDonnell Douglas case) is worth mentioning. Competition authorities on
both sides of the Atlantic examined the issue, and came to different
conclusions. This case shows that even in carrying out policies that have
traditionally been domestic, the EU is increasingly influencing economic
matters in other parts of the world.
In addition, nowhere is the effect of domestic policies likely to be as
relevant as with the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).8 2 The EMU
is essentially a domestic issue. However, EC authorities hope that the Euro
will benefit international trade, having a major impact both on
international markets, and on the weight attributed to the EU as an
international actor. That said, the variable geometry of the EMU with its
ins and outs poses a challenge for the unity of external representation in
the economic sphere. 3 To better understand the implications of the unitary
character of the EU (or lack thereof), we must look at the legal
interpretation of its role and responsibility.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 146.
82. Id.
83. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND
(Nicholas Emiliou & David O'Keeffe eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD
TRADE LAW].
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B. The Case of External Economic Relations
It is important to say a few words about what Torrent calls the "fourth
pillar" of the EU's institutional structure. If the reader studies the
Maastricht Treaty, 84 he or she will perceive that the CFSP has a very large
scope, and it covers the actions of EU Member States in the areas of
external economic relations." In fact,
1. Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to
"any matter of foreign and security policy" and to "action in
international organizations and at international conferences"
without exception
(therefore, without excluding economic
86
conferences);

2. Article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty also has a general scope;

7

84. The numbering of the Maastricht Treaty Articles is not the original one, but follows the
changes made by the post-Maastricht intergovernmental conferences (IGCs).
85. REFORMING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION: THE LEGAL DEBATE (Jan

A. Winter

et

al. eds., 1996).
86. TEU art. 12.
1.Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any
matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that
their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of
concerted and convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common
positions.
3. Member States shall co-ordinate their action in international organizations and
at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such
forums. In international organizations and at international conferences where not
all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the
common positions.
Id.
87. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 13, Dec. 24, 2002,2002 O.J.
(C 325) 5 [hereinafter TEU Consolidated]. Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the TEU
reads:
1.
The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines
for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence
implications.
2.
The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be
implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important
interests in common.
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and finally,
3. Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty establishes that "[t]he Union
shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities
as a whole in the context of its external relations, security,
economic and development policies. 88
However, no one has given such a broad interpretation of the CFSP.
Why is this so? An authentic interpretation of the CFSP is one that
addresses in the best of all possible ways, the interests of those civil
servants who had to put the CFSP in action:
1. From the point of view of the EU's national Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, the idea was to "keep" the CFSP for them, even
if they did not like it so much;
2. From the point of view of the Commission, there was only one
strategy concerning the external economic relations, i.e., to
extend the exclusive competence of the European Community
as far as possible. This strategy was incompatible with an
efficient co-ordination of the external economic policies of the
Member States in the framework of the CFSP.
It is this restrictive interpretation of the CFSP, which necessarily
provokes the development of what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the

Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be
made available by the Union and the Member States.
3.
The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and
implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general
guidelines defined by the European Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and
shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common
positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the
Union.
Id.
88. TEU Consolidated art. 3. Article 3 of the Consolidated Version of the TEU reads: The
Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and
the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and
building upon the acquis communautaire. The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of
its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and
development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such
consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies,
each in accordance with its respective powers.
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EU.89 The term restrictive does not suggest a possible inclination of the
CFSP toward the EC competences, but rather, toward the side of the
Member States acting outside the institutional framework of the EU. The
so-called "fourth pillar" shows how within the institutional framework of
the EU, the defacto common exercise of Member States' competences is
mainly, but not exclusively, on issues of external economic relations. We
may illustrate this with two very significant examples taken from
multilateral and bilateral relations:
1. When dealing with the management of the World Trade
Organization Agreements, it is the Council of Ministers of the
European Union that acts not only on behalf of the EC, but also
on behalf of the Member States in the matters in which they are
competent;
2. The Association Agreements with the republics of the former
Soviet Union deal mainly with the agreed treatment to the
enterprises. This issue reveals Member States' competences.
Proof of it lies in Opinion 2/92 of the European Court of Justice
of 24 March 1995,90 which deals with the competence of the
Community or of one of its institutions to participate in the third
revised decision of the Council of the OECD 9' concerning
national treatment. These agreements have been negotiated and
are integrally managed after their conclusion by the Council of
the European Union and the European Commission.
Torrent justifies the existence of a "fourth pillar" by saying that the
exercise of Member States' external economic competences within the
institutional framework of the EU does not show signs of being part of the
"third pillar," "second pillar,"92 or "first pillar."93 Therefore, we must

89. One interesting point by Torrent is the fact that making reference to the "fourth pillar"
of the Union shows how the language of "three pillars" does not let us comprehend correctly the
nature of the EU. See Ramon Torrent, Le 'Quatribme Pilier' de 1'Union Europienne, in LA
COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES, QUELLES PERSPECTIVES?49-63 (Jacques
Bourgeois et al eds., 1997).
90. Opinion 2/92, 1995 E.C.R. 1-521.
91. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is a forum of
30 countries for discussion of economic policies between industrialized market economies, sharing
a commitment to democratic government and the market economy.
92. Even less so in the second pillar if we take into account the restrictive interpretation
which has been given to the CFSP, which is the second pillar itself.
93. It could not be part of this pillar since we are dealing precisely with the exercise of
Member States' competences, and not with that of the Community's.
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speak of a "fourth pillar," if we wish to continue the linguistic usage of
pillars.
However, there are at least three comments to make regarding what has
been said so far:
-First comment: a clear distinction between the scope of EC
competences and the range of application of the EC Treaty must be
made. Let us make use of two examples in order to explain this
distinction.
Example one: Articles 149, 150 (education, vocational training, and
youth), 151 (culture), 94 and 152 EC (public health) 95 limit the
Community's competence. Any kind of harmonization of legal provisions
of the Member States is excluded from the scope of these articles.
However, this limitation does not mean that the national legislations in
culture, education, or health exceed the range of application of the treaties.
They must respect the general principle of nondiscrimination based on
nationality
and its specific translation in the field of the four freedoms in
96
EU law.
Example two: concerning the criminal legislation of Member States,
the ECJ has established Member States must respect the general principles
of EC law. If, for example, an infraction to customs regulations, before
January 1, 1993--date of completion of the internal market-was liable
to a fine applicable to intra-Community trade, it should respect the
principle of proportionality. The conclusions by the Advocate-General
Van Gerven in case 212/889' have a general appreciation for the Court's
decisions over this issue.
The distinction made by these two examples shows that Community
treaties have two different functions. On the one hand, one such function
is typical of an international treaty, that is, to limit the exercise of the

94. In cultural policy, the EC must contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the EU
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and bringing the common
cultural heritage to the fore. EC Treaty art. 151.
95. The EC action, which complements national policies, must be directed toward improving
public health, preventing human illness and diseases, as well as obviating sources of danger to
human health. EC Treaty art. 152.
96. Let us remember for the non-specialized reader that the four freedoms are the free
movement of goods, the free movement of persons, the free movement of capital, and the freedom
to provide services. This is certainly one of the great achievements of the EU, which has been able
to create a frontier-free area within which people, goods, services, and money can all move around
freely.
97. Case 212/88, CriminalProceedingsAgainst F. Levy, 1989 E.C.R. 3511, 3523.
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competences of the contracting parties (in other words, of the Member
States when they are competent). On the other hand, the other function,
which is transferring a competence to the Community is very specific.
While this function of transferring competences to the Community is very
specific, it is not exclusive to Community treaties. The fact of not making
this distinction has generated very generalized mistakes in the analysis of
the distribution of external competences between the Community and its
Member States. There was no distinction between the range of application
of the treaties and the scope of EC competences. This mistake had terrible
consequences when combined with the also mistaken thesis by which nonexclusive EC competences become exclusive competences when there is
a need to act at the international level. The combination of these two
mistakes was the genesis of the thesis by which all the Agreements of the
Uruguay Round were exclusive EC competence.
-Second comment: it should be underlined that there is a fine line
between what EU Member States do outside and inside the
institutional system of the EU. The earlier example of former
Yugoslavia is helpful here. Certain EU Member States decided to
send troops outside the institutional system of the Union. But to
what extent have the diplomatic initiatives from the various EU
Member States been inside or outside the framework of the CFSP?
And who pays for what in this same example? The same case would
apply mutatis mutandis to participation in the Middle Eastern peace
process. The best example of Member States' activities which are
borderline with the Union's institutional system is the EU's
participation in the UN.
-Third comment: when analyzing the Schengen Agreement, we
can observe how this agreement used to be based outside the
institutional framework of the EU. Presently, it is inside the
institutional framework of the EU. The issues dealt with in the
Schengen Agreement are, therefore, treated inside the institutional
framework of the EU, as Member States' competences. Some of
these issues are also treated as Community competence. This is a
very important point when it comes to external relations: very often
a specific problem of international politics can be treated in various
ways. The fact of being treated in one way or another has not only
legal but also political consequences. The means taken and the
foreseeable results are different.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss3/2

24

Leal-Arcas: Polycephalous Anatomy of the EC in the WTO: An Analysis of Law an

2007]

POLYCEPHALOUS ANATOMY OF THE EC IN THE WTO: AN ANALYSIS OF LA WAND PRACTICE

593

Experience has proven that one of the bigger mistakes of the usage of
pillars is that it prevents the same issue from being used in different ways.
With the system of pillars in mind, people tend to ask to which pillar a
specific issue belongs. Since a good number of national administrations
(and certain services of the EU institutions) are organized by pillars
instead of by issues, it is no surprise that this question causes internal
conflicts of power and jealousy. This is why it is almost evident for
national and Community civil servants that the political dialogue with
Third States belongs to the "second pillar." However, joint declarations,
which create this political dialogue, do not limit their scope to questions
which, inside the Union, are treated within the framework of the CFSP.
How can we then pretend to avoid Third States from raising questions
which relate to EC exclusive competence in the framework of this
dialogue?
It should not be necessary to underline that the right approach is
precisely the opposite of the one that comes from asking the question to
what pillar a certain issue belongs. The issue must be analyzed from all
possible angles in order to obtain the best solution. When various possible
angles provide different courses of action this approach implies a
difficulty, namely it has to guarantee coherence among the various ways
of action. But politicians, senior civil servants, and jurists are paid by
taxpayers to resolve these kinds of difficulties and not to find the way
(intellectually easy but the wrong way) of putting each issue in only one
of the potential courses of action.
1. The EC in the World Trade Organization: An Overview98
Let us start with a historical introduction of the WTO and its evolution.

98.

EU AND WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS: COMPLEMENTARITY OR
Dossier ed. 1999); J6m Sack, The European Community's Membership
oflnternationalOrganizations,32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Robert Reich, Judge-Made
'Europe 6 la carte': Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts Between European and German
ConstitutionalLaw Provoked by the Bananas Litigation, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 103 (1996); Pieter J.
Kuijper, The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the European
Community, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 222 (1995); Ulrich Everling, Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The
BananasJudgments of the Court of Justice and NationalCourts, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 401
(1996); Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The RelationshipBetween World Trade
OrganizationLaw, Nationaland Regional Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 83 (1998); Pescatore, supra
note 41, at 387; Sebastiaan Princen, EC Compliance with WTO Law: The Interplay of Law and
Politics, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 555-74 (2004).
MARY FARRELL,

COMPETITION? (European
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At times it seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay
Round brought about the biggest reform of the world's trading
system since GATT was created at the end of the Second World
War. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay Round did
see some early results. Within only two years, participants had
agreed on a package of cuts in import duties on tropical
products-which are mainly exported by developing countries.
They had also revised the rules for settling disputes, with some
measures implemented on the spot. And they called for regular
reports on GATT members' trade policies, a move considered
important for making trade regimes transparent around the world. 99
There are three main purposes to the WTO:
The system's overriding purpose is [(i)] to help trade flow as freely
as possible - so long as there are no undesirable side-effects. That
partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that
individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules
are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will
be no sudden changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be
"transparent" and predictable. Because the agreements are drafted
and signed by the community of trading nations, often after
considerable debate and controversy, one of the WTO['s] most
important functions is [(ii)] to serve as a forum for trade
negotiations. A third important side to the WTO['s] work is [(iii)]
dispute settlement." °
It is a fact that in international trade negotiations, there is unequal balance
of power between smaller states and bigger states.10'
Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. Contracts and
agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the WTO
99. WTO, Understanding the WTO: Basics. The Uruguay Round, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/fact5_e.htm (last visited June 12, 2007).
100. Information Centre SPS, WTO, http://www.sps-info.org. ua/en/wto/ (last visited Dec. 17,
2007).
101. This unequal balance of power is rectified in the VTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, where both parties have equal weight before the WITO Panel or Appellate Body and
the party with stronger legal arguments (regardless of its negotiating capacity) will win the case.
For a detailed analysis on the matter, see Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays
& CapacityConstraints:The SelectionofDefendants in WTO Disputes (Int'l Legal Stud. Program,
Working Paper No. 6, 2005), availableat http://repositories.cdlib.org/ils/wp/6.
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system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle
these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an
agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind 10the
dispute
2
settlement process written into the WTO Agreements.
The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system
is half a century older. Since 1948, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided the rules for the
system.... It did not take long for [it] to give birth to an unofficial,
de facto international organization, also known informally as
GATT. Over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of
negotiations. The latest and largest round, was the Uruguay Round
which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the WTO's creation.
Whereas GATT had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and
its agreements now cover trade in services, and in traded inventions,
creations and designs (intellectual property).' °3
As for the EC in the world trading system, it suffices to say that the EC
was one of the signatories to the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement
(Uruguay Round Agreement). Thus, the EC was committed to make
certain changes to its policies. The text of the Uruguay Round Agreement,
which in itself relates to tightening up the rules on preferential trade
agreements,l04 offers more scope for conflict between the WTO and the EC

102. Information Centre SPS, supra note 100.
103. WTO Understanding the WTO: Basics. What is the World Trade Organization?,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/factle.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2007).
104. Steve Peers, Banana Split. WTO Law and PreferentialAgreements in the EC Legal

Order,4 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 195 (1994); Judson Osterhoudt Berkey, The EuropeanCourt of
Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worth Revisiting (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int'l
& Reg'l Econ. L. & Justice Working Paper Group, Working Paper No. 3/98, 1998); Marise
Cremona, EC External CommercialPolicy after Amsterdam: A uthority andInterpretationwithin
InterconnectedLegal Orders, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 5 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000); Stefan Griller, JudicialEnforceabilityof
WTO Law in the European Union: Annotation to Case C-149/96 Portugalv Council,3 J. INT'L

ECON. L. 441 (2000); Naboth van den Broek, LegalPersuasion,PoliticalRealism,andLegitimacy:
The European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of the WTO Agreements in the EC Legal
Order,4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 411 (2001); Piet Eeckhout, JudicialEnforcement of WTO Law in the
European Union-Some FurtherReflections, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 91 (2002); Piet Eeckhout, The
DomesticLegal Status ofthe WTOAgreements: InterconnectingLegal Systems, 34 COMMON MKT.

L. REv. 11 (1997); Eileen Denza, The Community as a Member of InternationalOrganisations,in
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 83, at 3; Marise Cremona, Rhetoric
and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a MultilateralContext, 38 COMMON MKT. L.
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than do any other areas of the agreement bearing more directly on
individual EC policies, since the text challenges the essence of the EU.' 05
When looking at the history of the EC external trade relations, one sees
the EC was not a contracting party to the GATT. European countries such
as France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom (but not Italy and Germany) were founding contracting parties
to GATT 1947. Subsequently, all EC Member States became full
members. Over the years, the EC has become a full member and a
contracting party to the GATT/WTO. Accession protocols and trade
agreements negotiated in the GATT framework provided in their final
provisions that the agreements were open for acceptance by contracting
parties to the GATT and by the EC. In addition, the substantive and
procedural provisions of these agreements treat the EC like a GATT
contracting party.
Furthermore, since 1970, most agreements negotiated in the framework
of GATT were accepted by the EC alone, without acceptance by EC
Member States. The only exceptions are two agreements at the end of the
Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the part of the Tariff
Protocol relating to ECSC products."0 6 The EC exercised all rights and
fulfilled almost all obligations under GATT law in its own name like a
GATT contracting party. Since the 1960s, all GATT contracting parties
have accepted such exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations by the
EC and have asserted their own GATT rights, even in dispute settlement
proceedings relating to measures of individual EC Member States, almost
always against the EC.1" 7 The EC has replaced, with the consent of other
GATT contracting parties, its Member States as bearers of rights and
obligations under the GATT.
Accordingly, the Agreement establishing the WTO, which recognizes
the EC's membership alongside the EU Member States. Under Article XI
of the WTO Agreement, the EC and its Member States became original
members to the WTO of their own right.' 8 The EC is, without a doubt, a

REV. 359 (2001); Francis Snyder, The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and the WTO, 40
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 313 (2003).
105. MARY FARRELL, EU AND WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS: COMPLIMENTARITY OR
COMPETmON? 13 (1999).

106. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriersand on
Government Procurementin InternationalEEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5, 21-22
(1982).
107. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EECas a GA TTMember-LegalConflicts Between GA TT
Law and European Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GAT" 23, 37-38
(Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
108. WTO Agreement art. XI. Article XI of the VITO Agreement reads:
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major actor in the WTO thanks to the fact that it speaks with a single voice
in the world trading system and in the WTO. Facts speak for themselves:
the EC of fifteen represented the world's largest trading bloc. In 2002, it
amounted to 37.3% of exports and 34.9% of imports in world merchandise
trade. With respect to services trade, the EC accounted for 43.2% of
exports and 41.6% of imports. With the 2004 EU enlargement to 25
members, these figures have increased. °9
In relation to voting rights inside the WTO-voting de facto never
happens, since decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus-the EC has
a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States." 0 The vote
in areas of exclusive EC competence should not pose a problem in
principle, whereas difficulties may arise in areas of shared competence,
especially in the absence of a common position among the EU Member
States together with the EC.
2. The Diagnosis: Polycephalous (and Polyphonic?) Anatomy of the
EC in the WTO
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the EC
was faced with the issue of the scope of its authority under the EC Treaty
in the field of international economic relations, particularly with respect

1

The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of
this Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules
of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for
which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall
become original Members of the WTO.

2.

The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will
only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent
consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or
their administrative and institutional capabilities.

109. See INTERNATIONALTRADE

REGULATION. LAW AND

PoucY IN THE WTO, THE EUROPEAN
235 (Thomas Cottier & Mathias

UNION AND SWITZERLAND. CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTS

Oesch eds., 2005).
110. WTO Agreement art. IX. Article IX of the Agreement Establishing the VITO reads:
"[W]here the European Communities exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of votes
equal to the number of their Member States which are Members of the WTO."
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to trade in services..' and intellectual property rights." 2 Negotiations were
conducted according to the normal procedures for GATT negotiations,
albeit that the European Commission negotiated on behalf of both the EC
and its Member States." 3 The assumption throughout was that EU
Members States would continue to be members of the world trading
system (and therefore WTO Members) and would not be completely
replaced by the EC.
With regard to the latter point, two constraints of a political nature led
the European Commission not to stand up and claim exclusive EC
membership of the new organization. The first constraint was the fact that
the matter was discussed in a meeting of the EU Council in November
1993, after the Maastricht Treaty had entered into effect with some
difficulty and it was thought wise not to push the issue of replacing the EU
Member States at that stage. The second political constraint was that
around this time, the Council had not yet approved the Uruguay Round and
Sir Leon Brittan thought it was preferable not to put on the table another
contentious issue. A result was the creation of Article XI of the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the WTO, which states that the contracting parties
to GATT 1947 and the European Communities shall become original
Members of the WTO. 114

This dual membership of the EC and its Member States in the WTO
(which creates a European polycephalous approach to the WTO, that is, 27
EU Member States and the European Communities, but not polyphonic,
since by the time they reach the WTO, European nations have found a
common position to speak with a single voice) may be an open door for
abuse by other WTO members, and a handicap for both the EC and its
Member States." 5 The fact that the EC Member States are WTO Members
together with the EC, and the fact that the representation of the EC and its

111. Paulo Mengozzi, Trade in Services and Commercial Policy, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIALPOUCY AFTER 1992, at 223 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993) [hereinafter
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY].
112. See Inge Govaere, Intellectual Property Protection and Commercial Policy, in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY, supra note 111, at 197; A. David Demiray,
IntellectualPropertyand the ExternalPower ofthe European Community: The New Extension, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 187 (1994).
113. Peter L.H. Van den Bossche, The European Community and the Uruguay Round
Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 23, 56-57 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes
eds., 1997).
114. WTO AGREEMENT, art. XI.
115. See generally Mary E. Footer, The EUand the WTO Global Trading System, in 4 THE
STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: DEEPENING AND WIDENING 317 (Pierre-Henri Laurent & Marc
Maresceau eds., 1998).
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Members States in the WTO is unregulated poses questions in relation to
the position of the ECJ to the WTO law. As far as GATT 1947 was
concerned, and as a result of the substitution of the EC for the Member
States in relation to commitments under GATT, the ECJ would have the
final word on the interpretation of the GATT provisions, even in relation
to the compatibility of Member States legislation with GATT., 6 However,
this argument is no longer possible. In accordance with Article XI of the
Agreement establishing the WTO, both the EC and its Member States
signed the Final Act.
The ECJ has stated that the division of powers between the EC and its
Member States is a domestic question in which third parties have no need
to intervene. 1 7 In the minutes of the Council meeting on March 7-8, 1994,
the Commission relied on this argument by saying that: "[T]he Final
Act . . . and the [A]greements thereto fall exclusively within the
competence of the European Community.""' 8 This argument does not
allow a sensu contrarioinference because the Member States and the EC
are formally WTO Members, it is irrelevant for the division of powers
within the EC legal system. On the contrary, the Agreement establishing
the WTO and the agreements that form part of it were approved by the
Council on behalf of the EC expressly "as regards matters within its
competence."" 19 Therefore, the need for a useful raison d'etre regarding the
joint WTO membership of the EC and the Member States is inevitable. It
must have something to do with the division of powers within the EC.
Certain trade agreements deal with matters in respect of which both the
Community and its Member States have competence. In these cases, the
ECJ has stressed the duty of cooperation that exists between the
Community and the Member States. I shall explore some of the problems
that this raises in practice.

116. Joined Cases 267, 268, & 269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Societci
PetroliferaItaliana(SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) 1983 E.C.R. 801,
15, 17.
117. Ruling 1/78, Nuclear Materials 1978 E.C.R. 2151, 35.
118. The European Commission, Minutesfrom Meeting of March 7 & 8 ofthe Councilof the
EU, citedin Opinion 1/94, Int 'lAgreements ConcerningIntellectualProperty,
1994 E.C.R. 1-5267,

5.
119. 94/800/EC: Council Decision of Dec. 22, 1994 (O.J. 1994 L 336/1).
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III. ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE EC AND ITS
MEMBER STATES

20

The issue of allocation of competences is an internal question for the
EC. 2' Leaving aside trade policy (where the EC competences should be
co-extensive with the WTO) and human rights (where the EC should be
given a general competence to adopt any measure, which would increase
the protection of human rights within the sphere of application of EC
law), "22
' the EC does not require any increase in its substantive jurisdiction.
The issue of allocation of competences is nevertheless a central concern

120. For a general overview on division of powers, see RICHARD

SIMEON,

DIVISION OF

POWERS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985).

121. E. Freeman, The Division of Powers Between the European Communities and the
Member States, 30 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 159 (1977).
122. Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Philip Alston
ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS]. For further analyses on the external
dimension of EU human rights policy, see ELENA FIERRO, THE EU'S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS
CONDITIONALITY IN PRACTICE (2003); KAREN E. SMITH, EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY IN A
CHANGING WORLD ch. 5 (2003); Marise Cremona, Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the
EC's Trade Agreements, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW, supranote 83, at 62;

Marise Cremona, The EU and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy, in
EC-INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM III-A PEOPLE' SEUROPE: TURNING A CONCEPT INTO CONTENT
155 (Stratos Konstadinidis ed., 1998); Karen E. Smith, The Use of PoliticalConditionality in the

EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?, 3 ER. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 253 (1998);
Barbara Brandtner & Allan Rosas, Human Rights and the External Relations of the European
Community: An Analysis ofDoctrine and Practice,9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 468 (1998); Angela Ward,
Frameworksfor Cooperationbetween the European Union and Third States:A Viable Matrixfor
Uniform HumanRights Standards?,3 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 505 (1998); Dominic McGoldrick,
The EUafter Amsterdam: An Organisationwith GeneralHuman Rights Competence?, in LEGAL
ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY 249 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999)
[hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY]; Barbara Brandtner & Allan Rosas, Trade
Preferencesand Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 699; Eibe Reidel &

Martin Will, Human Rights Clauses in ExternalAgreements of the EC, in THE EU AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra, at 723; Dev-Chin Horng, The Human Rights Clause in the European Union's
External Trade and Development Agreements, 9 EUR. L.J. 677 (2003); Pieter Jan Kuyper, Trade

Sanctions,Security andHuman Rights and CommercialPolicy, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S
COMMERCIAL POLICY, supra note 111, at 387; Holly Cullen, The Limits ofInternationalTrade

Mechanims in Enforcing Human Rights: The Case of Child Labour, 7 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 1
(1999); Andrew Clapham, Where is the EU's Human Rights Common ForeignPolicy and How Is
It Manifested in MultilateralFora?,in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 627; J.H.H. Weiler
& Sybilla C. Fries, A HumanRights Policyforthe EuropeanCommunity and Union: The Question
ofCompetences, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra,at 147; Richard Youngs, European Union
Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On, 6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 355 (2001); Thomas
Cottier, Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111 (2002).
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and inflames high emotion among the general public, 23 who fear the
encroachment of supranational action into areas of national heritage,
power, and tradition.2 4 As suggested by Griller and Weidel, it is "another
manifestation of the struggle for power between the EC and its Member
States. ', 25 Third States should not mind, but practice demonstrates they do:
it is more difficult to communicate with 28 entities (27 EU Member States
plus the European Commission) than with one single entity (the EC).
Additionally, as argued by Lukaschek and Weidel, the "complicated
system [of allocation of competences in the EU] is hardly ascertainable for
the outside world and might entail uncertainty and confusion for third

123. Authors such as Weiler believe that the issue of competences in the EU remains highly
sensitive. The post-Maastricht public debate demonstrated a clear public distrust in the ability of
the EU institutions to guarantee the limits to EU influence on public life. Many people have tried
to nail down EC competences. At the same time, efforts have been made to increase public
confidence in the jurisdictional limits of the EC and EU. See J.H.H. WEILER, THE DIVISION OF
COMPETENCES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997).

124. Interestingly, German constitutional Judge Siegfried Bross has called for a separate court
to judge on disputes over competences. In his opinion, the ECJ cannot do this as it may not rule on
national constitutional law, and the equivalent national courts may not do it as they cannot rule on
interpretation of European law. Cases on economics law, competition law, or health law will
become more common in the future when the EU will claim more and more competences for itself.
The subsidiarity principle-which says that the EU should only act if the goal cannot be better
achieved by the EU Member States---offers no relief to the competence confusion, according to
Judge Bross. This is so because once the EU Member States transfer powers to the supranational
level, they implicitly acknowledge that it is better done at the EU level and cannot invoke the
subsidiarity principle at a later stage. For instance, monetary policy in the EU. Weiler and Mayer
have also proposed a similar idea: the creation of a Constitutional Council for the EU, modeled on
its French namesake. The Constitutional Council would have jurisdiction only over issues of
competences (including subsidiarity) and would decide cases submitted to it after a law was
adopted, but before coming into force. It could be seized by any EU institution, any EU Member
State or by the European Parliament acting on a majority of its members. Its President would be
the President of the ECJ and its members would be sitting members of the constitutional courts or
their equivalents in the EU Member States. Within the Constitutional Council, no single EU
Member State would have a veto power. The composition would also underscore that the question
of competences is fundamentally one of national constitutional norms, but still subject to a Union
solution by a Union institution. Although this idea of creating a Constitutional Council for the EU
may seem as an attack on the ECJ, Weiler claims that such a view is myopic and fails to appreciate
that the issue of competences is already bringing a shift in the position of the ECJ. See WEILER,
supra note 123, at iii & 62. See generally Siegfried Bross, Europaischer Gerichtshoffiir
Kompetenzkonflikte, 2001 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 425; Franz Mayer, The European Constitution
andtheCourts, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITuTIONAL LAW281-333 (Armin von Bogdandy
& Jtirgen eds., 2006).
125. See EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
15 (Stefan Griller & Birgit Weidel eds., 2002) [hereinafter EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS].
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countries about the identity and authority of their negotiation partner. ' 126
Furthermore, being divided but united can give the EC an edge in
international bargaining.' 27 It is well-known that foreign trade policy and
internal market policies require close coordination. However, in the case
of the EC, its nature makes this obviousness more challenging from a
constitutional viewpoint.'28 The separation of powers between the EC and
its Member States, and among the EU institutions, remains an unsolved
issue in external trade regulation. Oftentimes, the EU's institutional and
structural peculiarities are more of a constraint than a strategic advantage.
A. Principal-AgentTheory and InternationalNegotiations
The delegation of competences in the EC can be explained through the
principal-agent theory. This theory has only recently been applied to the
context of negotiations. 129 According to this theory, agency costs can be
due, inter alia, to information asymmetries. In other words, agents know
more about their duties than their principals do. In the context of
negotiations, we would speak of agency costs because the negotiator
knows more than the principal about the constraints of external
negotiations. 3 ' Often, agency costs also may occur because the agent's
interests may not be the same as those of her or his principals. "The...
challenge
is to create institutional arrangements to minimize such agency
3
costs."''
The question to analyze is who should speak for the EC in international
trade negotiations. According to Meunier and Nicolafdis, the answer
126. See Anita Lukaschek & Birgit Weidel, Exclusive ExternalCompetence of the European
Community, in EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 125, at 113, 140.

127. Sophie Meunier, Divided but United: European Trade PolicyIntegration and EU-US.
Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 193 (C. Carolyn Rhodes ed., 1998).
128. See Cremona, The Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy ofthe EuropeanUnion and the
ExternalRelations Powers of the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT
TREATY, supra note 17, at 247.
129. Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicola'dis, Who SpeaksforEurope?The Delegationof Trade
Authority in the EU, 37 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 477 (1999); NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS:
ADVICE TO LAWYERS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, SPORTS AGENTS, DIPLOMATS, POLITICIANS, AND

EVERYBODY ELSE (Robert H. Mnookin et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF
OTHERS].
130. Kalipso Nicola'fdis, Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games: Lessons from the
Trade Authority Controversies in the UnitedStates and the European Union, in NEGOTIATING ON
BEHALF OF OTHERS, supra note 129, at 87.

131. Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared
Competence Debate, in 5 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: RISKS, REFORM, RESISTANCE AND

REVIVAL 325, 328 (Maria Green Cowles & Michael Smith eds., 2000).
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depends both on the kind of relationship, which has been established
between the spokesperson (European Commission) and its principals (EU
Member States) and on the phase of the negotiation.3 2 For the study of the
allocation of EC competences in trade policy-making, we will first make
a brief note on the evolution of EC trade policy, and then apply the
principal-agent theory to understand the modes of control and the
difference between exclusive and shared competence in the EU.
There is no definition in the treaties as to the areas that do lie within
exclusive EC competence. Defining the respective boundaries of
competence is compounded by the fact that in a number of areas the EC
shares competence with its Member States. This difficulty of allocating
competences is further compounded by the presence of the implied powers
provision which appears in Article 308 EC 33 and the liberal construction
given to this by the ECJ.134 Also when one considers the division of
competence between the EC and its Member States from an explicitly
normative perspective, the difficulty becomes even more marked.'35 The
criteria which ought to govern this issue 136 and its institutional
ramifications 3 7 are controversial.
B. Legislative Competence
If it had been ratified by the EU Member States, the EU Constitutional
Treaty would have brought significant changes to the system of
competences in the EU. It would have looked like a competence catalogue,
with the main advantage of being less vague than the current situation of
not knowing clearly who does what. This catalogue approach would have

132. Id. at 327.
133. Former Article 235 EC. For an analysis of Article 308 EC, see LUDWIG KRAMER, EC
TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1994); G. Close, Harmonisation of Laws: Use or
Abuse of the Powers under the EEC Treaty?, 3 EUR. L. REV. 461 (1978).
134. J.H.H. Weiler, The TransformationofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,2445-46 (1991); Ami
Barav, The Division of External Relations Powers Between the European Community and the
Member States in the Case-Law of the Court ofJustice, in DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS 29

(C.W.A. Timmermans & Emond L. Voelker eds., 1981) [hereinafter DIVISION OF POWERS].
135. Paul Craig, Constitutions,Constitutionalism,and the European Union, 7 EUR. L.J. 125,
143 (2001).
136. Compare Frank Vibert, How not to Write a Constitution-The Maastricht/Amsterdam
Treaties, 10 CONST. POL. ECON. 149, 152 (1999), with WEILER, supranote 123.
137. J.H.H. Weiler, European Neo-Constitutionalism:In Search of Foundationsfor the
European ConstitutionalOrder, 44 POL. STUD. 517 (1996).
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resembled the German Constitution system. 13 8 The EC enjoys only those
powers conferred on it by the Treaties. 39 Four types of legislative
competence14 are conferred upon the EC: exclusive; shared;
complementary; and national competence. Since the EC Treaty does not
provide a definition of the various kinds of competences, these may be
defined as follows.
1. Exclusive EC Competence
The EC enjoys exclusive competence when it alone is able to adopt
rules in an area. Any intervention by the Member States is excluded unless
it has the authorization of the EU institutions or where there is a lacuna
needing to be filled. The areas where the EC has exclusive competence are
the following: common commercial policy (to the extent existing prior to
the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice); living marine resources in the
zones covered by the Treaty; establishment of the common customs
tariff;la l monetary policy for the twelve Member States in the euro area; "
and those areas which become areas of exclusive competence because the
EC legislates 43extensively in the area concerned on the basis of its shared
competence. 1

138. In Germany, Article 73 of the Constitution enumerates the competences of the federal
legislator. In addition, there is a catalogue of concurring competences and frame competences.
Furthermore, there is a structural principle laid down in Article 72 of the Constitution. Concurring
competences in the German model means that the Laender have competence so long as the federal
legislator has not taken action. The catalogue of concurring competences is combined with a
structural principle: the federal power is only allowed to take action in order to enhance economic
and legal unity, as well as uniformity of social conditions. F.R.G. CONST. art. 72. The catalogue of
concurring competences has to be read in conjunction with the rule that federal law overrules state
law.
139. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 5, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
3 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
140. Legislative competence refers to the adoption of legislative texts in the literal sense or
the creation of legal obligations by the EU institutions ("secondary legislation") based directly on
the Treaties of the European Communities ("primary legislation").
141. John Usher, Consequencesof the Customs Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD
TRADE LAW, supra note 83, at 105; Edwin Vermulst & Paul Waer, EC Rules of Origin as
Commercial Policy Instruments?, 3 J. WORLD TRADE 55 (1990); Vander Schueren, Tariff
Classification:An Instrument of EC Trade Policy, 2 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 255 (1997).
142. Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The ExternalRelationsofthe Euro Area:LegalAspects,
36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 289 (1999); Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochnre, ConstitutionalAspects
andExternalRepresentation,19 Y.B. EUR. L. 441(1999-2000); Christoph W. Herrmann, Monetary
Sovereignty over the Euro andExternalRelations ofthe EuroArea: Competences,Proceduresand
Practice,7 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 18 (2002).
143. European Convention, The Secretariat, Delimitation of Competence between the
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Exclusive competence is the result of the complete transfer of
competence from the Member States to the Community. When exclusive
competence arises, the Member States are considered to have forfeited
their legislative powers in that field. The mere existence of such
competence prevents the Member States from acting in that field,
irrespective of the existence of an actual conflict.'" In other words, the
exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States in the area covered
by the Community's exclusive competence is impossible.'45 Furthermore,
if the substantive provisions of an international agreement fall within
Community competence, "the Community is also competent to undertake
commitments for putting those provisions into effect."' 46 The exact
boundaries of Community competences are not set out in the Community
treaties, but it is "generally accepted that Community powers are exclusive
in so far as they cover areas which are strictly linked to the achievement
of the essential objectives of European integration."' 47 A power is also
exclusive where it appears from the wording or the context of the Treaty
provisions in question that any action by the Member States would conflict

European Union and the Member States-Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,
CONV 47/02, kin/MM/ac, at 6 (Discussion Paper 2002) [hereinafter Delimitation of Competence].
144. See Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 125-26.
25.

26.

While there is no contradiction between [the] provisions of the [ILO]
Convention and those of the directives mentioned, it must nevertheless be
accepted that Part III of Convention No 170 is concerned with an area
which is already covered to a large extent by Community rules
progressively adopted since 1967 with a view to achieving an ever greater
degree ofharmonisation and designed, on the one hand, to remover barriers
to trade resulting from differences in legislation from one Member State to
another and, on the other hand, to provide, at the same time, protection for
human health and the environmental.
In those circumstances, it must be considered that the commitments arising
from Part III of Convention No 170, falling within the area covered by the
directives [... ] are of such a kind as to affect the Community rules laid
down in those directives and that consequently Member States cannot
undertake such commitments outside the framework of the Community
institutions.

Id.
145. Opinion 1/75, Draft OECD Understanding on a Local Cost Standard 1975 E.C.R. 1355,
1364.
146. Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 28.
147. Andrea Appella, ConstitutionalAspects of Opinion 1/94 of the ECJconcerningthe WTO
Agreement, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 440, 442 (1996).
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with it.'48 Exclusive external competence may arise expressly or by
implication. There are very few examples of provisions in the Treaty or
Acts of Association where there is explicit conferral of exclusivity. The
most well-known provisions are Article 133 EC dealing with the Common
Commercial Policy and Article
102 of the 1972 Act of Accession dealing
149
with fisheries conservation.

Although the EC competence
is in principle allocated to it explicitly by the Treaties, the ECJ has
taken the view that in some cases competence flows implicitly from
the EC Treaty texts or their general structure. These tend to be cases
in which competence is necessary to implement aims set by the
Treaties, especially in the field of external relations. 5 '
[T]he EC only has the powers accorded to it under the Treaties. All
other powers thus reside with the Member States. A clause to this
effect, redolent of that to be found in the [Tenth Amendment of the]
U.S. Constitution, could then be included within a European
Constitution. This could undoubtedly be done. It would however
only serve to mask, or push... further back, the issues that really
serve to define the powers of the EU and the Member States."5 '
The idea of giving certain competences exclusively to the EC was a
creation of the ECJ's case law. 52 The Court has specified that EU Member
States were no longer allowed to adopt legislative measures or to
independently conclude treaties with third countries since the EC power

148. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1363-64.
149. Joined Cases 3,4 & 6/76, Officier van Justitie v. Kramer 1976 E.C.R. 1279, Grounds I
17-20; 2 C.M.L.R. 440, 99 9-13 (1976); Case 804/79, Comm'n of the Eur. Comm. v. United
Kingdom 1981 E.C.R. 1045 Grounds
12, 17-18; 1 C.M.L.R. 543, 99 12, 17-18 (1982); see
Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 8. See also Catherine Noirfalisse, The Community System of
FisheriesManagement and the FactortameCase, 12 Y.B. EuR. L. 325,325-26 (1994).
150. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 9.
151. Craig, supra note 135, at 143.
152. Among the authors that have studied this issue are: Pierre Pescatore, External Relations
in the Case Law of the ECJ, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 615, 622-24 (1979); Jean Groux, Le
Parallelismedes Competences Internes et Externes de la CE, 14 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 1
(1978); Robert Kovar, Contribution de la Cour de Justice au developpement de la condition
internationalede la Communaute europeenne, 14 CAMIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 527 (1978); Jean
Boulois, La Jurisprudencede la Cour de Justice des Communaut~s europdennes relative aux
relationsext~rieures des Communaut~s, 160 HAGUE RECUEiL 335 (1978).
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was exclusive. 5 3 However, in other cases, the ECJ held that certain
competences were not exclusive EC competences, which means that it did
not prevent EU Member States from acting.' 54 This said, it is fair to
acknowledge that the list of exclusive EC competence is very limited. 5'
In any case, the debate in the legal literature over the
meaning of exclusive
56
EC competence seems to be inconclusive to date.
Some scholars have suggested a common sense and pragmatic
approach, limiting the prohibition to Member States' measures, "which
demonstrably have a negative effect on common rules."' 5 7 Others have
argued "that exclusivity arising as a result of a Treaty provision is different
from exclusivity arising as a result of the exercise by the institutions of
their internal powers."' 58 In the first case, the Community occupies the
field and preempts Member State action whether or not it conflicts with
Community legislation and whether or not the Community has actually

153. Opinion 1/75 Export Credits [1975] E.C.R. 1355, at 1363-64. See also Case 41/76
Donckerwolcke v Procureur de la Republique [1976] E.C.R. 1921,
32, and Opinion 2/91
ConventionNo. 170 of the ILO Concerning Safety in the use of Chemicals at Work [ 1993] E.C.R.
1-1061, 8.
154. See Nicholas Emiliou, The Death ofExclusive Competence?, 21 EUR. L. REv. 294, 30507 (1996); J.H.H. Weiler, The External Legal Relations of Non-UnitaryActors: Mixity and the
FederalPrinciple,in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?
130 (1999); David O'Keeffe, Community and Member State Competence in External Relations
Agreements of the EU, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 7 (1994); Christiaan Timmermans, Organising
Joint Participation of E.C. and Member States, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL
RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 239, 243; Stephen Hyett, The Duty of Cooperation:A Flexible
Concept, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 248, 25 1; Inge
Govare et al., In-Between Seats: The Participationof the European Union in International
Organisations,9 ER. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 155 (2004).
155. Pierre Pescatore, Les relations extdrieures des communaut6s europdennes: Contribution
Ala doctrine de la personnalit6 des organisations internationales, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1961).
156. For a larger debate on the issue, see Grfinne de Bfrca, ReappraisingSubsidiarity's
Significance after Amsterdam (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int'l & Reg'I Econ. L. & Justice Working
Paper Group, Paper No. 7, 1999), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/
990701.html.
157. G.L. Close, Self-Restraint by the EEC in the Exercise of its ExternalPowers, 1 Y.B. EUR.
L. 45, 64 (1981). See also JONI HELISKOSKI, MIXED AGREEMENTS AS A TECHNIQUE FOR
ORGANIZING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER
STATES 40 (2001): "In a field or matter falling within the exclusive competence of the Community,
any concurrent authority on the part of the Member States is, by definition, excluded; legal acts are
either performed by the Community or they are not performed at all." Id. Member States may only
take measures if Community competence is non-exclusive.
158. Takis Tridimas, The WTO and OECD Opinions, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL
RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 58; Takis Tridimas & Piet Eeckhout, The External Competence of
the Community andthe Case-Law of the Court of Justice: Principle Versus Pragmatism,14 Y.B.
EUR. L. 143, 165 (1994).
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exercised its competence. There is no question of Member State
competence continuing or being held in suspension while the Community
exercises its powers. 59 Exceptionally, Member States may act pursuant to
a specific authorization by the Community. 160 In the second case, there is
no ab initiopreemption. Member States may continue to act but should not
adopt legislation which affects the Community rules or alters their
scope. 16 1 It would be a question of interpretation whether Community
action has surpassed the threshold of peremptory preemption, which
precludes even consistent national measures.
The ECJ often adopts a common sense approach, even if it finds the
Community exclusively competent. Older case law certainly seems to
accord with this analysis. 162 It has been argued that the ECJ has achieved
a golden balance in that it is easy to find competence but difficult to find
it exclusive. 163 The actual result might be further tempered by the
pragmatic and political niceties of the situation, for the ECJ strived "to
effectively meet its Treaty objectives and exert a coherent external policy,
yet ensure the mutual coexistence of functionally independent legal
regimes."'" Nevertheless, the mixing up of the legal test pertaining to each
type of competence and the reformulation of some tests are not conducive
to legal certainty. Nor do they enhance the credibility of the Community
to the outside world.

159. Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, 20. See also Armin von Bogdandy & Jilrgen Bast, The
European Union 's VerticalOrderof Competences: The CurrentLaw andProposalsfor its Reform,
39 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 227, 237 (2002) (opining that when the Member States vest the Union
with certain powers/competences the Member States do not necessarily lose "ownership" of those
competences).
160. Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 30.
161. See generallyOpinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267 and Opinion 2/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-521.
162. See Case 22/70, Comm'n of the Eur. Comm. v. Council of the Eur. Comm., 1971 E.C.R.
263, Grounds 86, 90. Here, the Court did not impede the advanced and still ongoing negotiation
proceedings, as this would be very disruptive and would call into question the Members States' and
the Community's credibility in the international scene. Compare with Opinion 1/94, Re:
Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the
protection of intellectual property-Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, Grounds
106-07, where the Court refused to sacrifice the correct legal analysis because of difficulties in
implementing the WTO agreement.
163. Tridimas & Eeckhout, supra note 158, at 172; Charles T. Kotuby Jr., External
Competence ofthe EuropeanCommunity in the Hague Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw:
Community Harmonisationand Worldwide Unification, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 99, 110 (2002).
164. Kotuby Jr., supra note 163, at 110.
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Since the then EEC founding fathers 165 chose a customs union as the
way to proceed towards a unified Europe, 166 a common trade policy vis-4vis the rest of the world was inevitable. The Community has retained
exclusive competence in almost all issues in this field, and the European
Commission acts on behalf of the EC with a qualified majority vote from
the Council. 167 However, on some trade issues, Member States have
competence (despite the "exclusive" EC competence in commercial
policy). For example, in the concluding phases of the Uruguay Round the
full stature of the EC in global trade affairs was displayed for the first time
as the world spotlight fell on
the EC and the United States, as they
168
hammered out the final deal.
It was at that moment that an internal debate arose between the EU
Member States and the European Commission about the coverage of the
existing commercial policy provisions of Article 133 EC in the areas of
intellectual property and services. The Commission negotiated the
Uruguay Round and the competence issue between the EC and its Member
States had been bracketed. As we will see later in greater detail, when the"
ECJ was consulted, it stated in Opinion 1/94 that only certain aspects of
the two sectors could be considered as falling under Article 133 EC, and
thereby under the EC's exclusive competence. 69 During the IGC that
produced the Treaty of Amsterdam, 7 ' the Commission, reacting against
Opinion 1/94, made a proposal to enlarge the scope of the relevant treaty

165. In the years following World War II, people like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman
dreamed of uniting the peoples of Europe in lasting peace and friendship. Over the following fifty
years, as the EU was built, their dream became reality. That is why they are called the "founding
fathers" of the EU.
166. A customs union, or CU, can be defined as full trade liberalization between two
countries/regions, plus a single external tariff. The customs union is one of the key components of
the EU, whereby non-EU countries exporting products to the EU are charged the same tariff
regardless of which EU country is importing the goods. This makes life simpler for traders and cut
down their paperwork. The EU also concluded a customs union with Turkey in 1995, aiming for
the free circulation of manufactured goods between the EU and Turkey.
167. Kotuby Jr., supra note 163, at 104.
168. Rosas, supra note 32, at 59-71.
169. Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, Summary XVI-5401; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205 (1995).
170. The Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of the IGC launched at the Turin European Council
on March 29, 1996. It was adopted at the Amsterdam European Council on June 16-17, 1997 and
signed on October 2, 1997 by the Foreign Ministers of the then fifteen EU Member States. It
entered into force on May 1, 1999 (the first day of the second month following ratification by the
last Member State) after ratification by all the Member States in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements.
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provisions to explicitly include services and intellectual property.' 7 ' The
Member States refused because they still wanted their participation in
international trade agreements.' 72 In this respect, one can argue that
Opinion 1/94 represents a step backwards in what had been until then, the
successful development of the EC common commercial policy.
However, the Community as a whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. According to Mavroidis, even Germany, the EC's leading economy,
has much more weight as part of the EC than it would by itself in
international economic relations.'73 The general assumption seems to be
that the EC combined as a single voice would be more powerful than
divided into 26 voices174 A sensu contrario,the old and successful military
strategy "divide and conquer"' 175 should be a sign for the EU to avoid
disunity. The tendency in trade policy seems to be toward exclusive EC
("EU" after the Constitutional Treaty) competence with the changes
brought by the EU Constitutional Treaty.
One important mechanism for coordinating a single voice is the
creation of European "policy units.' ' 176 Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, initiated this idea. Academics from various European
countries including Germany, France and Spain have been asked to
participate in this initiative. 177 This shows that Britain is still committed to
Europe. Authors such as Peter Mandelson and Bodo Hombach believe that
171. Alan Dashwood, ExternalRelations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, 35 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1998).
172. For a general discussion on this issue, see Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO
andAdvisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession,32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 763 (1995).
173. Petros Mavroidis, Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built, 38 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
669,674 (1999) (reviewing JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, "DO THE NEW
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER STORIES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999)).

174. President Lincoln's injunction, "United we stand, divided we fall," can be extrapolated
for the case of the EC's external trade relations to illustrate my argument. Abraham Lincoln used
this idea in a speech before the American Civil War, when he referred to a Biblical statement that
a house divided against itself cannot stand. Pascal Lamy often used this injuction when he was EU
trade commissioner to justify a larger delegation of trade competence by the EU Member States to
the EU supranational level. It implies that institutional rules, which allow the EU Member States
to make decisions more quickly and the Commission to represent Member States internationally
in a united manner, give the collective entity an edge in international bargaining.
175. Derived from the Latin saying divide et impera, it can mean in politics a strategy to gain
or maintain power by breaking up larger concentrations of power into chunks that individually have
less power than the one implementing the strategy. In reality, it often refers to a strategy where
small power groups are prevented from linking up and becoming more powerful, since it is difficult
to break up existing power structures. Effective use of this technique allows those with little real
power to control those who collectively have a lot of power (would if they could unite).
176. See London is Capitalof Third Way, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 10, 1999, at 2.
177. Id.
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collaboration will increase the likelihood of a European federal
superstate.178 In the same line, Mark Leonard believes that the EU needs
to have a single debate in the179EU rather than 27 separate national debates,
one for each Member State.
That said, the progressive centralization of EC trade policy and its
generally effective pursuit in international negotiations has not disguised
vigorous differences of policy and priorities among the Member States.
These differences do not make the EC an easy partner in negotiations. 8 °
2. Shared Competence
Shared competence covers areas where Member States may legislate
insofar as the EC has not yet exercised its powers by adopting rules.''
Once the [EC] has legislated in such an area, Member States may
no longer legislate in the field covered by this legislation, except to
the extent necessary to implement it, and the legislative rules
adopted have precedence over those of the Member States.
[EC]
18 2
competence thus becomes exclusive through its exercise.
Shared competence also arises where an agreement includes provisions
some of which fall within Community competence and some within
Member State competence. 183 With respect to shared competence, Mdny
argues that "since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the number of shared
compentencies-often benefiting the Union-has increased considerably,

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See MICHAEL JOHNSON, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TRADE POLICY AND THE ARTICLE
113 COMMrIEE (1998).
181. For example, with the common fisheries policy during the transitional period mentioned
in Article 102 EC. See Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1279, 39-40. See also Case 61/77
Comm'n v. Ireland 1978 E.C.R. 417, 7 64-65; Case 804/79 Comm'n v. United Kingdom 1981
E.C.R. 1045, 11 18, 20-21. See generally IAN MACLEOD ET AL., THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: A MANUALOF LAW AND PRACTICE 65, 236 (1996). In so acting, Member

States are perceived as acting on behalf of the Community as custodians or guardians or trustees
of the Community interest (Case 804/79, 28) in order to fill the legislative vacuum. They must
not bind the Community in a way that is disruptive to its powers eventually coming into force.
Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1279,
39-45.
182. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 7.
183. Opinion 1/78, Re: InternationalAgreement ofNaturalRubber, 1979 E.C.R. 287 1, 63;
Ruling 1/78, Re: the Draft Convention of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilitiesand Transports, 1978 E.C.R. 2151, Grounds 13,
Ruling 1-2.
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to the point that this is often seen as a creeping expropriation of the
[M]ember [S]tates' powers."'
There seems to be a presumption that where the Community enjoys
competence, competence is concurrent and not exclusive, unless there is
a contrary indication from the text or context of the Treaty. 8 This is
because Community powers are invariably of a general nature and pursue
vague objectives. It is difficult to construe them as exclusive. In certain
areas, Community and Member State competence can coexist without
either displacing the other, such as, in the realm of intellectual property
rights. 86
'
The EC's legislative action in those areas is subject to compliance with
the principles of subsidiarity'87 and proportionality.l 8 Most EC powers fall

184. Yves Mdny, The ExternalandInternalBorders
ofthe GreatEurope,37 INT'L SPECTATOR
19, 21-22 (2002).
185. Case C-316/91, Eur. Parliament v. Eur. Union Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-625 40 ("In the
absence of any indication to the contrary, it can be accepted that the Community and the Member
States share competence in that field."). See also Tridimas & Eeckhout, supranote 158, at 154-55;
Panos Koutrakos, The Interpretation of Mixed Agreements Under the Preliminary Reference
Procedure,7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 25, 30 (2002); Alan Dashwood, The RelationshipBetween
the Member States andtheEuropean Union/EuropeanCommunity, 41 COMMONMKT. L. REv. 355,
369-73 (2004).
186. Demiray, supra note 112, at 187, 189.
187. The principle ofsubsidiarity regulates the exercise ofpowers. It is intended to determine
whether, in an area where there is shared competence, the EC can take action or should leave the
matter to the Member States. The principle ofsubsidiarity hence means that EC decisions must be
taken as closely as possible to the citizen, and argues, as can be seen in Article 5 EC, that the EC
should take action only if, and insofar as, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at the EC level.
In other words, the EC does not take action (except on matters for which it alone is responsible),
unless EC action is more effective than action taken at national, regional, or local level. The
subsidiarity principle hence limits Community interventions. The implementation of this principle
is subject to ex ante control through the assent procedure of national parliaments, but also expost
through the judicial remedy. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality, art. 7,2004 O.J. (C 310) 207. A protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam sets
the conditions and application criteria of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. This
protocol specially provides for: the obligation to justify and legislative proposal by proving its
compliance with the subsidiary principles; guidelines; the obligation to present an annual report;
and a procedure of verification by the Council and European Parliament. In order to take better
account of the subsidiarity principle, the Commission set out several rules in its annual reports "To
Better Legislate" (1997-1999), in particular regarding consultation of interested parties,
improvement in the drafting quality of texts, and simplification of existing legislation. The report
"To Better Legislate 2000" introduced the implementation of principles on subsidiarity.
188. The principle of proportionality implies that any action by the EC should not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty. It should not be confused with the
principles of subsidiarity, which enables the resolution of the considered action's level (national
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within the category of shared competence;' 89 citizenship of the EU;
agriculture and fisheries (except for the part under exclusive EC
competence); the four freedoms (free movement of goods,
persons,
92
9
services, and capital); 90 visas, asylum and immigration;' ' transport;
or Community level), while the principle of proportionality concerns the size of the action. This
principle has appeared in Court decisions since 1956, for example, see Case 9/55, Zolder v. High
Auth. of the Eur. Coal & Steel Cmty., 1956 E.C.R. 311, 326-29.
189. The extent of the powers conferred on the EC by the relevant chapters of the EC Treaty
varies depending on the area.
190. See generally Piet Eeckhout, ConstitutionalConceptsfor Free Trade in Services, in THE
EU AND THE WTO-LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 211 (Griinne de Birca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE EU AND THE WTO].
191. See generally Steve Peers, The Visa Regulation: Free Movement Blocked Indefinitely,
21 EUR. L. REV. 150 (1996); Castro Oliveira, Immigrantsfrom Third CountriesunderEC External
Agreements: The Need for Improvement, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 215 (1994); Steve Peers,
Building FortressEurope: The Development of EU MigrationLaw, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1235 (1998); FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE EU (Dennis Martin & Elspeth Guild eds., 1996);
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 58-166 (Elspeth Guild ed., 1999); KAY HAILBRONNER, IMMIGRATION AND
ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000); Martin Hedemann-Robinson, An

Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in Relation to Third Country
NationalsResident Within the European Union, with ParticularReference to the Case Law of the
EuropeanCourt ofJustice, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 525 (2001); Steve Peers, TowardsEquality:
Actual andPotentialRight of Third CountryNationals in the European Union, 33 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 7 (1996); Gerhard Eisl, Relations with the CentralandEastern Countries in Justice and
Home Affairs: Deficits and Options, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 351 (1997); Fadi S. Hakura, The
External EUlmmigrationPolicy: The Need to Move Beyond the Orthodoxy, 3 EUR. FOREIGN AFF.
REV. 115 (1998); Roman A. Petrov, Rights of Third Country/NISNationals to PursueEconomic
Activity in the EC, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 235 (1999); ANNALISA MELONI, VISA POLICY
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION STRUCTURE (2005); ELSPETH GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2001); Steve Peers, ImplementingEquality?The Directive on Long-Term
Resident Third-CountryNationals, 29 EUR. L. REV. 437 (2004); J6rg Monar, Justice and Home
Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the Priceof Fragmentation,23 EUR. L. REV. 320
(1998); Kay Hailbronner, European ImmigrationandAsylum Law Under the Amsterdam Treaty,
35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1047 (1998); David O'Keeffe, Can the Leopard Change its Spots?
Visas, Immigration and Asylum Following Amsterdam, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM
TREATY, supra note 122, at 271; P.J. Kuijper, Some Legal Problems Associated with the
Communitarizationof Policyon Visas, Asylum and Immigration Underthe Amsterdam Treaty and
Incorporationof the Schengen Acquis, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345 (2000); Catherine Phuong,
Enlarging 'FortressEurope':EUAccession, Asylum, andImmigrationin CandidateCountries,52
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 641 (2003); Hdl~ne Lambert, The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, its
Impact on the Jurisprudenceof the UnitedKingdom andInternationalLaw,55 INT'L& COMP. L.Q.
161 (2006); ELSPETH GUILD, THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (1996); IMPLEMENTING AMSTERDAM: IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM RIGHTS IN EC

LAW (Elspeth Guild & Carol Harlow eds., 2001); INGRID BOCCARDI, EUROPE AND REFUGEES:
TOWARDS AN EU ASYLUM POLICY (2002).

192. See generally J.M. Balfour, Freedom to ProvideAir TransportServices in the EEC, 14
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competition; taxation; social policy; the environment; 93 consumer
protection; trans-European networks (interoperability and standards);
economic and social cohesion; energy; civil protection; and tourism. 94
Regarding the TEU, its title V which deals with the CFSP, with the
exception of defense, also falls within the shared competence category.' 95
Lastly, title VI of the TEU (police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters) falls within the shared competence category as well, apart from
the provisions relating to the setting up of joint bodies.
In fact, authors such as Alfonso Mattera 96 claim that there is only one
type of competence, that of shared competence, with different degrees of
interference, depending on the policy. In this sense, Member States might
interfere actively in cultural policy, but only minimally in common
commercial policy.' 97 The fundamental principles of democratic and
"political accountability cannot be achieved if the constitutional order is
fragmented and requires the use of metaphors to describe the interrelations
of its parts."' 98 Could one then argue that non-exclusive EC competence
(i.e., shared competence) is translated as de jure and de facto EC
fragmentation? From a national perspective, Schuppert argues that unity
of administration is based on the unity of democratic origin of all
sovereign power.

people.2"0

99

Hesse claims that all public authority originates with

the
With the enactment, continuation, and development of the
constitution, this authority is passed on to the various organs within the

EUR. L. REv. 30 (1989); George Close, External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: Air
Transport Policy or the Common CommercialPolicy?, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 107 (1990);
Peter P.C. Haanappel, The ExternalAviationRelationsof the EuropeanEconomic Community and
of EEC Member States into the Twenty-First Century, 14 AIR L. 122 (1989).

193. For a further analysis of external competence in environmental matters, see JAN H. JANS,
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at 69-100 (2d rev. ed. 2000).

194. The EC Treaty does not contain a specific legal basis covering the fields of energy, civil
protection and tourism. The EC can therefore act only on the basis of Article 308 EC.
195. Title V of the TEU provides for consultation, cooperation or coordination of Member
States' action in certain areas, as well as adoption by the EU Council of common actions and
common positions. TEU arts. 11-28.
196. Mattera was Special Advisor to former President of the European Commission Romano
Prodi, and Professor at the College of Europe, Brugges.
197. Information gathered from a conference at the Europaeische Rechtsakademie, Trier
(Germany) (Apr. 10-11, 2003).
198. Armin von Bogdandy, The Legal Casefor Unity: The European Union as a Single
Organizationwith a Single Legal System, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 887, 909 (1999).
199. GUNNAR FoLKE SCHUPPERT, DIE EINHEIT DER VERWALTUNG ALS RECHTSPROBLEM 760

(1987).
200. KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZUEGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND n.27 (19th ed. 1993).
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constitutional framework.2" 1 All bodies exercising sovereign power
continue to be dependent on the unifying origin of that power.20 2 Can these
arguments be made from a supranational perspective? Would they be valid
for the purposes of the EC's common commercial policy?
Shared competence between the EC and its Member States implies the
fragmentation of unity in the international representation of the EC and
translates into less power for the EC in the international arena. On the
other hand, EC exclusive competence facilitates international negotiations,
since the European Commission is the only competent actor in any given
matter. Experience has shown that mixed agreements can and do cause
delays, which can actually worsen negotiation situations. 20 3 However, at
present, the implementation and conclusion of mixed trade agreements is
done at the national level. 2' Therefore, a system in which both the EC and
its Member States are involved seems to be an optimal situation in terms
of efficiency.
With the new balance between Brussels and national institutions and,
to some extent, between national institutions and regional and local
authorities, some kind of political rebellion has started in Europe. As
Mdny rightly points out, "any attribution of powers is arbitrary and
therefore political; in fact, even if some criteria of efficiency and
rationality are taken into account, it is mainly on the basis of political
criteria that powers are distributed among the various decision-making
[... ] levels., 205 Even if there are expectations for eliminating overlap in
competences between the EC and its Member States, one should not forget
that economic and social reality is so complex that the hope of reaching a
clear separation of powers is an illusion.20 6 It is therefore important to
establish the methods and instruments for exercising those competences.
"In all existing constitutional texts-even in those based on a catalogue of
powers-gray areas exist and constitutional courts are called on to resolve
questions relating to the resultant conflicts of competence. 2 7
Trade is one of the areas where EU Member States have politically
agreed to delegate representation. However, EU Member States have
started to question the transfer of sovereignty to the EC level, especially

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Interview with Richard Wyatt, First Minister of the Delegation of the European
Commission to the United Nations, New York (June 2001).
204. Art. 133 (5 & 6) EC.
205. Mdny, supranote 184, at 22.
206. Id.
207. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 11.
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on issues such as services, investment, and intellectual property rights.2"8
The famous Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ clearly acknowledged that the EC
and the EU Member States actually share competence in these areas.2 °9 A
few years later, the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced restrictions on transfers
of sovereignty to the EC level in the area of trade by allowing EU Member
States to decide what competence to delegate on a case-by-case basis at the
end of a negotiation.210
The concept of shared competence should be distinguished from a case
where the existence of an external legal or political impediment prevents
the Community from becoming a party to a treaty, even though it enjoys
exclusive competence in the field. This could be the case, for example, if
the EC is not recognized by the other party, or if the international
instrument is only open to States.21' In such circumstances, Member States
that enter into an international agreement with outside countries or
international organizations 212 are effectively acting as trustees for the EC
208. Intellectual property is a special example of shared competence. HENRY G. SCHERMERS,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW

1557 (2d ed. 1980) (commenting on international

organizations in general).
The competence of international organizations to make agreements is related to
the competence of their members to do so. Both may be competent at the same
time. The best example is the case of a copyright convention to which an
international organization accedes solely to protect its own publications. It then
acts for the specific interests of the organization which are not at the same time
covered by any legal provisions of the members.
Id. This category of shared competence may also extend to agreements establishing rules of
international law, such as UNCLOS III or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between
States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (VCLTIO). The
rules in such law-making agreements should be equally applicable to the Member States and the
Communities as subjects of international law; the competence of one does not displace or
undermine the competence of the other. In theory, the EC and its Member States should all be able
to become parties to such agreements.
209. Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267.
210. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art.
133(5), 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, 238.
211. The ILO Convention is an example of this. It was possible for the agreement to fall within
the exclusive competence of the Community but to be concluded by the Member States. In such
circumstances, the Community's external competence maybe exercised through the medium of the
Member States acting jointly in the Community interests. See Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061,
5; Case C-316/91, 1994 E.C.R. 1-625, pt. IV. See also Tridimas & Eeckhout, supra note 158, at
148.
212. As to the relationship between the Community and international organizations, see J6m
Sack, The European Community's MembershipofInternationalOrganisations,32 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 1227 (1995).
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in relation to matters of Community competence or as put in Opinion 2/91,
'jointly in the Community's interest.'2 3
As mentioned before, in the field of external trade relations by the EC,
there are many examples where the Community's and the Member States'
competence is shared; for instance, in the Food and Agriculture
Organization, where Case 25/94, Commission v Council, can be viewed as
evidence.214 In this case, the ECJ made its most significant input about (or
regarding) the duty of cooperation.2" 5 Competences in the EC are joint
because Member States prefer not to allow Community competence,
preferring instead to preserve their national competence. 2 6 This approach,
which became apparent in the Court's Opinion 2/91 on the International
Labor Organization (ILO), 1 7 weakens the constitutional position of the
Community in the field of external relations. On the other hand, shared
competence increases the leverage of the most protectionist EU countries.
Shared competence also would imply a strong voice if the polyphonic
"choir" (all the EU Member States and the Commission) sings. This will
give the choir strength and independence.
With respect to shared competence, the second subparagraph of
paragraph 6 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty removes certain sectors from
the scope of the first subparagraph of paragraph 5 of Article 133 of the
Nice Treaty. The areas included are cultural and audiovisual services,
educational services, and social and human health services. 218 According
to Krenzler and Pitschas, "as the Community may not adopt any measures
under Articles 150 IV, 151 IV(c) and 152 EC that result in the
harmonization of national laws or regulations in these services sectors, the
Community does not have exclusive competence. 2 9 This means that the
competence is shared between the EC and its Member States. The second
subparagraph of paragraph 6 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty refers to it
by using the locution "shared competence." This is the first time that this
locution appears in the Treaty text. However, the concept of shared

213. See Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, T 5. See also Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263,
Grounds 80 & Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045.
214. Case 25/94, Comm'n ofEur. Cmtys. v. Council of Eur. Union, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1469, 48.
215. For a legal analysis of Case 25/94, see Joni Heliskoski, The Internal Struggle for
InternationalPresence: The Exercise of Voting Rights Within the FAO, in THE GENERAL LAW OF
EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 79.
216. The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or How to Ensure Unity of Representationfor Joint
Competencies, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 386 (1995).
217. Opinion 2/91, 36, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061.
218. Art. 133.6.2 EC.
219. Horst Ginter Krenzler, & Christian Pitschas, Progressor Stagnation?: The Common
CommercialPolicyAfter Nice, 6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF.REv. 291, 309 (2001).
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competence has existed for a very long time. Agreements in these services
sectors must be concluded as mixed agreements and only enter into force
after ratification by all EU national parliaments.22 ° The legal ramification
of shared competence explain the efforts made by the Commission and
scholars to bring about exclusive EC competence and avoid the potential
risk of Europaralysis. Yet, many trade agreements are signed as mixed
agreements.
In mixed agreements, if there is more than one negotiator other than the
European Commission, then the EC's negotiating position is weaker,
though the same is not necessarily true for the Member States.22 This is
because as long as the external competence has not become exclusively
EC competence, Member States, even acting collectively, remain free to
enter into multilateral treaty relations.222 The tensions created by the
mixture of competences between the EC and its Member States are seen
as an obstacle to the achievement of Community interests as a whole, and
are a problem for Europe's trade partners. 223 Even though Article 133 EC
gives exclusive competence in commercial policy to the EC, the treaty also
limits this competence.224
According to Jean Groux, for Third States, it is preferable to have a
mixed procedure because they are not familiar with dealing with the EC
225
and lack sufficient knowledge of its competences and responsibilities.
For example, in the case of a third party like the United States, if it has
complete information about the Member States' position, then it is easier
to accept that the EC acts with a single voice. In this sense, there are at
least three variables to take into consideration:
1) secrecy;
2) physical difficulty for a third party to obtain information; and
3) institutional processes.
In the case of the first variable, this would mean that having a single
representation by the EC in international agreements obscures information
about the Member States' actual position. Therefore, there is less
220. Id.
221. Interview with John Richardson, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission
to the United Nations, New York, (June 2001).
222. Even if de jure, this is a plausible situation, de facto it has never happened.
223. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Unitary CharacterofECExternalTrade Relations, 7 CoLuM. J. EUR.
L. 356 (2001).
224. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. (C 224/1) art. 44 (1992).
225. Jean Groux, Mixed Negotiations, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supranote 6, at 87.
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transparency and, consequently, it might be more difficult to reach an
agreement. With regard to the second variable, it is highly linked to the
first variable because having a single voice in the EC makes it harder to
negotiate for a third party, since there is less transparency. As for
institutional processes, this refers to the fact that sometimes exclusive EC
competence involves various Directorates-General of the European
Commission.
However, what has been the attitude of Third States when the EC has
entirely taken over the responsibilities of the Member States in certain
areas?
It is only in this last case that [T]hird States overtly put pressure on
the Community to use the mixed negotiation technique. Here one
may cite the example of the negotiations begun in 1975 ... between
the EEC and the CMEA (Comecon) with a view to normalizing the
relations of the Community with the East European countries.2 26
These countries, which were in fact somewhat reluctant to envisage
an official recognition of the Community, had much difficulty in
accepting the decision of the Council of the Communities that the
negotiations would be conducted by the Commission alone, and
they tried in vain to ensure the participation also of the Member
States.227
As a matter of fact, the EC was not recognized as an international
organization by Comecon until 1988.228 This position adopted by Comecon
was rectified shortly before Comecon was dissolved.229
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the EC is to have
collective action, is there really a "common" European interest? If so, is

226. Comecon was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the USSR with
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950-1990), Mongolia
(from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with Yugoslavia as an associated
member. Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. Its establishment was prompted by the
Marshall Plan. Comecon was formally disbanded in June 1991. It was agreed in 1987 that official
relations should be established with the EC, and a free-market approach to trading was adopted in
1990. In January 1991 it was agreed that Comecon should be effectively disbanded. See Comecon,
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0006083.html (last visited Dec. 10,
2007).
227. Jean Groux, Mixed Negotiations, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 87, 91.
228. Council Decision 88/345, art. 1, 1988 O.J. (L 154) 34 (EEC). See also Wojciech
Morawiecki, Actors and Interests in the Process ofNegotiationsbetween the CMEA andthe EEC,
2 LEGAL ISSUES EuR. INTEGRATION 1 (1989).
229. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 28.
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this interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances Member
States will act with a single voice? Do Member States have enough
proximity in their national interests to act with one voice in the
international sphere?
3. Complementary Competence
Complementary competence covers areas where EC competence is
limited to supplementing or supporting Member States' action, or
coordinating Member States' action.2 30 The power to adopt legislative
rules in these areas remains part of the Member States and intervention by
the EC cannot have the effect of excluding intervention by the Member
States.23 '
The fields where the Member States have exclusive competence to
legislate, and the EC has no power to interfere upon their work are:
economic policy; employment; customs cooperation; education, vocational
training and youth; culture; public health; trans-European networks
(excluding the interoperability of networks and technical standards);
defence policy (Title
industry; research and technological development;
233
V of the TEU); 232 and development cooperation.

230. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 8.
231. Id.
232. For further details about defence policy, see Ramses A. Wessel, The State ofAffairs in
EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice, 8 J.CONFLICT & SEC.
L. 265 (2003); Rory Keane, EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy: From Cologne to Sarajevo,
19 GLOBAL Soc'Y 89 (2005); Frederik Naert, European Security and Defence in the EU
Constitutional Treaty, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 187 (2005); The CFSP Under the EU
ConstitutionalTreaty-Issues ofDepillarization,42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 325 (2005); Asle Toje,
The 2003 European Security Strategy: A CriticalAppraisal, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 117
(2005); David Scannell, FinancingESDP Military Operations, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 529
(2004); Jolyon Howorth, The EuropeanDraftConstitutionalTreaty andthe Futureofthe European
Defence Initiative:A Question ofFlexibility,9 EUR. FOREIGNAFF. REV. 483 (2004); Martin Trybus,
The Limits of European Community Competence for Defence, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 189
(2004); Sven Biscop, Able and Willing? Assessing the EU's Capacityfor MilitaryAction, 9 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 509 (2004); TREVOR C. SALOMON & ALISTAIR J.K. SHEPHERD, TOWARD A
EUROPEAN ARMY: A MILITARY POWER IN THE MAKING? (2003); JOLYON HOWORTH & JOHN T.S.
KEELER, DEFENDING EUROPE: NATO AND THE QUEST FOR EUROPEAN AUTONOMY (2d ed. 2005);
EU SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (1999-2004) (Nicole Gnesotto ed.,
2004); BEN SOETENDORP, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THEORY, HISTORY AND

PRACTICE (1999); WILLIM NICOLI & TREVOR C. SALMON, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2001); Simon Duke, CESDP:Nice's Overtrumped Success, 6 EUR. FOREIGNAFF. REV. 155
(2001); Antonio Missiroli, European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence, 6 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 177 (2001); Antonio Missiroli, Ploughsharesinto Swords? EurosforEuropean
Defence, 8 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 5 (2003); Adrian Treacher, From Civilian Power to Military
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4. Exclusive EU Member States' Competence
Member States' competence covers areas not referred to in the EC
Treaty and therefore, not within the competence of the EC.234 It remains
within the Member States' areas where the Treaties expressly exclude EC
competence, or expressly recognize the competence of Member States, as
well as areas where the EC Treaty forbids the EC to legislate.235
The areas within the EU Member States' competence are: 1) those that
are not within the EC competence and therefore remain Member States'
competence, such as the internal organization of States, national identity,
national military structure inter alia; 2) areas expressly reserved to the
Member States by the EC Treaty,236 such as public order and public
security, the enforcement of criminal law and the administration of
justice,237 the right to strike and the right of association, the supply of
health services and medical care, rules dealing with the system of property
ownership; and 3) areas where the EC Treaty forbids the EC to legislate:
education, vocational training, culture, employment and health. 238 The
Actor: The EU's Resistible Transformation, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 49 (2004); Catherine
Gegout, Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the DemocraticRepublic
of Congo: A RealistExplanation, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 427 (2005); Richard G. Whitman,
NA TO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?, 25 CONTEMP. SEC. POL'Y (2004);
Martin Reichard, Some Legal Issues Concerningthe EU-NA TO BerlinPlus Agreement, 73 NORDIC
J. INT'L L. 37 (2004); Ramses A. Wessel, The EU as a Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to Give
Birth to a European Security and Defence Policy, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: DISCORD OR HARMONY? 405 (Vincent Kronenberger ed., 2001).

233. Delimitation of Competence, supranote 143, at 8. For further discussion of development
cooperation, see generally JOSEPH A. MCMAHON, THE DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION POLICY OF

THE EC (1998); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Democracy and Development, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 635
(1997); Joseph A. McMahon, InternationalAgriculturalTrade Reform andDevelopingCountries:
The Case of the European Community, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 632 (1998); Carlos Santiso,
Reforming EuropeanForeignAid."Development Cooperationas an Element ofForeignPolicy, 7
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 401 (2002); Jan Orbie, EU Development Policy Integration and the
Monterrey Process:A Leadingand Benevolent Identity?, 8 ER. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 395 (2003).
234. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 8.
235. Id. "In some cases, the [EC] Treaty limits the exercise of Member States' competence
by imposing obligations upon them (e.g. the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
[or] the prohibition on granting State aids incompatible with the common market)." Id. at 8 n.4.
236. The EC Treaty grants Member States various derogations from the four freedoms of
movement on grounds of public order, public safety or other considerations of general interest.
237. For further discussion of enforcement of criminal law and the administration ofjustice,
see generally STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW (2000); Georgia Papagianni, Free

Movement of Persons in the Light of the New Title IV TEC: From IntergovernmentalismTowards
a Community Policy, 21 Y.B. EuR. L. 107 (2002).
238. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 9.
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hypothesis of exclusive EU Member States' competence is somehow
difficult to conceive in the framework of the EC external trade relations,
at least from a conceptual viewpoint. The fact that we are dealing with the
EC external trade relations explicitly implies the participation and
inclusion of a supranational entity, that is, the EC. Therefore, this
hypothesis has very little or no foundation at all on which to base the
question whether there will be more legal coherence by having exclusive
EC competence on all issues of EC trade policy. One could foresee,
though, a situation where there is no polyphonic choir among the EU
Member States. They would therefore be in danger of losing their
sovereignty but they would still keep their independence.
C. Non-Legislative or Executive Competence
"Competence to implement and apply legislation in accordance with
their respective constitutional rules ...rests with the Member States...,
subject to monitoring by the Commission, national courts and the [ECJ].
239
The [EC] exercises such competence in a subsidiarity capacity only.
24 °
1. Implementation of Legislative Acts

Implementation of legislative acts concerns the drafting of normative
rules.2 4' It will only be necessary for the EC to adopt regulations if the
aims of the planned action cannot be adequately achieved by the Member
States.242 Should it be the case for the EC to adopt regulations, then the
power of implementation by the EC of its legislative acts is conferred on
the Commission by the European Parliament and the Council in the case
of codecision and by the Council in other cases.243
2. Administrative, Material, or Budgetary Implementation of
Community Acts
This concerns administrative implementing measures... [and]
The adoption of
sanctions to ensure compliance with [EC] law ....
such measures is a matter for EU Member States, which determine
239. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted); see also Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov.
10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, arts. 202, 211 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
240. See generally Jonas Bering Liisberg, The EU Constitutional Treaty and its Distinction
Between Legislative andNon-legislativeActs-Orangesinto Apples? 11-26 (Jean Monnet Ctr. for
Int'l & Reg'l Econ. L. & Justice Working Paper Group, Paper No. 01/06, 2006).
241. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 9.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 9, n.4; see EC Treaty art. 202.
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..the proper bodies, procedures, and conditions for ensuring the
correct implementation of [EC] law. The [EC] may nevertheless
intervene in the.., implementation of [EC] acts where the Treaty
or the [EC] legislator gives [the EC] the power to do so.2 4
IV. MIXED AGREEMENTS

245

Mixed agreements are agreements where both the EC and its Member
States are contracting parties on the European side to an international
agreement with a third party.2 46 "The notion of mixed agreement is
not... normally understood to cover [a] situation where an agreement
falls... within the competence of the [EC] and partly within that of the
Member States[,] but [rather a situation where Member States] are in a
position to become parties to it."'247 "In such a case, the [EC's] competence
may be exercised through the medium of the Member States acting jointly
in the interest of the EC. '248 While it may be largely unknown to the
general public, and even though the legal credentials of this type of
agreements have been questioned by various scholars,249 mixity (or mixed
244. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 10.
245. In 1961, Pescatore spoke of"Accords mixtes, mi-gouvemementaux, mi-communautaires,
conclus conjointement par les Etats membres et la Communaut6.... Pierre Pescatore, Relations
Extdrieures Des Communaut~s Europ~enes: Contributiond la Doctrine de la PersonnalitgDes
OrganisationsInternationales, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 104 (1961).
246. See HELISKOSKI, supra note 157, at 6-7. Heliskoski disagrees with McGoldrick's
contention in McGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 78 (stating that the concept of mixed agreements
encompasses the situation where an agreement falls partly within Community competence and
partly within Member State competence but only the Member State can become a party to it
(Opinion 2/91 scenario)). In such case, the Community's competence may be exercised through the
Member States acting jointly in the interests of the Community. Id.
247. HELISKOSKI, supranote 157, at 7 n.26. The possibility of mixed agreements is expressly
recognized in Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the Euratom. Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, art. 102 [hereinafter Euratom
Treaty]. The expression "mixed agreements" has been used by the ECJ. See, e.g., Case 12/86,
Demirel v. Gmiind, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 8. See also MIXED AGREEMENTS, supranote 6; MAURITS
J.F.M. DOLMANS, PROBLEMS OF MIXED AGREEMENTS: DIVISION OF POWERS WITHIN THE EEC AND
THE RIGHTS OF THIRD STATES (1985); Nanette Neuwahl, Joint Participationin International
Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and Its Member States: Mixed Agreements, 28
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 717 (1991); MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 142.
248. HELISKOSKI, supra note 157, at 7 n.26 (citing Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 5 on
the ILO Convention No. 170 on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, which is only open to
Members of the ILO (Art. 21)).
249. See John J.Costonis, The Treaty-MakingPower of the EuropeanEconomic Community:
The Perspectives of a Decade, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 421, 450 (1967-68). See also Marise
Cremona, The Doctrine of Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements in the External
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agreements) has become part of the daily life of the EC external relations.
Mixity has also been a very complex topic for scholarly debate.25°
Interestingly enough, mixed agreements, important as they are, were
not foreseen in the Treaty of Rome.25 ' However, the concept does appear
in the Treaty establishing the Euratom252 and is incidentally inscribed in
the Nice Treaty in Article 133(6).253 As Granvik correctly asserts, "the
very same article [Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the Euratom] has
later been accepted [by EC law-makers] as a suitable model for the EC. 254
In this same line of thought, MacLeod et al. point out that there is no doubt
about the existence and legal validity of the concept of "mixed

Relations of the European Community, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1982); Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6;
Neuwahl, supra note 247, at 717; Nanette A. Neuwahl, Shared Powers or Combined
Incompetence? More on Mixity, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 667 (1996).
250. Most of the relevant literature is in the more general context of the EC external relations.
See generallyDIVISION OF POWERS, supranote 134; MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6; DOLMANS,
supra note 247; JEAN GROUX & PHILIPPE MANN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 57-88 (1995); ALBRECHTCONZE, DIE VOLKERRECHTUiCHE HAFTUNGDER
EUROPAISCHENGEMEINSCHAFT 73-87 (1987); Neuwahl, supranote 247; Neuwahl, supra note 249;
RACHEL FRD, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. LEGAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE 111-16 (1995); MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 142-64; MOSHE

KANIEL, THE EXCLUSIVE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: UP TO THE
PERIOD OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 145-74 (1996); MCGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 78-88; LA
COMMUNAUTt EUROPEENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES, QUELLES PERSPECTIVES? (Jacques H.J.
Bourgeois et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MIXED-TYPE AGREEMENTS];

Alan Dashwood, Implied ExternalCompetence of the EC, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra
note 6, at 113; Allan Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS,
supra note 6, at 125; Lena Granvik, Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the
Community and the Principleof Bindingness, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6, at
255.
251. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
252. It is precisely in Article 102, which reads:
Agreements or contracts concluded with a [T]hird State... to which, in addition
to the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into
force until the Commission has been notified by all the Member States concerned
that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance with the
provisions of their respective national laws.
Euratom Treaty art. 102.
253. Treaty of Nice amending the TEU, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. (C 80) 1.
254. Lena Granvik, Incomplete Mixed EnvironmentalAgreements of the Community and the
Principleof Bindingness, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 256.
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agreement. 255 Proof of this is Article 102 of the Euratom Treaty, which
recognizes a form of mixed agreement and "makes explicit provision for
treaties which are to be concluded by the Community and one or more of
the Member States. 256 It is, nevertheless, unfortunate that the
Constitutional Treaty did not take into account the express recognition of
mixed agreements in the legal text.
The legal phenomenon of mixed agreements poses various complex
issues, such as the fact that these agreements must be ratified by all the EU
national parliaments of the countries which are contracting parties to that
given mixed agreement. Consequently, this creates uncertainty as to the
liability of the EC and its Member States to third parties, as well as the
limits of the ECJ's competence to interpret such agreements. In addition,
there are various important clarifications to be mentioned in this subtitle
in order to facilitate the understanding of the issue. Here are some of them:
1. Since the early 1960s, the mixed procedure as a legal phenomenon has
been used in a wide field of policy areas ranging from commercial
policy to environmental policy257 from cooperation to the management
and conservation of the resources of the sea. The general trend towards

255. MACLEODETAL.,supra note 181, at 143.

256. Id. at 143-44.
257. For further discussion of mixed procedure in the areas of commercial policy and
environmental policy, see Panos Koutrakos, I Need to Hear You Say It: Revisiting the Scope of the
EC Common Commercial Policy, 22 Y.B. EuR. L. 407 (2003); Geert Van Calster, The EU, Trade,
Environmentand Unilateralism:Passing the Buck, 5 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 9 (2000); JOANNE
SCOTT,EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1998); Paul Demaret, EnvironmentalPolicy and Commercial
Policy: The Emergence of Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMS) in the External
Relations of the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY,

supra note 111, at 305; Damien Geradin, Trade and EnvironmentalProtection in the Context of
World Trade Rules: A View from the European Union, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 33 (1997);
Joanne Scott, On Kith andKine (and Crustaceans):Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO
(Jean Monnet, Working Paper No. 3/99, 1999), availableat http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/
papers/99/990301.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); Halina Ward, Common but Differentiated
Debates: Environment, Labour and the World Trade Organization,45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 592
(1996); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, InternationalTrade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1997); Asif H. Qureshi,
ExtraterritorialShrimps,NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body, 48 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 199 (1999);
Barbara Eggers & Ruth Mackenzie, The CartagenaProtocolon Biosafety, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 525
(2000); Horst Gllnter Krenzler & Ann MacGregor, GMFood: The Next Major TransatlanticTrade
War?, 5 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 287 (2000); ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001); SARA DILLON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND ECONOMIC LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ch. 5 (2002).
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the use of the mixed formula both in the multilateral and bilateral 258
contexts seems to be continuing.259
2. There should be no doubt about the general validity or actual practical
significance of the mixed procedures since important EC and Member
States' policy areas of international relations are organized based on
the mixed agreements technique. 26" This, as a matter of principle, is not
contested on any legal grounds any more.261
3. The ECJ has accepted the concept of mixed agreements 262 and
recognized in its Ruling 1/78, Opinion 1/78, Opinion 2/91, and Opinion
1/94 (Re WTO Agreement) inter alia that some agreements require the
participation of both the Community and the Member States.2 63 From
here one can deduce that not all Community competence is
exclusive. 2' Furthermore, in the everyday practice of the Community
institutions we see that the concept of mixed agreement is a wellestablished part of EC law. 265 An example of this is Case 12/86,
Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gmiind, in which the European
Court of Justice used the term "mixed agreement" to describe the
Association Agreement between the Community and Member States
on the one hand and Turkey on the other.26 6
4. It is a fact of life that mixed agreements raise difficult and interesting
legal and political issues about the role of the Communities and the

258. Almost all the EC's association agreements under article 310 EC have been concluded
as mixed agreements, being the only exceptions the agreements with Cyprus and Malta.
HELISKOSKI, supra note 157, at 3. See also EC Treaty art. 310; 1973 O.J. (L 133) 2 (Republic of
Cyprus); 1971 O.J. (L 61) 2 (Malta).
259. HELISKOSKI, supra note 157, at 2-3.
260. MACLEODETAL., supra note 181, at 143-44.
261. Id. For previous criticism, see G. Testa, L'intervention des Etats membres dans la
procedurede conclusion des accords d'associationde la Communautg economique europdenne
[The Intervention of the Member States in the Procedure of Conclusion of the Agreements of
Association of the European Economic Community], 2 CARFERS DE DROIT EUROPtENNE 502
(1966); Costonis, supra note 249, at 451-53.
262. See, e.g., Ruling 1/78, Draft Convention of the InternationalAtomic Energy on the
PhysicalProtectionof Nuclear Materials,Facilities,and Transports, 1978 E.C.R. 2151; Opinion
1/78, InternationalAgreement of NaturalRubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871; Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R.
I-1061; Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267. See also Advocate General Jacobs, C-316/91, European
Parliamentv. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-625, 48; Neuwahl, supra note 249, at 667-68 (referring to
a "benevolent" attitude toward mixity illustrated in the WTO Opinion).
263. Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151; Opinion 1/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2871; Opinion 2/91, 1993
E.C.R. 1-1061, 5; and Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267.
264. See Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 5.
265. MACLEODETAL., supra note 181, at 144.
266. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Gmtind, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 8.
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Member States in the international arena.267 Despite the legal
uncertainties, in practice, the Community and the Member States
participate together effectively in various international agreements.268
It is precisely in the field of international treaty law that mixed
agreements show the changes that international law has undergone
through the establishment of entities such as the EC.269
5. In this same line of thought, Allan Rosas argues that:
[t]he European Union being a hybrid conglomerate situated
somewhere between a State and an intergovernmental organisation,
it is only natural that its external relations in general and treaty
practice in particular should not be straightforward. The
phenomenon of mixed agreements ... offers a telling illustration of
the complex nature of the EU and the Communities as an
international actor.27 ° We speak of complex nature since the
circumstance which has to occur is to have an agreement which is
a Community and a national agreement at the same time. This
means that Europe has [27] voices (one for each Member State)
plus one more voice coming from any of the European
Communities.
6. The phenomenon of mixed agreements is, therefore, not only deeply
interrelated to EC law and its division of powers doctrine but it is also
interrelated to public international law. As for the division of powers,
McGoldrick points out that "[e]ach international agreement will require
consideration of its subject matter to determine the allocation of
competence between the EC and the [M]ember [S]tates, and the nature
of that competence.,, 27 ' This allocation of competence can evolve over
the lifetime of an agreement [this is so even during the drafting of an
agreement, as evidenced by Case C-24/95, Comm 'n v. Council (FAO
Fisheries Agreement)]27 2 or series of agreements. This has been the
case with the GATT. 273 According to public international law, the
rights and obligations which derive from an agreement form an

267. MACLEOD ETAL., supra note 181, at 144.
268. Id.
269. Christian Tomuschat, Liabilityfor Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra
note 6, at 125-26.
270. Allan Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra
note 6, at 125.
271. McGOLDRIcK, supra note 4, at 78-79.
272. Case C-25/94, Comm'n v. Council (FAO Fisheries Agreement), 1996 E.C.R. 1-1469.
273. For further detail, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Participation of the European
Communities in the GATT: International Law and Community Law Aspects, in MIXED
AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 167. See also MCGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 121.
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undivided entity. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the EC
and its Member States cannot respect the internal division of
competence according to EC law.274
As for the inadequate explanation of mixed agreements, in his book
Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International
Relations of the EuropeanCommunity andits Member States, Heliskoski
rightly points out the lack of adequate contextual legal principles among
legal scholars who pursue legal analyses of mixed agreements.275
If the EC and its Member States both participate in international
agreements, it is due to the limited scope of the EC's competence in
international relations. 276 The international rights and obligations of an
institution such as the EC depend on its functions and purposes. The EC
is based on general and limited attribution of legal authority laid down by
the EC Treaty.27 7 Often times, a particular international agreement goes
beyond the EC's competence or legal authority to act. In such cases,
Member States assume the remainder of treaty commitments. This is the
legal reason for having recourse to the mixed procedure. 8
Quite frequently, the justification for the conclusion of an agreement
as mixed relates to the nature of the EC's competence. The ECJ recognizes
that EC competence does not necessarily exclude that of Member States'
and it may be up to Member States to take part in the agreement together

274. Giorgio Gaja, The European Community's Rights and Obligations under Mixed
Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 137.
275. HELISKOSKI, supra note 157, at 7. For examples of works denouncing this fact, see which
denounce this fact works by KLAUS D. STEIN, DER GEMISCHTE VERTRAG IM RECHT DER
AUSSENBEZIEHUNGEN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFrSGEMEINSCHAFT (1986); DOLMANS, supra
note 247.
276. The scope of the common commercial policy has been subject of political and legal
debate for a long time. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Scope ofArticle 113 of the EEC Treaty, in
STUDIES OF RIGHT OF COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES: MELANGES OFFERTS A PIERRE-HENRI
TEITGEN 148 (1984); Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The Common CommercialPolicy-ScopeandNature
of the Powers, in PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 7(1st ed. 1983); Marise
Cremona, The Completion of the Internal Market and the Incomplete Commercial Policy of the
European Community, 15 EuR. L. REv. 283, 296 (1990); THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S
COMMERCIAL POLICY, supra note 111; PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1994); Damian Chalmers, Legal Base and the
External Relations of the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE
LAW, supra note 83; Marise Cremona, Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and
External Trade, in THE EU AND THE WTO, supra note 190.
277. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J., at 180 (Apr. 11); Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
278. DOLMANS, supra note 247, at 95.
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with the EC. 279 Most legal scholars tend to rely on non-contextual general
principles when dealing with mixed agreements. This means that the
criterion for the division of powers between the EC and its Member States
has turned into a scheme of interpretation by which the different legal
questions arising in relation to mixed agreements such as implementation
or responsibility could be addressed. This means that the practice of mixed
agreements is not analyzed since the conception is purely noncontextual.2 °
When giving a legal analysis of mixed agreements, one should also
incorporate the EC's and Member States' treaty partners. Legal scholars
have admitted that the various rules and principles to be applied do not
only emanate from EC and national law but also from international law. 21'
Why is it so important to include third parties when trying to reach a
proper conception of the mixed procedure? Simply because without them
there would be no international agreement. Any conception of mixed
agreements without taking into account third parties would be a partial
approach and, therefore inadequate, explanation of this legal phenomenon.
On the international law front, we perceive that neither the EC Treaties,
nor Community legislation, nor the ECJ's case law is binding on the other
contracting parties. If the practice of mixed agreements is neglected, then
one could argue that the general principles of international law 2 2 seem to
be transplanted to the specific context of the EC and Member States'
external relations in general and mixed agreements in particular. In this
line of thought, we can quote Albert Bleckmann: "In order to find a
solution to [the] problem [of judicial positions of the different parties to a
mixed agreement], we have necessarily to refer to the general principles
of interpretation of public international law. 2 3 That said, the scope of
such principles tends to be unclear and controversial. Quoting Bleckmann
again, "[The] general principles to which we refer ... have not, as yet,

279. Alan Dashwood & Joni Heliskoski, The ClassicalAuthoritiesRevisited, in THE GENERAL
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 17. See also HELISKOSKI, supra note 157, at
36-46.
280. STEIN, supra note 275, at 61.
281. While there is no international law treatise on the topic, this aspect has been discussed.
See, e.g., Phillip Allott, Adherence To andFromMixedAgreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra
note 6, at 97; Christina Tomuschat, LiabilityforMixedAgreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra
note 6, at 125; Giorgio Gaja, The European Community's Rights and Obligations Under Mixed
Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 133; Albert Bleckmann, The Mixed
Agreements of the EEC in Public InternationalLaw, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supranote 6, at 155.
282. Be them, effet utile, good faith, or equality, among others.
283. Albert Bleckmann, The Mixed Agreements of the EEC in Public InternationalLaw, in
MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 157.
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been clearly established by public international law. ' 2 4 The general
principles might "be excluded if an analysis of the interests
of the parties
25
regulated by the treaty indicates a different solution., 1
When dealing with legal analyses of mixed agreements, this is the
current state of the art. It is, therefore, important to clarify the unlimited
number of questions concerning the legal implications of the mixed
procedure which constantly arise in the actual practice of the EC's external
relations. That said, mixed agreements are favored by EU Member States
as it allows them to preserve their presence and prestige in the
international scene or their voting rights in an agreement. 286 They are also
favored by the Commission for practical reasons. A mixed agreement does
not usually delineate the allocation of competences. 287 Therefore, the
arduous task of agreeing the nature of some Community competences is
obviated. Politically, the Community also yields benefits, as its
international presence is enhanced. Mixed agreements could arise when
the Community wishes to ensure and/or increase the responsibility of
Member States in a given field, for example, with environmental issues.
It could also be the case that the Community is not able to fulfill a given
objective independently, or as effectively as with the co-operation of
Member States, for example with humanitarian or development aid.

284. Id.
285. Id. at 160.
286. McGOLDRJCK, supra note 4, at 78; Neuwahl, supra note 247, at 726.
287. In fact, the ECJ is not particularly keen on express ex ante allocation of competences
between the Member States and the Communities in an international agreement with third
countries. As a matter of Community law, the Community and the Member States are under no
obligation to provide how competences are divided in the agreement. This is an EU domestic
question in which Third States need not intervene. See, e.g., Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151, 35.
The inherent difficulty of delineating competences is obvious. Also, even the clearest division of
powers is susceptible to change over time. See, e.g., Commission Communication to the Council
on Participation by the Community in the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, at 3, COM
(81) 799 final (Dec. 9, 1981): "[S]uch requirements would be bound to lead to serious disputes,
quite apart from the practical difficulty of their application in the case of the Community, given the
essentially evolving nature of the responsibilities assigned to the latter by the Treaty of Rome."
Sometimes, a statement of the declaration of the respective competences of the Community and the
Member States, what is called a "declaration of competence," is insisted upon as a pre-condition
for Community participation in an agreement. See, e.g., Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1353 (1982); Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffick in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (Art. 27(2), 1992 UKTS 26, Cm 1923); Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer (Art. 13 (3), 1988 O.J. (L 297) 8). The declaration, which invariably
describes the allocation of competences in general terms, is without prejudice to the allocation
under the Treaties and contains caveats as to changes over time. The Community usually reserves
the right to make further declarations of competence as its powers increase. The legal credentials
of such declarations are also debatable as they cannot override the legal position under the Treaties.
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Needless to say, mixed agreements are a useful device in avoiding or
hiding inter-institutional tension since there is no need to agree on the
exact delimitation of Community powers in relation to Member States'
powers. 288 They cater for the constantly evolving nature of Community
competences.2 89 The allocation of competences can evolve over the
lifetime of an agreement.29 °
Since there are many different types of mixed agreements, depending
on how they are categorized, the answer to the question they raise may
" ' Let us, see then, some ways of classification. Rosas
vary dramatically.29
292
makes a basic distinction between parallel and shared competences.
A. Types of Competence
The terminology used in the doctrine is very unclear: non-exclusive,
shared, parallel, joint, concurrent, and divided competence of the EC.

288. As very vividly described by Weiler, they "diffuse at a stroke the explosive issues of the
scope of Community competences (and treaty-making power) and the parameters ofthe preemptive
effect." J.H.H. Weiler, The ExternalLegalRelations ofNon-unitaryActors: Mixity and the Federal
Principle, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 75.
289. See, e.g., Case C-25/94, Comm 'n v. Council(FAO Fisheries Agreement) 1996 E.C.R. I1469; Joined Cases 21-24/72, Int'l Fruit Co. NV and Others v. Produktschapvoor Groenten en
Fruit (Int'lFruit), 1972 E.C.R. 1219.
290. For example, in the InternationalFruitcase, the ECJ held that the Community had
assumed competence in the field of, inter alia, common external tariffs and trade policy, within
which the GATT fell. Joined Cases 21-24,72, Int'l Fruit Co., 1972 E.C.R. 1219,
14. The
Community was therefore perceived as having succeeded the Member States in the GATT and the
provisions of that agreement had the effect of binding the Community. Id. 18. See also Ruling
1/78 (Nuclear Material Case), 1978 E.C.R. 2151, 35. Here, the ECJ expressly recognized the
continuous changing nature of Community law and refused to insist on a clear demarcation of
powers between the Community and the Member States in the Draft Convention on the Physical
Protection ofNuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, noting that it was an internal Community
question in which third parties had no need to intervene. Id. What was important was that the
implementation of the Convention should not be incomplete. Id. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Participationof the EuropeanCommunities in the GA TT: InternationalLaw and Community Law
Aspects, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 167; Pierre Pescatore, ExternalRelations in the
Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615
(1979); Ilona Cheyne, InternationalAgreements and the European Community Legal System, 19
EuR. L. REv. 581 (1994).
291. Henry G. Schermers, A Typology of Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra
note 6, at 22; DOLMANS, supra note 247, at 25, 39-42; Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supranote 6, at 128-33; MACLEOD ET AL., supranote 181, at 143;
Giulio Tognazzi, Nozione e classificazione degli accordi misti, 4 COMMUNITARIAN RT. & INT'L
EXCHANGES 590 (1994).
292. Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 128-33.
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These terms are used here to describe the same phenomenon, that is the
potential powers which the EC may exercise if the Council so decides and
which, when exercised, may turn into exclusive EC competence. 93
However, as we will see later, it is inappropriate to use the locution
"parallel competence" to refer to a situation where non-exclusive EC
competence turns out to be exclusive EC competence. Again, the doctrine
is imprecise in its terminology. 94
1. Parallel Competence
"Parallel competence ...implies that the Communities may adhere to
a treaty, with full rights and obligations as any other Contracting Party,
this having no direct effect on the rights and obligations of Member States
' However, this situation might have
being parties to the same treaty."295
indirect effect on the rights and obligations of the Member States.296 For
example, the Agreement establishing the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),2 97 which is open to States and

293. The fundamental principle of EC law is the principle that the EC's powers are attributed
to the EC by the Member States. See, e.g., PAUL J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, § 1.3, at 112 (2d ed. 1989); see Ren6
Barents, The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community
Legislation,30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 85 (1993) (discussing the principle).
294. To make the terminological confusion ever greater, while international law uses the term
power or jurisdiction, EC law has usually adopted the term competence. Furthermore, the ECJ has
used both competence and power interchangeably. See Tridimas & Eeckhout, supra note 158, at
144; Neuwahl, supra note 247, at 718; MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 38-39.
295. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 203.

296. For a discussion on the conclusion of external international agreements and their effect
on Community law and the law of the EU Member States, see Nanette Neuwahl, Individuals and
the GA 77: DirectEffect and Indirect Effects ofthe GA TT in Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 83, at 313-14; Philip Lee & Brian Kennedy, The
PotentialDirect Effect of GA7T 1994 in European Community Law, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 67
(1996); NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (Monroe Leigh et al. eds., 1999).

297. Founded in 1991, the EBRD uses the tools of investment to help build market economies
and democracies in 27 countries from central Europe to central Asia. See Wikipedia, European
Bankfor Reconstruction and Development, Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ EBRD (describing the
history and general information regarding the EBRD) (as of Dec. 31,2007, 14:50 EST). The EBRD
is owned by 60 countries and two intergovernmental institutions. Id. Despite its public sector
shareholders, it invests mainly in private enterprises, usually together with commercial partners.
Id. The EBRD provides project financing for banks, industries, and businesses, both new ventures
and investments in existing companies. Id.It also works with publicly-owned companies to support
privatization, restructuring state-owned firms, and improvement of municipal services. Id. The
EBRD's mandate stipulates that it must only work in countries that are committed to democratic
principles. See Wikipedia, EuropeanBankforReconstruction andDevelopment,supra.The EBRD
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the EC alike,298 obliges "each Contracting Party to provide financial
resources as a loan or grant to a Third State or international fund
(assuming that the participation of the EC would be covered by the
Community budget., 299 The given situation can be more complex if
financial assistance does not come from the Community budget but from
a separate fund, consisting of Member States' contributions and based on
a separate internal agreement between or among the Member States.
An example could be the adherence to the 1989 Protocol Relating to
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
prompted by the need to protect the Community trademark.3 °° According
to Article 10 of the Madrid Protocol, each Contracting Party, including the
EC, has one vote.3 ' 1 This implies that the EC and its Member States may
have altogether 28 votes, a principle contested by the United States, which
has so far refused to adhere to the Protocol. °
2. Shared Competence
As for shared competence, it implies some division of the rights and
obligations in the agreement between the Community and the Member
States. According to Dolmans, one can distinguish between mixed
agreements with coexistent competence and mixed agreements with
concurrent competence.30 3 Let us start with the latter case.
a. Concurrent Competence
A mixed agreement with concurrent competence implies that the
agreement in question forms a certain whole or totality, which is
indivisible or cannot be separated into two parts. Phillip Allot, when
referring to concurrent competence, speaks of mixed agreements "in the

is directed by its founding agreement to promote, in the full range of its activities, environmentally
sound and sustainable development. Id. For more information on the EBRD, see MAcLEOD ET AL.,
supra note 181, at 187-89.
298. Council Decision of 19 Nov. 1990 (EBRD), 1990 O.J. (L 372) 1.
299. Allan Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS,
supranote 6, at 129.
300. Commission Proposalfora Council DecisionApproving the Accession of the EC to the
ProtocolRelatingto the MadridAgreement Concerningthe InternationalRegistrationofMarks,
COM (96) 367 final (July 22, 1996).
301. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, June 27, 1989.
302. Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAw ASPECTS, supranote

6, at 203 n.20.
303. DOLMANS, supra note 247, at 25, 39-42, 97.
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strong sense," meaning that the Community and Member States
participation is "inextricably confused." 3" Such a truly sharedcompetences situation may arise principally if there is a non-exclusive
Community competence covering the whole and entire agreement. Articles
11, paragraph 5 (agreements relating to economic and monetary policy),
174, paragraph 4 (environmental agreements), and 181, paragraph 2
(agreements relating to development cooperation) of the EC Treaty
provide that not only the Community, but also the Member States may
negotiate in international bodies and conclude international agreements.
Nevertheless, according to a Declaration on Articles 111, 174, and 181 EC
contained in the Final Act of the TEU, °5 this (non-exclusive) competence
is subject to the European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) judgment
of the ECJ, that is to say, the principle by which the adoption of common
rules by the Community may create exclusive Community competences
also on the fields covered by the said articles.
There are also other areas where the Community may have a nonexclusive competence to conclude agreements if it has a corresponding
competence to establish internal rules and this specific competence has not
yet been used. In this respect, we have as examples the joined cases 3, 4
and 6/76 (Kramer)30 6 as well as Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No. 170)307
and Opinion 2/92 (OECD National Treatment Instrument). 8 According
to Rosas, even if this specific competence has been used, "the external
competence may rest at least partly non-exclusive if the common internal
rules are considered as minimum rules only or [if the common internal
rules] do not cover the whole area regulated in the international
agreement. ' ' 309 An example of the latter case is Opinion 1/94 (WTO
Agreement).310
304. Phillip Allot, Adherence and Withdrawal from Mixed Agreements, in MIXED
AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 118-19.
305. TEU Final Act.
306. Joined Cases 3, 4, and 6/76, Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. 1303, 1308-09 ( 9 19-34). See
generally Albert W. Koers, The ExternalAuthority of the EECin Regard to Marine Fisheries,14
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 269-301 (1977).

307. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061 at 1076-77 (997, 12).
308. Opinion 2/92, OECDNat'I Treatment Instrument, 1995 E.C.R. 1-521, at 558-60.
309. Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 131 (footnotes omitted).
310. Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, 82. See also Opinion 2/91, ILO
Convention 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061. If the common rules are in fact "minimum requirements" or
standards, the Member States are not precluded from concluding international agreements which
establish higher standards so long as these international commitments are not an obstacle to the
adoption of more stringent measures by the Community. Id.9 18-21. It would seem, however, that
as soon as a directive contains provisions which are more than minimum requirements, the
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b. Coexistent Competence
As for mixed agreements with coexistent competence, since the
agreements "contain provisions which fall under the exclusive competence
of the Community and/or the Member States, respectively,3 1' [it is] in
principle possible to divide it into two separate parts, for which either the
Community or the Member States are responsible. 312 Rosas suggests, as
an example of this, "a treaty containing one chapter on trade in goods and
another on military defence. This situation could.., be seen as [if we were
dealing with] two different treaties presented in one.., document., 313 In
this respect, Allot notes that for such mixed agreements "in the weak
sense" it should not be possible to separate completely the Community and
Member States parts of the agreement.314
If there are real national competences involved, which "coexist" with
EC competences, then the nature of the agreement may make it difficult
to separate the agreement into two parts.315 In this respect, "the ECJ has
... said that the Community and the Member States share competence
where an agreement covers both matters within the exclusive competences
of the Member States and matters within the exclusive competence of the
[EC]. 316 An example, which gives evidence of this is Opinion 1/78
(National Rubber). There, the Court addressed a scheme where, under a
commodity agreement,317 Member States would have directly financed the
Community would acquire exclusive competence and, therefore, an international agreement dealing
with the same subject matter will necessarily "affect" these rules. See MACLEOD ET AL., supranote
181, at 59; McGOLDRICK, supranote 4, at 76; David O'Keeffe, Exclusive, Concurrentand Shared
Competence, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 189; Nanette

Neuwahl, Case Note on Opinion 2/91, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1185 (1991).
311. See Cremona, supranote 276, at 393; Marise Cremona, ExternalRelationsandExternal
Competence: The Emergence of an IntegratedPolicy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 137 (Paul
Craig & Grdinne de Bfirca eds., 1999); Panos Koutrakos, The Interpretationof MixedAgreements
Under the PreliminaryReference Procedure,7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 25 (2002).
312. Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 129.
313. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supranote 18, at 204.
314. Allot, Adherence to and Withdrawalfrom Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS,
supra note 6, at 118-19. See, e.g., Ruling 1/78, (DraftConvention on the PhysicalProtectionof
Nuclear Materials,Facilities,and Transports), 1978 E.C.R. 2151.
315. MACLEODETAL.,supranote 181, at 131.
316. Id. at65.
317. On commodity agreements, see FIONA GARDEN-ASHWORTH, INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITY CONTROL: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND APPRAISAL (1984); ERVIN ERNST,
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS: THE SYSTEM OF CONTROLLING THE INTERNATIONAL
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agreement, with the pertinent implications for its decision-making
procedures, even if the essential policy of such an agreement came within
the Community's exclusive competence under Article 133 EC.31 8 On the
relevance of Member State financing of the agreement, 1 9 see Opinion 1/94
and Case C-316/91, Parliamentv. Council3 20 and Opinion of AdvocateGeneral Jacobs, paragraphs 55-59.321 This NaturalRubber case is related
agreements in pursuance of
to Community participation in commodities
322
the common commercial policy.
In the case of coexistent competence, there is what Rosas calls a
"presumed 'horizontal' (sectorial) distribution of competences"
(commercial policy, due to trade in goods, and defence policy, due to
military policy). 323 One can also imagine a more "vertical" distribution of
competences.3 24 By this, Rosas means a situation in which "the
Community would be competent to conclude the main substantive parts of
the agreement, while Member State participation would be deemed
necessary because of the nature of its obligations relating to the
implementation and enforcement of those substantive parts. ' 325 As an
example we can take into account the agreement considered in Ruling 1/78
(Re the Draft Convention on the PhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterials,
Facilities and Transports), in which, as far as its provisions on penal
sanctions and extradition were concerned, Member State participation was
required.326
One more example is that of the 1995 U.N. Agreement Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly

COMMODITY MARKET (1982); KABIR-uR-RAHMAN KHAN, THE LAW AND ORGANISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (1982).

318. See 1979 E.C.R. 2871,2917-18 ( 57-60); Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151,2180(136);
MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 65.
319. Opinion 1/94 (Re WTO Agreement), 1 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 205 11 19-20 (1995).
320. Case C-316/91, Parliamentv. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-625.
321. Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-316/91, European Parliament.
322. See generally Opinion 1/78, Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979
E.C.R. 2871.
323. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 204; Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 130.
324. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 204; Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 130.
325. Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 130.
326. Ruling 1/78, (Draft Convention of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency on the
PhysicalProtections of Nuclear MaterialsFacilities& Transports) 1978 E.C.R. 2151 36.
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Migratory Fish Stocks.327 This agreement, mainly because of its provisions
on compliance and enforcement (Part VI), has been defined by the Council
of the EU as a mixed agreement.32 Following this line of argument, in an
EC Declaration submitted upon signature in accordance with Article 47,
it is noted that, while the Community has exclusive competence with
respect to the conservation and management of living marine resources,
including the regulatory competence granted under international law to the
Flag State in this respect, measures such as refusal, withdrawal or
suspension of authorization to serve as masters and other officers of
fishing vessels, as well as certain enforcement measures relating to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Flag State over its vessels on the high seas,
are within the competence of the Member States.329
However, in many cases, "the provisions relating to possible
'coexistent' Member States competences may be of such a limited
relevance that they should be seen as 'ancillary' (subsidiary) to the
essential objectives of the agreement., 330 The ECJ has cases on subsidiary
provisions, which are often related to Article 133 EC on common
commercial policy. I would like to illustrate one case and two opinions
from the ECJ as examples of what has been previously said: Opinion 1/78
(Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber),331 Opinion 1/94
(WTO Agreement),332 and Case C-268/94 Portugalv. Council.333 In this
last case, the ECJ concludes in its paragraph 77 as follows:
Furthermore, with regard to the linking of Article 10 of the
Agreement [Cooperation Agreement between the European
Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and
Development] to commercial policy, it is sufficient to point out that
the Community is entitled to include in external agreements

327. U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 32 (1996).
328. Id. at 26.
329. Commission's Proposal for a Council Decision on the Ratification by the European
Community for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Law of Sea of Dec. 10, 1982, relating
to the conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, 1996
O.J. (C 367) 24.
330. Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 130.
331. Opinion 1/78, DraftInternationalAgreementonNaturalRubber,1979 E.C.R. 2871 56.
66-68.
332. Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5278
75, 77. For an academic
333. Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. 6177,
comment on the case, see Steve Peers, FragmentationorEvasion in the Community's Development
Policy? The Impact of Portugalv. Council, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS,
supra note 18, at 100-12.
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otherwise falling within the ambit of Article 133 ancillary
provisions for the organization of purely consultative procedures or
clauses calling on the other party to raise the level of protection of
intellectual property (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/94, [1994 E.C.R.
526], paragraph 68).
MacLeod et al. assert that
The principal consequence of shared competence is that the
Member States still have power to enter into agreements and to take
action in the areas in question .... Although the concept of shared
external competence is well established in Community law and
practice, it has not always been possible to persuade [T]hird [S]tates
to recognize that the legal powers and interests of the Community
and the Member States co-exist. 335 Third States have tended to insist
that either the Community or the Member States should accept legal
responsibility for a given matter, and that both cannot be
responsible, or exercise rights at the same time, on the same
matters. The extent to which international law recognizes the
concept of "shared competence" is therefore open to debate.336
At the same time, it must be said that the fact Member States will have
obligations concerning the implementation and execution ofthe agreement
does not classify the agreement as mixed. As means of evidence, we have
337 Here the Court
Opinion 1/75 (Understandingon a Local Cost Standard).
held that "[i]t is of little importance that the obligations and financial
burdens inherent in the execution of the agreement envisaged are borne
directly by the Member States."3 38 Another example is Opinion 2/91 (ILO
Convention No 170). 339
B. Types of Mixity
Mixity can also be classified as facultative (non-compulsory) and
obligatory, that is, legally necessary. 34° "Where the competence of the

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. 6177, 77.
This is mainly the case in the World Intellectual Property Organization.
MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 63 (footnotes omitted).
Opinion 1/75, Understandingon a Local Cost Standard,1975 E.C.R. 1355.
Id. at 1364.
Opinion 2/91, (ILO ConventionNo. 170),1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 34.
Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supranote 6,

at 131.
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[EC] is non-exclusive but there are no competences [specifically] reserved
for Member States either, [then as a matter of EC law this] mixity becomes
facultative, [optional, non-compulsory]." ' 1 This is illustrated in
environmental agreements and development cooperation agreements. This
means that you may have pure Community agreements with shared
competence. The language of the EC Treaty makes it very clear that
development cooperation is not exclusive EC competence, and yet the EC
concludes international agreements on its own.3 42 Thus, one must have a
mixed agreement only when part of the agreement covers matters outside
EC competence altogether, but EU Member States are free to insist on a
mixed agreement whenever there is shared competence.
As Rosas argues, in cases of concurrent competences, mixity is
facultative ab initio. However, if the Council and the Member States insist
on mixity for political reasons, the question arises as to whether parts of
the agreement become reserved for the Member States, in which case they
should all become contracting parties.343 We should also illustrate, in this
same line of argument, the example of an Opinion (No. 20/1995) given on
30 November 1995 by the Constitutional Committee to the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Finnish Parliament. 3" This Opinion discusses problems
"concerning the ratification of the 1995 Europe Agreement establishing an
association between the European Communities and their Member States,
on the one part, and the Republic of Estonia [before it was a member of the
EU], of the other part. 34 5
As far as obligatory mixity is concerned, it is understood that it is
necessary to have the participation of both the Member States and the EC
on a particular issue. 3" A classical example of obligatory mixity is the
Law of the Sea Convention where it is highly difficult to have one voice
representing the EU.34 7 In such a case, we deal with what is called
"subordination clauses, 348 which provide that the EC can become a party
only if one or more of the Member States have become parties. 349 For

341. Id.
342. PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 109 (2004).
343. Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note

6, at 132 n.36.
344. Id. at 143 n.78.
345. Id.
346. McGoLDRdCK, supra note 4, at 78.
347. Id. at 87.
348. See G.L. Close, SubordinationClauses in Mixed Agreements, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
382-91 (1985).
349. McGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 87.
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example, Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention
(1982), which advocates that the EC may become a party only if a majority
of the Member States ratifies or accedes.350
This distinction between obligatory and facultative mixity is not always
recognized in practice. Proof of this are the "discussions in the framework
of the EU Council (including Coreper and the Working Groups) on the
Community v. mixed character of a given agreement, [where] it is almost
always taken for granted that the lack of exclusive Community
competences... requires mixity [out of necessity]. 35'
However, it may sometimes be difficult to apply to certain cases, as can
be deduced from uncertainties such as whether Opinion 1/94 implies that
Member States' participation in the WTO Agreements on services 352 and
intellectual property rights was legally necessary or simply legally
possible. The Commission asked the Court to rule that the Community had
exclusive competence to adhere to the GATS and the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), either under Article 133
of the EC Treaty, the ERTA doctrine, implied powers in accordance with
Opinion 1/76, 353 or Articles 95 and 235 of the EC Treaty.354 In denying

350. Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention reads: "An international
organization may deposit its instrument of formal confirmation or of accession if a majority of its
Member States deposit or have deposited their instruments of ratification or accession." U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex IX art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982,21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter Law
of the Sea Convention]. Kenneth R. Simmonds, The Community'sDeclarationUpon Signatureof
the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 521 (1986). The Law of the
Sea Convention (LOSC) entered into force on November 16, 1994. However, an agreement on
Annex IX of the LOCS has meant that there is a much greater likelihood that more Member States
will ratify. Ratification of the LOSC by the EC is under active consideration. A delay in ratification
already announced by the UK in May 1996 may delay EC ratification. K.R. Simmonds, The
Communities Declaration Upon Signature of the UN.Convention on the Law of the Sea, 23
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 521-44 (1986). The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) entered into force
on Nov. 16, 1994. However, an agreement on Part IX of the LOSC meant that there would be a
much greater likelihood that more Member States would ratify, which eventually happened.
351. Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 132 n.34.
352. For an analysis of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) from a European
perspective, see Elspeth Guild & Philip Barth, The Movement of NaturalPersonsand the GA TS:
A UKPerspective andEuropeanDilemma, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 395 (1999); Piet Eeckhout,
ConstitutionalConceptsfor Free Trade in Services, in THE EU AND THE WTO, supra note 190;
Christoph W. Herrmann, Common Commercial PolicyAfter Nice: Sisyphus Would Have Done a
BetterJob, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV.7 (2002); Margareta Djordjevic, Domestic Regulation and
Free Trade in Services-A BalancingAct, 29 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 305 (2002).
353. Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement Establishinga European Laying-up Fundfor Inland
Waterway Vessels (Rhine Navigation Case), 1977 E.C.R. 741. For an analysis of Opinion 1/76, see
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their existence of exclusive competence for the whole subject area covered
by these two treaties, the Court concluded that the GATS and TRIPS
Agreement are mixed agreements.355 Some of the Member States had
argued that those provisions of the TRIPS Agreement fall within their
competence. The Court replied that "[i]f that argument is to be understood
as meaning that all those matters are within some sort of domain reserved
to the Member States, it cannot be accepted. The Community is certainly
competent to harmonize national rules on those matters.... 356
What has been said so far concerning the types of competences in the
external relations of the EU can be graphically shown as follows:35 7
A. Types of competence

B. Types of mixity

1. Parallel competence

facultative mixity

2. Shared competence
a. Concurrent competence

facultative mixity

b. Coexistent competence

obligatory mixity

1. Horizontally
2. Vertically
Lena Granvik denotes that "[m]ixed agreements are concluded
especially in the field of the environment, entailing that both the [EC] and
some or even all of its Member States individually become parties to an

Michael Hardy, Opinion 1/76 of the Court of Justice: The Rhine Case and the Treaty-Making
Powers of the Community, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 561 (1977).
354. Article 235 of the EC Treaty reads: "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in
disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second paragraph of Article 288."
EC Treaty art. 235.
355. Opinion 1/94, Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267,
53, 71.
356. Id. 104.
357. Rosas, Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6,
at 132.
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international environmental agreement. ' According to this author, there
are two types of mixed agreements: complete and incomplete mixed
agreements.359 "[C]omplete mixed agreements means that both the EC and
all of its Member States are treaty-parties, while the concept of incomplete
mixed agreements indicates that only some of the EC Member States have
acceded to the agreement in question along with the EC., 3 60 However, it
must be said that incomplete mixed agreements bind all the Member States
of the Community.3 6' Member States, whether they are parties or not,
"have an obligation to cooperate with the EC in the implementation of the
Community's international obligations. 3 62 In addition to that, a mixed
agreement, which does not distinguish between the rights and obligations
of the EC and the Member States, gives obligations to both the EC and its
Member States under all its provisions.363
It should be mentioned that the above given typology should only and
merely be seen "as a tool to assist in the structuring of the discussion on
the legal nature and implications of mixed agreements." 3" Some
agreements may fall under several of these categories as can be seen from
the ILO Convention No. 170 as interpreted by the ECJ in its Opinion
2/91.365 In this Opinion, the Court seemed to hold that part III of the
Convention belonged to exclusive EC competence and the other parts to
non-exclusive EC competence because the relevant Community directives
set minimum standards.3 66 The representation of certain dependent
territories belonged to the competence of some Member States.367
However, this right of representation is, strictly speaking, not a question
of mixity, as the Member States involved do not act in their capacity as EU
Member States.368

358. Lena Granvik, Incomplete Mixed EnvironmentalAgreements of the Community and the
Principle of Bindingness [hereinafter Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements], in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 255.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 269.
362. Id.at 270.
363. Granvik, Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 269.
364. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 207.

365.
366.
367.
368.

Opinion 2191, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061
34, 36.
Id. 34.
Id. 35.
Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF Ec
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 207; MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 65-66.
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Regarding the conclusion of mixed agreements, there seems to be
uncertainty about the nature and legal implications of joint participation
by the EC and its Member States in the conclusion of international
agreements. 369 Rosas argues in this respect that "[t]he phenomenon of
mixed agreements is still surrounded by a host of question marks, both of
a theoretical and practical nature. 37 ° In this sense, within the legal
scholarship, three main and divergent positions can be presented: 1) one
part of the doctrine has tried to reduce the mixed procedure to only
exceptional cases of some compelling legal reasons; 371 2) another part of
the doctrine has focused on the practical and theoretical problems of mixed
procedure, limiting EU Member States' participation in the EC's
international agreements to a minimum; 372 and 3) a third group of scholars
has a more dogmatic approach to obtain normative propositions by
interpreting the various provisions of international agreements or by
extrapolation from the general schemes of EC law and international law.373
As for the implications of mixed agreements for third parties, we shall
evaluate the validity and effects that the EC's international agreements
have on non-Member States of the EU.374 As we know, mixed agreements
are, together with the exclusive Community agreements, "one of the two
methods by which the Community undertakes contractual international
obligations."s In fact, "[a] lthough no specific provision is made in the EC
Treaty for joint participation of the Community and the Member States in
international agreements, the practice of concluding mixed agreements is

369. See Trevor C. Hartley, National Law, InternationalLaw and EU Law-How do they
Relate?, in ASSERTING JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 65

(Patrick Capps et al. eds., 2003).
370. Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements,in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note
6, at 127.
371. Pescatore, supra note 290, at 642.
372. Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supranote
6, at 125; Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supranote 18, at 200; Ehlermann, MixedAgreements-A List ofProblems,
in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 3.

373. Albert Bleckmann, Dergemischte Vertrag im Europarecht,EUROPARECHT 301 (1976);
STEIN, supra note 275, at 23; Bleckmann, The Mixed Agreements of the EEC in Public
InternationalLaw, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 155.
374. For a broader spectrum of the implications of international agreements on States, see a
legal analysis by Andrew Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements (Int'l Legal Stud.
Program, Working Papers Series, Paper No. 8, 2004), availableat http://repositories.cdlib.org/ils/
wp/8 (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
375. Ehlermann, MixedAgreements: A List of Problems, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note
6, at 3.
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well established in the law of the [EC]."376 This has been recognized by the
ECJ on several occasions. The recognition of the practice by the Court was
first implied in cases concerning the early agreements of association.377
The first express reference which the Court made to the concept of mixed
agreement is in Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch
Gmiind.3 78 Another example is the dicta in Opinion 1/78 on the
International Natural Rubber Agreement.379
The answer to specific legal problems arising from the issue of mixity
may vary depending on the subject matter. In other words, "the jurisdiction
of the [ECJ] in the field of mixed agreements [and] the responsibility and
liability of the [EC] and its Member States vis-di-vis [T]hird [S]tates," inter
alia.38 °
In relation to the liabilities of the EC and the Member States to third
parties,"' within the EC legal order, the Community and the Member
States are responsible for the implementation of those parts of mixed
agreement which fall within their respective competences. The only
authoritative discussion of the liability of the Community and the Member
States under a mixed agreement is in the opinion of Advocate-General
Jacobs in Case C-316/91, where he said:
The [Lome] Convention was concluded as a mixed agreement
(i.e. by the Community and its Member States jointly) and has
essentially a bilateral character. This is made clear in Article 1,
which states that the Convention is concluded between the
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP
States, of the other part. Under a mixed agreement the Community
andthe Member States arejointlyliable unless theprovisionsof the
agreementpoint to the opposite conclusion.382

376. HELISKOSKI, supranote 157, at 2.

377. See, e.g., Case 96/71, Haegeman v. Comm'n, 1972 E.C.R. 1005 (concerning the 1961
Agreement with Greece).
378. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Gmijnd, 1987 E.C.R. 3719,
8-9.
379. Opinion 1/78, Int'lAgreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871,
2, 29.
380. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supranote 18, at 207.

381. Stefano Nicolin, Modalitei di Funzionamentoe di Attuazione degli Accordi Misti, in LE
RELAZIONI ESTERNE DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA NEL Nuovo MILLENNIO 177 (Luigi Daniele ed.,

2001).
382. Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-316/91, European Parliamentv. Council, 1994
E.C.R. 1-625, 69 (emphasis added).
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Generally, each party to an international agreement is responsible for
performance of its own obligations, and joint liability under an agreement
is not usually to be presumed.383 However, the special circumstances of the
EC and the Member States may lead to an exception to this rule. The EC
and the Member States generally work together in pursuit of a common
policy. Since it is very difficult to determine where legal powers lie
between the EC and the Member States, for the third party the most
convenient conclusion is that the EC and the Member States assume joint
obligations and that they are required to assure these joint obligations. The
ECJ, with its emphasis on the "requirement of unity" in the external
representation of the Community, concurs. The ECJ also emphasizes this
view in cases such as Ruling 1/78, (Draft Convention on the Physical
ProtectionofNuclear
Materials)"4 and Case 104/81, HauptzollamtMainz
385
v. Kupferberg.
In agreements where the rights and obligations of the EC and the
Member States are inter-linked, the problem of the respective liabilities of
the Community and the Member States will arise quite clearly. In other
words, we are dealing here with cases where the nature of the agreement
is such that a third party is entitled to respond to Community or Member
State action in one area covered by the agreement by retaliation of another
area. The main example is the WTO Agreement and those agreements
associated with it, but in principle, the issue could arise in any
international agreement to which the Community and the Member States
were parties. MacLeod et al. go further in the explanation by saying that:
[i]f the action and retaliation take place in respect of matters
entirely within the competence of the Community or entirely within
the competence of the Member States, the problems are less
intractable. If, however, the third party responds to action in an area
of Member State competence by retaliation in an area within the
competence of the Community, the need for close co-operation
between the Community and the Member States is evident.3 86
When an agreement is covered by a general rule of the law of treaties,
by which a party is responsible for all obligations of the treaty unless it
makes a reservation, we are dealing with an agreement which is not mixed

383. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 159.

384. Ruling 1/78, Art. 103 of the EAEC Treaty, 1978 E.C.R. 2151, 35.
385. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. c.a. Kupferberg& Cie KGA.a, 1982 E.C.R. 3641,
13-14.
386. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 159-60.
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under a formal or under a substantive definition of mixed agreements. In
extreme cases, as Schermers mentions, the position might be defended
that, in such a case, adherence by the Community implies a tacit
reservation in the sense that the EC cannot be held liable for matters which
are outside its competence.387 In these cases, Article 46 of the 1986 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties38 8 Between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations (VCLTIO)38 9 will
apply. It reads:
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound
by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its
internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as
invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2. An international organization may not invoke the fact that its
consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of
the rules of the organization regarding competence to conclude
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest
and concerned a rule of fundamental importance.
3. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to
any State or any international organization conducting itself in the
matter in accordance with the normal practice of States and, where
appropriate, of international organizations and in good faith.39 °
Concerning the effects on third parties of mixed agreements concluded
in violation of EC law, despite the fact that the internal legal competence
of the Communities and the Communities' procedures for concluding
agreements are matters of EC law, both the validity and the effects of
agreements in relation to third countries concluded in the framework of
any rules of EC law must be taken into consideration in terms of

387. Schermers, A Typology of MixedAgreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS, supranote 6, at
28.
388. The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articulates the basic rules applied
to the interpretation of treaties. These rules are increasingly important due in large measure to the
growth in treaties that directly affect non-state actors, such as corporations and individuals. For
example, there has been a proliferation of treaties that govern international economic relations,
trade, and investment; enable the enforcement of foreign awards and judgments; protect human
rights and regulate European integration. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between
States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986.
389. The 1986 Vienna Convention has not yet entered into force but it follows almost to the
letter the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
390. Id.
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" ' As Brownlie points out, the rules of
international law, and not EC law.39
392
customary law on these issues are not easy to state with certainty.
Within the doctrine, some argue that international law leaves the matter
to the internal rules of the international organization to determine the
procedures by which its consent to be bound has to be expressed.
Therefore, any violation of the internal rules of the organization

vitiates the expression of such consent, and renders the agreement
which has been 'concluded' void or voidable. Others hold that the
acts of a representative of an organization acting within his
ostensible authority bind the organization in international law, even
if the internal rules of the organization have not been complied
with.393
As a matter of fact, the principles which appear in Article 46 of the 1986
VCLTIO fall somewhere between the two previously cited schools and
represent the views of the majority of jurists.
When looking carefully at Article 46 of the 1986 VCLTIO,
"agreements concluded in breach of an organization's internal rules are not
ipso facto void ..... " As MacLeod et al. argue, "the rule in Article 46
applies in principle in favor of the State or international organization
which has acted in violation of its own internal rules, and amounts to a
defence against a claim for performance of the agreement by the
'innocent' party., 394 Therefore, the rule in Article 46 would not apply to
a state or organization which has concluded an agreement with the EC to
claim that such an agreement was void because it had been concluded
against a rule of the EC's internal legal order.395 The rest of Article 46
reinforces this presumption in favor of the validity of agreements which
have been duly concluded.3 96 One of the parties in the agreement must
show that the violation of its internal rules was "manifest" in order to
invoke an expression of consent to be bound by that agreement.397 In order
to determine whether a violation is "manifest," Article 46(3) clarifies the
situation: "the violation must have been 'objectively evident' to a party

391. See MACLEOD ETAL., supra note 181, at 129-32.
392. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622-24 (4th ed. 1990).
393. MACLEOD ET AL., supranote 181, at 130.

394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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acting in accordance with normal practice and in good faith., 398 In addition
to that, "the internal rule involved must have been 'of fundamental
importance.'" 3
Determining the extent to which the powers of the Communities relate
to a given agreement is not always easy. Sometimes, the particular roles
and competences of each of the Community institutions in the process of
concluding agreements may not be so obvious. In this regard, irregularities
result when concluding that an agreement may not be "manifest" to third
parties. This is so because if an agreement which has been irregularly
concluded is voided, it could be a problem for third parties.
The ECJ supported this view in Case C-327/91, France v.
Commission.400 This case concerned the Commission's power to conclude
an agreement between the Community and the United States in relation to
competition. 40 1 The Court's opinion was that the Commission had no such
power, but this did not affect the validity of the agreement in international
law: "[t]here is no doubt.., that the [Competition] Agreement is binding
on the European Communities... In the event of non-performance of the
Agreement by the Commission, therefore, the Community could incur
liability at international level. 40 2 Thus, an agreement concluded by, or in
the name of, one of the Communities will almost always be binding on that
Community as a matter of international law. In the light of this argument,
Schermers comments that:
[Foreign States] cannot be expected to know the extent of the
competence of the Community. Whenever the Community
concludes a treaty, [F]oreign States may presume that it is
competent to do so. If the Community acted beyond its powers it
will nonetheless be bound unless it or its Members can prove both
its lack of competence and its manifest character. The latter
especially will be difficult because of the complicated nature of
Community Law. 403
In this regard, it is pertinent to mention Article 230 of the EC Treaty,
which suggests that international acts are unusual in that, unlike other acts,

398. MACLEOD ET AL., supranote 181, at 130-31.
399. Id.at 131.
400. Case C-327/91, France v Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641, 25.
401. Id. 28.
402. Id. 25.
403. Henry G. Schermers, The InternalEffect of Community Treaty-Making, in ESSAYS IN
EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 167, 173 (David O'Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1982).
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they cannot be voided.4 4 From the reading of the first paragraph of Article
230 EC, however, one could interpret that it is possible to annul the
conclusion of international agreements concluded by the EC. 405 An
example of that could be the case mentioned earlier, France v.
Commission, where the European Commission concluded an agreement
vis-A-vis the United States on behalf of the EC on competition.4 °6 The
French Republic argued that the Commission had no power to conclude
agreements for it is only the Council of the EU the institution which has
competence to conclude international agreements on behalf of the EC.4 °7
Concerning the EC institutions and the Member States, it is not easy to
see how they could be obliged as a matter of EC law to give effect to an
agreement which was out of the demarcation of the EC's powers or which
had been concluded in the framework of constitutional principles of EC
law. However, as MacLeod et al. mention, "if... agreements concluded
in violation of internal rules of Community law usually remain valid in
international law and, binding on the Community vis-6-vis [T]hird States,
the institutions and the Member States must ensure that the rights of the
[T]hird State or international organization under the agreement are
respected."40 8 There are three ways by which the EU institutions and the
Member States would have to
take steps to align both the internal and external effects of the
agreement[: 1)] by withdrawing from the agreement, [supposing
this is possible, 2)] by rectifying the defect of [EC] law or practice
which had rendered the agreement invalid, or,... [3)] by securing
the participation of the Member States in the agreement along with
the Community.409

404. EC Treaty art. 230.
405. Article 230 EC reads:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission
and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the
European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-6t-vis third parties.
Id.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Case C-327/91, France v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641.
Id. 20, 27.
MACLEODETAL., supra note 181, at 132.
Id.
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A good example of the second method is the Commission's proposal for
a Council decision concluding the Competition Agreement with the United
States, which was the subject of annulment proceedings in Case C-327/91
Francev. Commission.41°
However, although the 1986 VCLTIO almost completely assimilates
international organizations to States, its main weakness "is that it does not
make a distinction as to treaties between an international organisation and
one or more of its Member States and third parties., 411 Nevertheless, the
International Law Commission proposed a new Article 36 his, which
reads:
Obligations and rights arise for States members of an
international organization from the provisions of a treaty to which
that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty intend
those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations
and according such rights and have defined their conditions and
effects in the treaty or have otherwise agreed thereon, and if: (a) the
States members of the organization, by virtue of the constituent
instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously
agreed to be bound by the said provisions of the treaty; and (b) the
assent of the States members of the organization to be bound by the
relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought to the
knowledge of the negotiating States and negotiating
organizations.4 12
This proposal of a new Article 36 bis came into existence mainly
because Member States of an international organization appear as "Third
States" in regard to treaties to which the international organization is a
party.413 Following the words of Riphagen, "this fiction is manifestly
absurd in most cases" due to the fact that Member States are usually
closely involved in the conclusion of a treaty by an international
organization and also because the other party to that treaty expects
410. Case C-327/9 1,France v. Comm 'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641. See also Council Decision, 1995
O.J. (L 95) 45-46.
411. Granvik, Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the
Principleof Bindingness, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 262-63.

412. Report of the Commission to the GeneralAssembly on the Work of the Thirty-Fourth
Session, [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1/(Part 2).Vol. II
(part 2).
413. Lena Granvik, Incomplete Mixed EnviornmentalAgreements of the Community andthe
PrincipleofBindingness, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 263 (Martti

Koskenniemi ed., 1998).
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performance of the Member States." 4 This proposed Article 36 bis
followed very closely the idea underlying Articles 34 to 37 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In other words, it followed the
requirement of consent of a Third State. In the eyes of Riphagen, Article
36 bis conserves the idea of consent, "be it possibly given (1) before the
fact, i.e. before the determination of the rights and obligations by the
Treaty concluded with the international organization, and (2) given
collectively."4 5 In addition, Member
States are usually very involved in
416
the performance of the treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did not address the
question of direct effect. According to Riphagen, this attitude of a system
of general international law ignoring the domestic legal systems is
remarkable in view of the emphasis nowadays placed on the international
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.4 17
V. THE PANACEA:

THE DuTY OF CLOSE COOPERATION

The origins of the duty of close cooperation may be tracked back to the
treaties themselves, particularly to the duty of loyal cooperation4"' derived
by the Court from Articles 86 ECSC,4 9 192 Euratom, and 10 EC. 420 A

414. W. Riphagen, The SecondRound ofTreatyLaw, in DUDRorrINTERNATIONALAuDROIT
DE L'INTtGRATION: LIBERAMICORUM PIERRE PESCATORE 565,568 (F. Capotorti et al., eds. 1987).
415. Id. at 568.
416. Id.
417. Id.at 569.
418. For further discussion on the duty of loyal cooperation, see KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN
TIIEMAAT, supra note 293, at 86-91. The principle of loyal cooperation concerns relations between
the supranational and national levels. According to Article 1-5(2) of the Constitutional Treaty, it
means that "[tjhe Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain
from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives." Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Oct. 29, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 47.
419. Article 86 of the former ECSC reads:
Member States undertake to take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations resulting from decisions and
recommendations of the institutions of the Community and to facilitate the
performance of the Community's tasks.
Member States undertake to refrain from any measures incompatible with the
common market referred to in Articles 1 and 4.
They shall make all appropriate arrangements, as far as lies within their powers,
for the settlement of international accounts arising out of trade in coal and steel

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

83

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

similar duty is contained in Article 3 TEU, where the Council and the
Commission are responsible for ensuring the consistency of the external
activities of the Union as a whole in the context of its external relations,
security, economic, and development policies."' This duty applies as much
to mixed agreements as to any other area of the Union's activity. The EC
and the Member States are under a legal duty to cooperate on the
negotiation, conclusion, and implementation of mixed agreements.422 This

within the common market and shall afford each other mutual assistance to
facilitate such settlements.
Officials of the High Authority entrusted by it with tasks of inspection shall enjoy
in the territories of Member States, to the full extent required for the performance
of their duties, such rights and powers as are granted by the laws of these States
to their own revenue officials. Forthcoming visits of inspection and the status of
the officials shall be duly notified to the State concerned. Officials of that State
may, at its request or at that of the High Authority, assist the High Authority's
officials in the performance of their task.
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 86, Apr. 18, 1951,261 U.N.T.S.
140 (expired July 23, 2002) [hereinafter ESCS Treaty].
420. Article 192 of the Euratom Treaty and article 10 of the EC Treaty lay out this duty in
identical language:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the
objectives of this Treaty.
Euratom Treaty art. 192; EC Treaty art. 10.
421. Article 3 TEU reads:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure
the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a
whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development
policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such
consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation
of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers.
TEU art. 3.
422. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 145. See also generally ALASDAIR R. YOUNG,
EXTENDING EUROPEAN COOPERATION: THE EU AND THE "NEW" INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGENDA
(2002); McGOLDRICK, supra note 4, at 86.
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duty results from the requirement of unity in the international
representation of the Community.4 23 "Such cooperation is 'all
4 24 the more
necessary' if the EC cannot become party to the agreement.
This duty to co-operate is an obligation imposed on Member States and
EU institutions under Community law as a consequence of the competence
situation for EC participation in the WTO. Formerly, the repealed Article
116 EEC was available for that purpose.425 It obliged Member States to
proceed within the framework of international organizations of an
economic character on matters of particular interest to the common market
only by common action. 426 However, ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty was
regrettably deleted at Maastricht. It had proven to be a useful legal basis
for coordination of actions of Member States and the Community in the
no-man's-land of dubious demarcation between Community and national
competences, or where the exercise of these competences was inextricably
linked (for instance, the international commodities agreements in
application of the so-called Proba 20427). Yet, in the view of EU
for Trade, Peter Mandelson, this coordination may need to
Commissioner 428
still.
go further
Nonetheless, ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty was not one of the most
transparent provisions of the Treaty. Where the Community was not able
to act because it was not a member of the relevant organization, Member
States would have to act on its behalf, and the necessary Community
action was decided on the basis of Article 133 EC, not ex-Article 116 EEC

34-36; Opinion 2/91, ILO, 1993 E.C.R. I423. See, e.g., Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151,
1061, 36; Opinion 1/94, WTO, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, 108. On cooperation obligations, see EC
Treaty art. 5 and TEU art. C.
424. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The EC in the WTO: The Three-Level Game of Decision-Making.
What Multilateralism can Learn from Regionalism, 8 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 18

(2004).
425. EEC Treaty art. 116 (repealed Jan. 11, 1993).
426. Id.
427. The informal administrative arrangement known as PROBA 20 is how Community
coordination takes place in all commodities agreements covered by the UNCTAD's integrated
program, except those under a common organization of the agricultural market. EECKHOUT, supra
note 342, at 195. PROBA 20 was agreed upon by the Commission and its Member States in 1981,
and "intended to improve the [EC's] external image and to strengthen its internal cohesion and
solidarity." Id. PROBA 20 is "based on the understanding that all legal and institutional
considerations regarding the respective competences of the [EC] and [its] Member States were to
be set aside," and is important for formalizing an understanding shared with the EU Council that
the EC should speak with a single voice. Id.
428. Peter Mandelson, Eur. Comm'r for Trade, An Action Plan for Trade and Development
in 2005: the EU, WTO, the G8 (Feb. 7,2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=MEMO/05/39&format=HTM.
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Treaty. There is a similar issue in Article 12 TEU in relation to matters
falling within the scope of the CFSP4 29 and Article 33 TEU4 3° in relation
to common positions in international organizations and at international
conferences in various fields covered by title VI (Provisions on Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) of the TEU.4 31 "It is thanks to
the duty of cooperation between the EC and its Member States that
consensus can be found. With regard to cooperation obligations, Article
4 32
5 EC and Article 3 of the TEU deal in the treaties directly with it.
With regard to mixed agreements, the duty of close cooperation first
emerged in Ruling 1/78133 on an Euratom case.4 34 The Court had to
adjudicate on the division of powers between Euratom and the Member
States with regard to a draft Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials.4 35 The Court said that "the draft convention.., can be
implemented as regards the Community only by means of a close
association between the institutions of the Community and the Member
States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the
fulfilment of the obligations entered into. 4 36 Regarding the
implementation of the convention, the Court said that the Community
would implement measures falling within its competence, the Member
States would implement measures falling within their competence, and the
Council would arrange for coordination of the actions of each.4 37
Since the essence of mixed agreements4 38 is that some of their
provisions fall within the competence of the Community, while others fall
within the competence of the Member States, it is hard to precisely divide
powers between the Member States and the Communities within an

429. TEU tit. 1, art. B, tit. V.
430. Article 33 TEU reads: "This title [Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in
Criminal Matters] shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security."
TEU art. 33.
431. TEU tit. VI.
432. Leal-Arcas, supra note 424, at 18.
433. Ruling 1/78, (Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,

Facilities,and Transports), 1978 E.C.R. 2151.
434. For an analysis of the ECJ case law on the matter, see Francis G. Jacobs, JudicialReview
of CommercialPolicyMeasures After the UruguayRound, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD

TRADE LAW, supra note 83, at 329.
435. Ruling 1/78, (Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,
Facilities,and Transports), 1978 E.C.R. 2151, 1.
436. Id. 34.
437. Id. 36.
438. Let us remember that a mixed agreement is an agreement signed by one, more than one,
or all the 27 Member States of the EU and the EC, on the European side, with a third party.
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agreement. The ECJ has discouraged attempts to allocate competence
between the Member States and the Community."' Instead, when
considering issues dealing with mixed agreements, the Court has
emphasized the need for common action, or close cooperation, between the
Community and its Member States in close association with each other in
the negotiation and implementation of mixed agreements." The duty of
cooperation, which follows from what the Court calls the "requirement of
unity in the international representation of the Community, ' is one of
the fundamental principles of the external relations of the Communities.
In Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention 170),4 2 the Court had to deal with an
agreement that covered matters falling within the exclusive competence of
the Community, matters where both the Community and its Member States
shared competence, and matters within the competence of the Member
States." 3 The Court said:
36. At points 34 to 36 in Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, the Court
pointed out that when it appears that the subject-matter of an
agreement or contract falls in part within the competence of the
Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is
important to ensure that there is a close association between the
institutions of the Community and the Member States both in the
process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the
obligations entered into. This duty of cooperation, to which
attention was drawn in the context of the EAEC Treaty, must also
apply in the context of the EEC Treaty since it results from the
requirement of unity in the international representation of the
Community.
37. In this case, cooperation between the Community and the
Member States is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the
former cannot, as international law stands at present, itself conclude
an ILO convention and must do so through the medium of the
Member States.
38. It is therefore for the Community institutions and the Member
States to take all the measures necessary so as best to ensure such

439. Ruling 1/78 DraftConventionon the PhysicalProtectionofNuclear Materials,Facilities
and Transports 35, 1978 E.C.R. 2151 (in relation to third parties).
440. MIXED AGREEMENTS, supra note 6, at 32.
441. Opinion 2/91,ILO Convention 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 5.
442. Id.
443. Id. 30.
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cooperation both in the procedure of submission to the competent
authority and ratification of Convention No. 170 and in the
implementation of commitments resulting from that Convention.'"
The agreement under consideration in Opinion 2/91 was not a mixed
agreement stricto sensu. The Community could not formally become a
party to it." 5 This limitation may stem from ILO provisions restricting
membership and participation only to States. However, the agreement did
involve matters within the competence of the Community and of the
Member States.
As we have already analyzed, the issue of cooperation between the
Member States and the Community institutions was raised even more
acutely in Opinion 1/94. The context of the WTO also shows that in areas
of non-exclusive EC competence, it is necessary to have coordinated
action in an EC framework." 6 It is important to note that non-exclusive EC
competence does not mean nonexistent EC competence. In areas of nonexclusive EC competence, the EC can if the EU Council of Ministers so
decides, enter into agreements with third countries without formal
adherence of EU Member States to these agreements, thereby having a socalled pure Community agreement. However, Member States normally
insist on the mixity of international agreements, even if mixity would not
be legally necessary. Speaking with one voice in many domains has to be
ensured through cooperation between the EC and its Member States, with
the idea of achieving unity of representation." 7
Therefore, the basic principle is that in all aspects of the negotiation,
conclusion and implementation of a mixed agreement, the Member States
and the Community are required to co-operate closely and act in close
association. This duty of cooperation applies to agreements involving any
of the European Communities, and is binding on the institutions of the
Community as well as the Member States. Let us now examine the EU's
interpretation of the concepts of coordination and cooperation.

444. Id. 36-38.
445. Id. 1.
446. In this sense, Torrent speaks of a fourth pillar, meaning the use of national competences
in a EU framework. See Ramon Torrent, Le quatribmepilierde 1'UnionEuropenne,in EUROPEAN
CoMMuNITY AND MIXED-TYPE AGREEMENTS, supra note 250, at 49.

447. Allan Rosas, The ExternalRelations ofthe European Union: Problemsand Challenges
66 (Paper prepared for the Forum for U.S.-EU Legal-Econ. Aff., 1998) (on file with author).
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A. Community Coordination

When engaged in proceedings involving a mixed agreement, both
Member States and the EU institutions are obliged to inform each other of
their positions, to seek to reach a common view on matters that fall within
the scope of a mixed agreement, and to proceed by common action within
the framework of international bodies."8 This involves meetings between
the representatives of the Member States and the institutions (usually the
Commission) to seek a common position. These meetings are called
Community co-ordination and take place within the framework of the
Council, either in Brussels or in an international forum in which the
Community and the Member States are participants." 9 Community coordination in the negotiation of international agreements is well
established in practice. There are informal understandings between the
Commission and the Council, such as co-ordination arrangements in
international commodity agreements and in international organizations,
particularly in the FAO and the United Nations.45 °
B. Close Cooperationand Unity of RepresentationPrinciple
Trying to reach an agreement on a common position will inevitably
lead to difficulties and disagreements. For example, a Member State may
wish to take a position inconsistent with that of the Community and its
partners during the negotiation of an agreement. An agreement also may
not be of equal relevance among all the Member States. Therefore, the
question arises whether the duty of cooperation requires all the Member
States to reach a common position or just to use their best effort to reach
such a position. In the end, each Member State will have to defend its own
interests.
It is important to distinguish between failure to agree on a position on
matters falling within the exclusive competence of the EC, and failure to
agree on a common position on matters where the Community and
Member States share competences. With regard to matters exclusively

448. David O'Keeffe, Community and Member State Competence in External Relations
Agreements of the EU, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 7-36 (1999).

449. See MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 148. When meetings between representatives
of the EU institutions and its Member States take place within the framework of an international
forum to seek a common position, they are known as sur place coordination.
450. Joni Heliskoski, Internal Strugglefor InternationalPresence: the Exercise of Voting
Rights Within the FAO, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 79
(proving through legal analysis the difficulty in finding a coordinated action between the EC and
its Member States).
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within the Member State competence, the EC Treaties have in principle
nothing to say (although the provisions of titles V and VI TEU may be
relevant).45 '
In those cases where a common position between the Community and
the Member States cannot be reached, Member States will be able to
express their own national views on matters within national competence
and exercise their national powers. Support for this proposition may be
derived from the practice of the EU Council.452 In addition, there are
instances in which a Member State might claim that its participation in an
agreement was contrary to its national interests or for some other reason
undesirable or even impossible.
Emphasis is often placed on the duty of cooperation between the
Community institutions and the Member States and the need for
Community solidarity.45 3 This duty is traced back to the Community
Treaties themselves. 454 The duty for cooperation is even more imperative
in circumstances such as those of Opinion 2/91, in which the Community
(albeit being exclusively competent) could not have entered into the ILO
convention itself and had to do so through the medium of the Member
States.455 Allocation of competences cannot (and should not) depend on
administrative issues.456
So what is entailed in Community cooperation? MacLeod et al. claim
that "[a]s a minimum, the Member States and the institutions are obliged
to inform each other of their positions, to seek to reach a common view on
matters which fall within the scope of a mixed agreement, and to proceed
by common action within the framework of international bodies and
conferences. 45 7 The Community institutions and the Member States must
take all necessary steps to ensure the best possible cooperation.458
451. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 149.

452. Id.
453. See, e.g., Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement for a Laying-Up Fundfor Inland Waterway
Vessels (Rhine Navigation Case), 1977 E.C.R. 741. On the duty of solidarity in relation to the
common commercial policy, see Opinion 1/76 OECD Local Costs Understanding,1975 E.C.R.
1355.
454. See ECSC Treaty art. 86; Euratom art. 192: EC Treaty art. 5; KAPTEYN& VERLOREN VAN
THERMAAT, supra note 293, ch. 3.5.2, at 148. Ruling 1/78, Draft Convention of the International
Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protections of Nuclear Materials, Facilities, and
34-36; Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 E.C.R. ITransports, 1978 E.C.R. 2151,
1061, 36.
455. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 37.
456. Opinion 1/94, Int'l Agreements ConcerningIntellectualProperty, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267,
107.
457. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 148.

458. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061,
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[O]nce the Community enters into [a mixed agreement,] the
subject-matter of which falls within the [shared] competence of the
Community and the Member States, the Member States are [bound
by the obligations of Article 10 EC to] facilitate the fulfilment of
the Community's obligations arising out of the agreement and may
not act unilaterally in a way which would compromise their duty to
proceed by common action within the framework of the
agreement.45 9
C. Some PreliminaryConclusions
[T]he legal position governing the participation of the [EC] and
[its] Member States in [international trade agreements and
negotiations] is flexible and... allows arrangements to be agreed
which can suit the circumstances of the particular international
organisation in question [while] recognising the positions of the
[EC] and [its] Member States.... [W]ith good [political] will and
common sense on all sides such arrangements can work.460
Proof of this can be found in successful outcome of the Uruguay Round
and the conclusion of the financial services negotiations in the framework
of the WTO in the summer of 1995.461 In this last case, the EC took the
lead during the negotiations as a result of combined efforts of the
European Commission and the Member States: "the United Kingdom,
given its position as the [EU] country with a major financial services
industry, was better able to lobby in some parts of the world than the
[European] Commission., '462 Finally, "it is in the interests of the [EC] and
[its] Member States to use their combined weight to the best effect. 4 63 The
practical application of the duty of co-operation must recognize that it is
to their advantage to do so.
To better understand the Member States' perspective on mixed
competences, we will look at one national court's interpretation of the
EC's role.

Comm 'n v. Council (FAO Fishery Agreement), 1996 E.C.R. 1-1469, 48.
459. Advocate General Jacobs in C-316/91, Eur. ParliamentvEur. Union Council (EDF case)
[1994] ECR 1-625, at 1-639, 48.
460. Stephen Hyett, The Duty of Co-Operation:A Flexible Concept, in THE GENERAL LAW
OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 253.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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VI. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND
ITS COMPLIANCE

Delimitation of competences is absolutely necessary in a federal 464 or
a quasi federal set-up nature. This appears to be the case of the EU,
depending on what policy we are analyzing-and that is certainly the case
of trade policy-for the simple reason that if there was no such
delimitation, there would be chaos within the system and no clarity among
citizens as to who does what. Therefore, I do not think that the rationale
of traditional States can be applied directly to the Union because the Union
is itself a Union of sovereign States. An example of this is the fact that
defence and foreign policy have not been clearly stated by the EU
Constitutional Treaty to be within the Union's exclusive competence,
which would be necessary in the traditional federal set-up.
Below is an analysis of the four main and non-exhaustive criteria for
evaluating the distribution of powers: efficiency; transparency and clarity;
coherence/consistency; and accountability.
A. Efficiency in InternationalTradeNegotiations
One criterion is effective functioning. Power should be exercised by an
authority at a level where it can be exercised most effectively. Since the
distribution of powers is vague, it leaves immense scope for disputes
between the Union and its Member States, which can only hamper an

464. "Broadly speaking, [European federalism] means any system of government where
several states form a unity and yet remain independent in their internal affairs." A Plain Language
Guide to Eurojargon, http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index en.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2007)
[hereinafter Eurojargon]. People who are in favor of this system are often called "federalists."
A number of countries around the world--e.g. as Australia, Canada, Germany,
Switzerland, and the United States-have federal models of government, in which
some matters (such as foreign policy) are decided at the federal level while others
are decided by the individual states. However, the model differs from one country
to another. The EU is not based on any of these models: it is not a federation but
a unique form of union in which the [M]ember [S]tates remain independent and
sovereign nations while pooling their sovereignty in many areas of common
interest. This gives them a collective strength and influence on the world stage that
none of them could have on their own. Part of the debate about the future of
Europe is the question of whether the EU should or should not become more
"federal."
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efficient Union. The EC has become a more important and difficult trading
partner. It started with six homogeneous Member States and then was
enlarged to 9, 10, 12, 15, 25, and finally 27 countries. When demands are
presented in the WTO by the EC as a common front, these inevitably carry
more weight within the WTO than would be the case if an individual
country were making the case.465 A prime example is the EC's mandate for
the Services Agreement negotiations prepared for the Seattle Ministerial
Conference in October 1999.466 This mandate included various cultural
exceptions for individual EU Member States, originating from the French
4 68
delegation. 467 France had concerns about its audio-visual services area.
The French wanted the EC to defend its national interests in the WTO.469
The reverse situation, demands from small EU Member States without
much trade clout not being heard in the WTO forum may also happen.
These demands can be lost as a result of the functioning of the EC and
thereby never emerge in the WTO arena. An example would be the lack
of action on the part of the EC on behalf of Member States in relation to
agriculture.47°
After negotiating the agreement, it must be ratified. Any EU Member
State can prevent an agreement from being finalized.47' WTO Agreements
are subject to adoption by the EU Council of Ministers and, at times by the
European Parliament.4 72 Agreements may also be adopted through
ratification by national parliaments.4 73 Therefore, it is quite possible to
have a delay in presenting ratification to parliament.
B. Transparency and Clarity
Another criterion is transparency.4 74 In the Trade Policy Review of the

465. Richard Senti, The Role of the EU as an Economic Actor Within the WTO, 7 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REv. 111, 113 (2002).
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. id.
470. Senti, supranote 465.
471. Id. at 114.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. The term "transparency" is often used [in a broad sense] to mean openness in the way the
[Member States' and] EU institutions work. The EU institutions are committed to greater openness.
They are taking steps to improve public access to information, and they are working to produce
clearer and more readable documents. This includes better drafting of laws and, ultimately, a single,
[simplified EU Constitutional Treaty]. Eurojargon, supra note 464.
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WTO, it was impossible to discern who in the EC was responsible for
negotiations, who made the actual decisions and with whom negotiations
had to be conducted.475 With EU enlargement, the current situation will
deteriorate.476 Thus, from the point of view of the WTO, the EC has
become both a powerful but difficult negotiating partner.47 7
Given the lack of transparency of the current democratic system,
accountability of the governing forces depends on their respective
competences. Therefore, in a proper democratic forum, it is imperative for
the populace to know the competences of the governments. There is a
difference of competences in the national and the transnational level, and
needs to be a clear transparent mechanism whereby the people are in a
position to understand which government to hold accountable for which
action.
As for clarity, any set-up which involves an exercise of power at two
levels-national and supranational-by numerous bodies requires clarity
and precision with which the powers have been delineated. By this, I do
not mean that any overlap be avoided at all times, which is hardly possible,
but that all efforts be made to avoid foreseeable clashes. The division as
it stands in the Nice Treaty fails miserably on this criterion. There are no
provisions in the treaties describing the principles governing the allocation
of competence between the EC and its Member States. Furthermore, as a
result of political compromises, the treaties are drafted in a complex
manner. Moreover, there are misunderstandings and false ideas
surrounding the extent of the EU's legislative competence due to lack of
clarity. Along these lines, the French Government has initiated an internet
campaign to explain, in a clear manner, what the EU process of integration
is about.478
475. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Union,
PRESS/TPRB/I198, July 26, 2002.
476. For general scholarly discussions about enlargement of the EU, see Guenther Burghardt
& Fraser Cameron, The Next Enlargementof the European Union, 2 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 7
(1997); Barbara Lippert & Peter Becker, StructuredDialogue Revisited: The EUs Politics of
Inclusion and Exclusion, 3 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 341 (1998); HEATHER GRABBE & KIRSTY
HUGHES, ENLARGING THE EU EASTWARDS (1998); THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

(Marise Cremona ed., 2002); Christophe Hillion, Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal
Analysis, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGrIMACY INTHE EUROPEAN UNION 401 (Anthony Amull &
Daniel Wincott eds., 2002); Andrew Williams, Enlargement of the Union and Human Rights
Conditionality:A PolicyofDistinction,25 EUR. L. REV. 601 (2000); Kirstyn M. Inglis, The Union's
Fifth Accession Treaty:New Means to Make EnlargementPossible,41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 937
(2004).
477. Senti, supra note 465, at 114.
478. For more detailed information on the French proposal, see Euractiv, France to Launch
Internet Site Dedicated to Europe, Jan. 18, 2006, available at http://euractiv.com/en/future-
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The steady evolution of the EU has resulted in a complex organization
of competences in the treaties. The legal provisions covering the
distribution of EC competences are dispersed over the EC Treaty. This
renders the system opaque and difficult to understand. In turn, this lack of
clarity hampers democratic control, as it is unclear where political
responsibility lies. This is, perhaps, due to lack of political will. Political
responsibility and democratic control would be made easier if power were
not so dispersed. From a legal perspective, Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ gave
some indications on issues of responsibility between the EC and its
Member States in the WTO, but did not really clarify much, partly because
of the intrinsically evolutionary nature of, say, the GATS.4 79
The Nice and Laeken European Councils requested the delimitation of
competence between the EC and its Member States be examined in order
to respond to criticism that the EC should take less action in certain areas
and more in others. 48" The EC has a tendency to legislate in areas in which
it is not competent or in which it is not appropriate for the EC to do so. 481
At the moment, the system of delimitation of competences between the EC
and its Member States lacks clarity for various reasons: a) amendments to
the EU Treaties of provisions drafted in a complex manner, as a result of
political compromises; b) the fact that neither the system for delimiting
powers, nor the principles governing such a delimitation, nor the types of
competence available to the EU and the areas covered by each type of
competence are clearly defined by the EC Treaty; and finally, c) the new
methods of coordination, which set objectives without taking into account
the allocation of powers.48 2
All of these reasons contribute to the lack of clarity and give the
impression that the EC's powers are very broad, when in fact this is not the
case. Thus, misunderstandings and false ideas about the extent of the EC's

eu/france-launch-intemet-site-dedicated-europe/article- 151644 (last visited Dec. 18,2007). Other
related articles are: Euractiv, Transparency Initiative, June 8, 2005, available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/transparency-initiative/article- 140650 (last visited Dec. 18,2007);
Euractiv, French Civil Society Jumps into the Transparency Debate, June 19, 2006, availableat
http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/french-civil-society-jumps-transparency-debate/article-I 56200 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2007).
479. Piet Eeckhout, The EUand its Members States in the WTO-Issues of Responsibility, in
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 449-64 (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds., 2006).
480. European Convention, The Secretariat, Description of the Current System for the
Delimitation of Competence Between the European Union and the Member States, CoNY 17/02,
dre/JD/mb, at 2 (Discussion Paper 2002).
481. Id. at 5.
482. Id. at 12.
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legislative competence often exist.483 The competences today appear in the
EU Constitutional Treaty in a vague form. The concepts of exclusive and
concurrent competences could be more clearly defined. This would clarify
the fields for which the principle of subsidiarity applies (i.e., only
concurrent competence).484 It can be envisaged to combine this exercise
with a re-ordering of the treaties along logical lines. This could increase
the clarity of the text, making it easier to locate responsibility. In this
respect, another main problem is the failure to comply with the principle
of subsidiarity and proportionality. One should conceive the principle of
subsidiarity as a mechanism to regulate the implementation of the EC's
non-exclusive powers. Interestingly, the principle of loyal cooperation was
not taken into account during the distribution of competences between the
Union and its Member States at the time of the drafting of the EU
Constitutional Treaty. However, the principles of subsidiarity,
proportionality and the attribution principle do appear in the Constitutional
Treaty (Article 1-9).485
C. Coherence/Consistency
There is lack of precision of certain provisions of the EC Treaty: a
minority has requested that the existing system be replaced by a

483. Delimitation of Competence, supra note 143, at 12.
484. Article 5 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality states:
For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsidiarity principle
shall be met: the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by [the EU] Member States' action in the framework of their national
constitutional system, and [these objectives] can therefore be better achieved by
action on the part of the [EC]. The following guidelines should be used in
examining whether [these two conditions are] fulfilled: [1)] the issue under
consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated
by [Member States' actions]; [2)] actions by Member States alone ... [would]
significantly damage Member States' interests; [and 3)] action at the
[supranational] level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects
compared with action at the [national level].
2004 O.J. (C 310) 207. Ofcourse, when speaking of benefits, one wonders: benefits for whom? The
supranational elites? Or the national citizens? And how does one prove this benefit objectively?
485. "The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral." Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. I-1 1(1), Oct. 29, 2004, O.J. (C 310). This means that
Union competences are strictly conferral, they are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty, or they
are established according to a specified procedure. Without this principle, "competences not
conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States." Id. art. 1-11(2).
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"catalogue" of competences.486 A large majority, however, argues for
keeping the evolution of competences flexible and dynamic.487 Also, a
transfer of activities from the national to the supranational level would
increase the coherence/consistency of the EC's position in world trade
negotiations. Another way to explain the lack of coherence is the fact that
the EC's powers do not match citizens' expectations.4 8 "[C]itizens want
the [EC] to play a greater role in certain areas, [but also] find that the [EC]
intervenes too much in other [areas].""489
D. Accountability
Legitimacy (or accountability) and efficiency tend to go hand-in-hand.
Ideally, each government should be able to make its policies in its own
spheres of activity, without referring too much to other governments'
activities. Each government would be accountable to its own electorate,
and each voter would know precisely which government deserves the
credit or blame for a particular output of public policy. However, and
unfortunately, many practical reasons prevent this ideal from being
achieved. Thus, for practical purposes, accountability must sometime be
sacrificed for the sake of other criteria. A high request of accountability
would reduce the margin of maneuver of EC trade negotiators and
complicate their ability to conclude complex international agreements. So,
is there a political and institutional mechanism whereby efficiency and
accountability, two sides of the same coin, are complementary of each
other?
In relation to checking the delimitation of competences, there is a poor
system of ensuring compliance.
At present, political monitoring of compliance with the delimitation
of competence is ...exercised [mainly] by the [EU institutions].
Legislative bodies at the national level [(national parliaments)]
exercise that monitoring ... to a lesser degree. There are currently

486. For an analysis against the creation of a rigid competence catalogue, see Wilfried
Swenden, Is the European Union in Need of a Competence Catalogue?Insightsfrom Comparative
Federalism,42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 371 (2004).
487. European Convention, The Secretariat, Delimitation of Competence Between the
European Union and the Member States-Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,
CONV 47/02, May 15, 2002 (17.05), kin/MM/ac, at 3.
488. Id.at 17.
489. Id.
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two types of checks to ensure compliance with the delimitation of
competence and the subsidiarity principle:
(a) political control: the question . . . rests . . . with the [EU]
Institutions participating in the legislative process. Each
Institution must act in accordance with the powers allocated to
it. [National] governments... , national parliaments and public
opinion also exercise such a control to the extent that they
control the positions adopted by their government
representatives in the Council;
(b) judicial control: by appeal to the [ECJ] or national courts.4 9°
After analyzing the criteria for the evaluation of the distribution of
powers and its compliance, one must ask why we have a delimitation of
competences. In the current system of EU foreign policy, there are several
constitutional problems:4 91
1. Inadequate parliamentary control: The EU has constitutionally weak
governance structures. 492 The EC's integration policy raises problems of
democratic legitimacy to the extent that it is not effectively controlled by
parliaments (for example, in the foreign trade policy area), and focuses
more on the protection of powerful interest groups than on the general
interests and equal rights of EU citizens (for example, consumers and taxpayers).4 93 So the question arises: is it in the interest of the EU citizens to
have a common commercial policy without a parliamentary control?
2. Constitutional limitations of government powers by rule of law,
fundamental rights, separation of powers and democratic participation are
not effectively applied in foreign policy powers. 494 Therefore, the rights of
domestic citizens are less effectively protected against abuses of foreign
policy powers of governments (for instance, EC Treaty art. 133) than visfi-vis their domestic policy powers. 49 5 Certainly, these power-oriented EU
foreign policies can undermine the rule of law within the EU. In this
respect, it is relevant to mention the limited role of the European

490. Id. at 4.
491. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The ForeignPolicy Constitution of the European Union: A
Kantian Perspective, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER 435 (Ulrich Immenga
et al. eds., 1996).
492. Id.
493. Id. at 434.
494. Id. at 435.
495. Id.
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Parliament in the EC's common commercial policy, and hence, the
importance of EU institutional reforms.496
3. The division between private powers of EU citizens and government
powers seems to be more important than the division between national and
EU government powers.
VII. CONCLUSION
To sum up this Article and following the line of thought of
Timmermans and V6lker (1981), mixed agreements are one of the most
distinctive features of the external relations law and practice of the
Communities as well as one of the most difficult.49 7 Three types of
competence are covered by an international agreement: 1) competence
exclusively with the Community; 2) competence shared between the
Community and the Member States; and 3) competence exclusively with
the Member States.498 "Where the Community is alone competent for
matters covered by an agreement, . . . the Community alone should
become party [to that agreement]." '9 However, there are some cases
where the participation of Member States may also be necessary.5 °° In such
cases, it is important to distinguish between the theoretical situation and
how it is in practice. Theoretically speaking, in these cases, Member States
do not participate in the table of negotiations alongside the EC."'
Nevertheless, in practical terms, the agreement itself may require the
Community
participation of Member States in the agreement so that50the
2
effectively.
participate
and
competences
its
exercise
can
In the case where Member States and the Community share
competence, there are several ways to carry out this task. Some of the
obligations in the agreement may have to do with matters for which the

496. It was at the Nice IGC that the then 15 EU Member States established framework
guidelines in order to pursue EU institutional reforms. The European Council of Stockholm in
March 2001 already reaffirmed this objective, and the various modalities were established in
Laeken in December 2001 with the Declaration on the Future of Europe, and the decision to call
for a Convention. See Presidency Conclusions, Stockholm European Council, Mar. 23 & 24,2001.
497. See generally DIVISION OF POWERS, supra note 134; see also MACLEOD ET AL., supra

note 181, at 142; MIXED AGREEMENTS, supranote 6.
498. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 142.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. This is so because Member States have transferred their competences to the
Communities.
502. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 142.
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Community is exclusively competent. °3 Others have to do with issues for
which the Member States are exclusively competent.5 4 Sometimes it is so
that, by virtue of the provisions of the Treaties, the agreement is related to
an area in which the Member States and the Community share competence
to act.50 5 On other occasions, the agreement may deal with issues where the
powers of the Member States and the Community run in parallel, so that
each has a separate and independent interest in participating in [the
agreement]. 0 6 Explained in the words of MacLeod et al.,
[w]here competence for the subject matter of an agreement is
shared between the Community and the Member States, the full
implementation of the obligations in the agreement will usually
require the participation in the agreement of the Communities and
the Member States together, each in respect of their powers and
interests. 0 7
In the view of Rosas,
[p]ure Community agreements may be preferred not only by the
Commission but sometimes also by some or all of the Member
States, mainly in order to speed up the process and avoid
complications of various sorts. There have been situations where
third States, out of similar considerations, have expressed a
preference for a pure Community agreement. 0 8
A practical alternative seems to be the adoption of soft law instruments in
the form of a declaration plan, which may be adopted by the Council and
in some cases also signed by the Council Presidency and/or the
Commission, but without the need of27 national ratifications.5 9 Examples
are the Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean
Conference of November 27-28, 1995 and the New Transatlantic Agenda
signed by President Clinton, Prime Minister Gonzdlez of Spain
(representing the then Spanish Council Presidency), and President Santer

503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 143.

508. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
ExTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 216.

509. Id. at217.
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of the European Commission." l° It is important to note, however, that these
are soft alternatives to treaty-making as a whole, not to the mixed form of
treaty-making.
With regard to treaties, and notably bilateral agreements, one could
try to devise the negotiation directives to be adopted by the Council,
and to conduct the actual negotiations, so as to avoid areas of
national competence. . . . Member States are often unwilling to
authorise the Community alone to conclude bilateral agreements
containing concurrent competences. An example.., would be the
existence of substantive provisions relating to intellectual property
ights ....(as well as clauses on services [and] direct investment).
Such [provisions] ...in a draft bilateral agreement would almost
inevitably lead to... mixity, as at least some Member States seem
to interpret Opinion 1/94 as establishing exclusive national
competence in this field."1 '
On the potential competence of the Community to conclude international
agreements in the field of intellectual property rights, it is pertinent to see
Case C-53/96 Hermes International.'12 The Commission may try to avoid
provisions on questions such as intellectual property rights, services, and
investment or monetary policy in order to avoid assertions of mixity.
Development cooperation agreements and environmental agreements
often belong to the above mentioned category of concurrent competences.
Concurrent competences are spelled out in the EC Treaty,5" 3 but a potential
competence may exist in many other areas such as intellectual property
rights, and investment or services. "It remains to be seen to what extent the
[EU] Council will agree to the Community becoming a party to such
agreements and conventions, without insisting on Member States

510. Rosas, Mixed Union-MixedAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS, supra note

6, at 143 n.80. See also the documents adopted at the EU-US Summit in London on May 18, 1998,
with a view to resolve the so-called Helms-Burton dispute (Understanding with Respect to
Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection, Transatlantic Partnership on Political
Cooperation, Understanding on Conflicting Requirements). See Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der
Borght, The EU-US Compromise on the Helms-Burton andD'Amato Acts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 227
(1999); Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.SomeAspectsfrom the PerspectiveofInternationalEconomicLaw, 1998
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 217.
511. Rosas, The European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 217 (footnotes omitted).
512. Case C-53/96, Hurms Int'l v. FHT Mktg. Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3603.
513. EC Treaty arts. 174, 4 & 181.
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participation. In many instances this will presumably not be the case, and
'
mixity will continue to [exist]."514
The fact that the [Nice IGC] in December 2000 did not want to
broaden Article 133 EC so as to cover all questions of services,
intellectual property rights, and investment is a clear sign of the
unwillingness of Member States to give up mixity even in areas of
commercial policy. Another example is that of a trade and
cooperation agreement negotiated with South Africa that Member
States refused to accept in the spring of 1999 as a pure Community
agreement, even if it was obvious that there was no legal need to
conclude the agreement as a mixed agreement. The agreement was
signed on October 11, 1999. While the Commission preferred a
Community agreement, the great majority of Member States wanted
the agreement to become mixed. 5

514. Commission Proposal to Conclude an Agreement on Trade, Development, and
CooperationBetween the Community and South Africa, COM (1993) 245 final (May 11, 1999).
515. Rafael Leal-Arcas, United We Stand, Divided We fall-The European Community and
Its Member States in the WTO Forum: Towards Greater Cooperation on Issues of Shared
Competence?, 1 EuR. POL. ECON. REV. 65, 72 (2003).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss3/2

102

